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“Making Feminism Matter Again” analyzes new shifts in gender and their social 
representations in feminist theory.  I take as my point of departure the “crisis” of feminism and 
the loss of its explanatory and transformative effectivity in the wake of the cultural turn, which, I 
argue, was a class development in feminism brought on by the economic crisis of profit in 
capitalism in the late 20th century. I question its main assumptions of gender, articulated in texts 
by Derrida, Foucault, Negri, Fraser, Butler, Gibson-Graham, Sandoval, Probyn, Wiegman, Felski 
and others, for the way they culturally rewrite materialist concepts such as “class,” “division of 
labor,” “ideology,” and “history” and represent cultural shifts in gender as “constitutive” of 
material change—and ultimately as progress—for women within capitalism.  
“Making Feminism Matter Again” re-examines the historical significance of cultural 
shifts, including shifts in feminist theory as well as new gendered forms of work (“caring” and 
“service labor”), family, consumption, diet, clothing, sexuality, and love.  In analyzing gender 
now, I demonstrate that culturalism analytically dissolves gender into autonomous differences 
and “ethics,” and uses cultural values to obscure over the crisis of transnational capitalism’s class 
relations and deepening economic exploitation of women. As a result, cultural feminisms are not 
an intervention but an affirmation of the way things are.  
I argue for a historical materialist theory of gender in the tradition of Marx, Engels, 
Lenin, Rosa Luxemburg, Alexandra Kollontai, Eleanor Leacock, and such contemporary critics 
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as Angela Davis, Delia Aguilar, Elizabeth Armstrong, and Teresa Ebert, which shows that 
permutations in gender are not new because the wage-labor/capital relations that exploit women 
have not changed. Instead the changes are an updating of gender to adjust women to changes in 
the division of labor under which surplus-value is extracted.  
In the intersection of labor theory and cultural theory, “Making Feminism Matter Again” 
maps the material relations of gender now.  This map is also a materialist re-mapping of feminist 
theory and the development of a new model for a materialist analytics of gender as a way to 
contribute to restoring the explanatory and transformative effectivity of feminism now. 
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PART I: A WAKE FOR FEMINISM  
 1 
1.0  FEMINISM IN CRISIS 
Along with the end of ideology, the end of history, and the end of socialism, feminism is also 
said to have ended. The “end” projects are, of course, all grounded in a theology and their goal is 
to to put certain practices such as ideology, history or socialism, outside the reach of history. My 
goal here is not to offer a reading of the “end of feminism” as a supersession of the existing 
material relations of economic exploitation and social injustice, and therefore a new opening to 
history (Marx, Critique of the Gotha Program) or a re-writing of the “ends” before this “end” 
(Jean François Lyotard, “Re-writing Modernity”). Rather, I am interested in the specific project 
of the “end of feminism” in the sense of an exhaustion. Feminism is said to have been exhausted 
(“ended”) because, for example, it is believed that the project of women’s freedom is over. It is 
over, the argument goes, because feminism is in “crisis.”  Feminism has lost its way. Many 
women have become successful and have abandoned projects concerned with women’s freedom, 
others hope to become successful and talk about “post-feminism,” and many have simply given 
up and have concluded that there is no feminism, the project is finished. 
The notion that feminism is in “crisis” is, of course, by no means new and has been a 
major theme of feminism itself, particularly in the decades following World War II and the 
material conditions of the West at the end of “the long boom” of capitalism roughly from the end 
of World War II to the oil crisis of 1973. In a sense, feminism has always been in crisis in that 
historically it came to being in the material crisis of the so called “democratic” societies of 
capitalism and their continuing social injustice, economic inequality, and exploitation. What has 
changed is the way the “crisis” has been interpreted and the strategies deployed to deal with it. 
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These interpretations range from a purely culturalist understanding of the crisis theorized as 
“patriarchy” (see Shulamith Firestone’s recently re-released book The Dialectic of Sex); through 
a poststructuralist analysis based on the crisis of sexuality and the body theorized in terms of 
language and its performativity (see Diane Elam’s Feminism and Deconstruction, Elizabeth 
Grosz’s Volatile Bodies, and Judith Butler’s Bodies That Matter); and a “transnational” analysis 
based on the crisis of the “transnational-local civil society” (as in Inderpal Grewal and Caren 
Kaplan’s Scattered Hegemonies); to a historical materialist re-understanding of “crisis” in terms 
of labor theory (see Teresa Ebert’s Ludic Feminism and After, Lindsay German’s Sex, Class and 
Socialism, and Science and Society’s January 2005 special issue on Marxist-Feminist Thought 
Today edited by Martha Gimenez and Lise Vogel). 
By most counts, to be clear, contemporary feminists do not actually openly declare an 
“end” to feminism as do conservative cultural critics (see, for example, Kay Hymowitz’s “The 
End of Herstory” and Phyllis Schlafly’s Feminist Fantasies, 2003). To openly declare an “end” 
to feminism is considered to be an act of closure and a denial of difference. For example, the 
Introduction to Feminist Consequences: Theory for the New Century (an anthology in which 
prominent postmodern feminists such as Judith Butler, Biddy Martin, Rosi Braidotti, Rey Chow, 
Lauren Berlant and others discuss the “end of feminism” and feminisms’ futures), Misha Kavka 
suggests that the question of “end” inevitably: 
returns us to the problem of feminism being a set of practices without a single 
definition, rather than a practice that has overreached its own goal. The problem is 
not that the project has been completed. On the contrary given that feminism lacks 
a single origin as much as a single definition, it can also have no single moment 
of ending. (xi) 
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In other words, to posit an “end” implies a beginning, an origin, and a presence. Contemporary 
feminism—by which I mean primarily the dominant feminist theories of gender, sexuality, and 
difference canonized in poststructuralist, postmodernist, postcolonial, and postmarxist theories—
does not openly use the concept of “end” because “end” (telos), like “origin” (arche), is 
considered to be an absolute and as an absolute it is a “totality.”  Moreover, as a totality “end” is 
premised upon “presence” and as a “presence” it is understood to be based on the repression of 
“absence.”  Much of contemporary feminism is, therefore, careful not to talk overtly about an 
“end” on the grounds that “end” presupposes a closural conception of feminism and women and 
thus denies the ongoing differences of feminisms.  
However, while no one actually dares to utter the word “end” for fear that they may be 
read as too closural, linear, or reductive, the discourses of contemporary feminism are haunted 
by the spectre of the “end.”  Contemporary feminism alludes to and hints at an “end,” without 
openly declaring an end to feminism, by evoking a “crisis” in the “old” mode of feminism and 
the emergence of a “new” mode of feminism. For example, for several decades now, 
contemporary feminists—along with cultural theorists—have hinted at an end by alluding to the 
end of so called modern feminism and evoking a “new” mode of what has most commonly been 
referred to as postmodern feminism. Modern feminism reached its height in what has been called 
the “second wave” of feminism, which came of political and intellectual age in the material 
conditions of the West immediately following World War II, particularly during the “long boom” 
of capitalism a period of unprecedented growth of the capitalist economy—as well as intense 
economic disparity worldwide—which led to the expansion of the welfare state and the culture 
industries in the West including the universities. To varying degrees, feminism at this time 
contested over how to explain “women” as a social collectivity. Some, such as Betty Friedan in 
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her book The Feminine Mystique, saw this collectivity as an existential identity whose 
“universal” interests were met by women obtaining an equal share of upper-middle class life 
enabled by the prosperity of the long boom. Others, such as radical feminist Shulamith Firestone 
(The Dialectic of Sex) and socialist feminist Heidi Hartman (“The Unhappy Marriage of 
Marxism and Feminism”) saw women as a separate “class” from “men” whose material interests 
for economic freedom and social justice could only be satisfied by a revolution in family and 
sexual relations and by women receiving the benefits of social democracy and the welfare state 
(in forms such as payment for domestic labor). Still others such as Angela Davis explained 
“women” as a product of the division of labor in class society and, moreover, argued that women 
could not be freed from economic inequality and social injustice without freedom from class 
relations and, hence, they could not be freed without transformation of the capitalist social 
relations of production (see, for example, The Angela Y. Davis Reader). 
These contestations over women as a social collectivity and how to collectively transform 
material relations as a means of bringing about economic equality and restoring social justice for 
all women have long been thought of in contemporary feminism as having reached a “crisis” and 
collapsed (“ended”) under the weight of their own discursive and cultural contradictions. All 
understandings of “women” as a social collectivity situated in a totality of social relations—
regardless of whether this was understood as an ahistorical existential identity, or an independent 
“class,” or a labor force explainable by wage-labor/capital relations—have been taken to be 
forms of “reductivism” that re-inscribe in women a fixed identity or essence. The “reasons” 
offered by feminists such as Hélène Cixous, Judith Butler, Diane Elam, and Drucilla Cornell for 
the collapse or “end” of these debates is that the very notion of “woman” contained with in it an 
epistemological “crisis” that made it impossible to serve as a ground of collective action and 
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material transformation. To attempt to explain the “difference” of gender by a historical and 
material outside that would situate women as a social collectivity has been considered to be an 
act of discursive violence that “prescribes an exclusive identification for a multiply constituted 
subject … [and] enforce[s] a reduction and a paralysis . . . at the expense of race or sexuality or 
class or geopolitical postioning/displacement” (Butler, Bodies 116). This particularly took the 
form of cleansing Marxism from feminist theory and from explaining the relationship of gender, 
sexuality, and difference to issues of class, labor, the social relations of production, and wage-
labor/capital relations (exploitation). Marxism was considered, in the words of Gayle Rubin, a 
‘dismal exercise’ for feminism (“Thinking Sex” 33). Taken as sure signs of the “old” 
reductivism of “modernist” cultural critique, therefore, is any emphasis on issues of solidarity 
and collectivity in politics, matters of universality and conceptuality in epistemology and 
philosophy, positions regarding any grounding material conditions of production that lie 
“outside” of gender and sexuality and explain them, particularly class, labor, and production, as 
well as concerns of historical and dialectical development, liberation, emancipation, and 
revolution.  
The “new” in this case has been characterized by the irreducible singularities of 
differences such as gender and sexuality. Differences in this mode of feminism are seen as 
cultural and culture itself has most often been primarily understood as the discursive. When class 
is addressed in these discourses, it has been treated primarily as a cultural difference (rather than 
a material relation and structure of conflicts) and, therefore, a matter of “textuality,” a “self-
inventing” discourse that is (semi)autonomous from material conditions of production. In the 
dominant discourses of contemporary feminism, “race matters,” “gender matters,” “sexuality 
matters” and they “matter” as autonomous or “irreducible” singularities. Politics, in these terms, 
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was retheorized as an “ethics of difference”—of the disclosure of established meanings in culture 
and the social representations founded on these meanings. The “end” or “crisis” of “modern 
feminism” and the ushering in of this new “postmodern” era of differences seemingly 
autonomous from questions of grounding material conditions in capitalism was given enormous 
credibility in feminism and cultural theory generally as an emerging transnational capital was 
dismantling the welfare state and trade-unions once useful to capital, moving from Fordist mass-
production to niche-marketing, pulling women and persons of color en masse into the labor 
force, and re-organizing the social division of labor from “domestic” (national) production to 
(trans)national production.  
Today, however, this “end/new” is itself by no means new, it the old “end/new” of “New 
Times,” “post-Fordism” and “postmodernism”—set by a fledgling transnational capitalism which 
sought to break up workers collectivities and solidarity, break up the welfare state once useful for 
production for profit, and de-regulate the nation-state limits on “free trade.”  This old “end/new” 
is now in the midst of being re-articulated into a new “end/new” under the rubric of 
“globalization,” “transnationalism,” or “cosmopolitanism.”  One of the signs that the old “new” 
is now under duress and coming into “crisis” is that the spectre of the “end” has once again been 
raised in feminism and cultural theory generally. In her widely discussed essay “The 
Impossibility of Women’s Studies,” for example, Wendy Brown re-examines the academic 
institutionalization of postmodern feminism and laments: “why, when we looked so closely at 
this project for which we had fought so hard and that was now academically institutionalized, 
could we find no there there?” (80). In Robyn Wiegman’s anthology Women Studies On Its Own, 
which takes Brown’s 1997 essay as its point of departure, feminist theorists such as Wiegman, 
Rachel Lee, Sneja Gunew, Diane Elam, Caren Kaplan and Inderpal Grewal are absorbed with the 
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quandary of how to come to grips with what they characterize as the current “crisis,” “impasse,” 
“malaise,” and “paralysis” not of modern but of postmodern feminism. Moreover, Misha Kavka 
codifies the “crisis” in the following terms: 
the very terms through which we might now seek to define feminism have been 
refined, pluralized, displaced, and/or deconstructed to the point where they hardly 
seem available anymore, certainly not if one claims to be defining feminism on 
behalf of ‘women.’  Which brings us to the paradox of being involved in a 
political practice that can no longer define itself as a practice, let alone define its 
goals. (x) 
Feminism, now in its poststructuralist and post-poststructuralist incarnations, according to the 
assumptions of its own proponents, seems once again to have exhausted itself. It has, so the story 
goes, become paralyzed by its own assumptions and criticisms to the point in which it has come 
into a “crisis” under the weight of its own immanent discursive contradictions; it has imploded 
(ended) and now, it is claimed, it is again time for something “new.”  This is part of the spectre 
of a broader “end” in which “postmodern cultural theory,” as Timothy Brennan suggests, has 
“finally been placed on the defensive” by which he means that it is “forced to explain itself to the 
public sphere” which includes not merely traditional liberal humanists but others on the “left” (At 
Home 96). Many cultural critics are now suggesting that postmodern cultural theory (especially 
poststructuralism), with its logic of “undecidability,” its denial of any historical foundation upon 
which to base effective political praxis, and its fetishizing of the local, contingent, and aleatory, 
has made it virtually impossible for anyone to conclude or decide on any collective plan of 
action, except the plan of remaining undecided and undecidable. Brennan charges that rather 
than offering a progressive politics that challenges existing social configurations, postmodern 
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cultural theory has lent itself to creating a cultural climate of “political abstention” (82) which 
“destroys the very means of possibility of liberatory thinking” (93) by reducing all forms of 
collectivity, organization, and political plans of action to the hegemony of the “state” (84). 
Consequently, contemporary feminists such as Kavka are now suggesting that “feminism has—
perhaps—been through the era of differences, learned its lessons and is now moving on” (xxiii).  
The new “new” in feminism is now being articulated around a “transnational feminism” 
and such issues as how to forge an ethical “unity” through transnational-local values such as 
Chela Sandoval’s notion of “post-modern love,” new forms of “governance” via non-
governmental organizations—an ethical unity across lines of difference. Transnational feminism, 
to be clear, is in many ways reworking and updating “postmodern” feminism in response to what 
is being called its constitutive “crisis.”  For example, in the Introduction to their anthology 
Scattered Hegemonies, transnational feminists Inderpal Grewal and Caren Kaplan argue that the 
postmodernism of Lyotard and others has maintained a localizing ethnocentric focus on Western 
texts and restricted debate to aesthetics and culture at the exclusion of politics (3-5). They argue 
that, in its references to “the circuits of transnational capital,” poststructuralism has lent support 
to “construct[ing] an apolitical collage of locations and people, linked not through their 
historicized social relations but through their mystified experiences as players in a field of global 
travel” (7-8). As a consequence, they argue, it has been “unable to account for contemporary 
global conditions” (1) and produce an effective politics that intervenes in them.  
Yet at the same time while they distance themselves from poststructuralism, they hold on 
to poststructuralist politics. For instance, they reject the notion of emancipation and revolution 
and re-state Foucault’s notion that what can be done under capitalism is “resistance.” In their 
essay “Transnational Feminist Cultural Studies: Beyond the Marxism/Poststructuralism/ 
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Feminism Divides” Grewal and Kaplan further argue, “there is no space outside of [existing] 
power configurations,” and no “binary” position from which to overthrow them, and thus 
feminism must “negotiate” within the existing structures of violence and power (356). This view 
is based on the notion of power that Foucault spelled out in The History of Sexuality, volume 1. 
For Foucault, power is autonomous from any “general system of domination” such as capitalism 
“exerted by one group over another” (92). Power relations have their own “immanent logic” that 
is “not . . . the effect of another instance that ‘explains’ them” (94-95). This is, to be clear, in 
direct contrast to the Marxist understanding that “power” derives from the private ownership and 
control of the means of production—of the material resources of society and the ends and 
interests to which they are put—and is thus, at its basis, the capacity to command over the 
surplus-labor of others. By contrast, Foucault claims, “relations of power are not in 
superstructural positions” to production (94). Instead, power is a “multiplicity of force relations” 
that “comes from everywhere” (93). Moreover, there is no material basis for revolutionary 
struggle “instead, there is a plurality of resistances, each of them a special case” (96). Power 
cannot be overthrown because “there is no binary and all-encompassing opposition between 
rulers and ruled at the root of power relations” (94).  
In the presumed absence of structural connections of class relations, transnational 
feminism articulates the “unity” of various local sites—between the “local” and its global 
context—on the basis of what Derrida called “a link of affinity, suffering and hope” (Spectres of 
Marx 85): affect, values, tastes and consumption. “Transnationalism” is signaled by the fact that 
“one listens to reggae, watches a western, eats McDonald’s food for lunch and local cuisine for 
dinner, wears Paris perfume in Tokyo and ‘retro’ clothes in Hong Kong” (Lyotard, Postmodern 
76). The “transnational-local” relation is understood to be brought about by what Bruce Robbins 
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calls “feeling global,” by which he means ethical responsibility to “others” in the world. This 
“transnational-localism” is the hallmark of a call for a “new global civil society”—what Spivak 
in an interview with David Plotke called “globe girdling”—composed of a combination of 
“nongovernmental” organizations (NGOs) and locally based activist groups that serve as a 
foundation for a new global citizenship. Following this logic, Michael Clough has argued that, 
“our best and perhaps only chance to bring into being a more peaceful, humane and equitable 
world is to give civil society a greater role in governance” (16). Translated into “concrete” terms, 
this means an “ethical consumerism” (Yúdice) and “enlightened donorship” (Spivak) on the part 
of those in the “North” and the development of new consumer publics through redistributions of 
resources in the south. Along these lines, Spivak argues for a “southern global resistance” in 
which she claims that “local initiatives . . . brought on in the name of sustainable development 
are constituting themselves as a transnational network and are the new global front . . . In this 
sense, local initiatives are immediately global” (Spivak and Plotke 6).  
But how “resistant” to capitalism is this transnational-local “resistance”? In the context of 
transnational-localism, “hard-core economic resistance,” as Spivak defines it, involves not an 
abolition of capital but “reallocating the uses of capital” (8). That is, it involves a radical 
democratic “redistributive use of capital” (11). Now that transnational capital has, relatively 
speaking, matured it has reached a new level of class contradictions in which it is currently 
embroiled in an imperialist battle to re-divide the surplus-labor of the globe and export capital to 
maintain profit. “Values” have emerged as the “new” horizon through which the culture of 
capital attempts to suture together in a spiritual unity the isolated workers whose lives have been 
materially fractured by the onslaught of transnational capitalism into all levels of social and 
economic collectivity. The postmodern ethics of difference once used by capital to help re-
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organize its division of labor and break up worker’s solidarity is currently being re-articulated 
today into a “new” “post-difference” hegemony of values to enable transnational capitalism to 
bring together isolated workers as new consumers.  
In the cultural aftermath of “9/11” and the so called “war on terror,” moreover, the 
spectre of the “end” and positing of a “new” has grown even more exaggerated. The plays of the 
sign seem to be coming to a grinding halt as many contemporary feminists are all the more eager 
to dispense with once engrossing meditations on the fate of the signifier in order to embrace a 
“post-difference” spiritual unity in the family, the state, and neo-conservative civic “values” of a 
“new era.”  Judith Butler, who became an academic feminist “star” in the 1980s and 1990s by 
rejecting the state and its norms against freedom of sexuality and desire in such books as Gender 
Trouble and Bodies That Matter, after 9/11 (through a relay in which she formally distances 
herself from the Bush regime) defended the state and its “anti-terrorist” measures (“Guantanamo 
Limbo”). Similarly, Drucilla Cornell who in 1992 argued against Enlightenment concepts as re-
inscribing a “fixed essence” to women in Beyond Accomodation, now has turned to the 
romanticism of Kant’s notion of “ideal humanity” as a way of coping with “terrorism.” While 
(like Butler) she formally distances her argument from the practices of the Bush regime in the 
wake of 9/11 toward all persons whom it considered “un-American,” the core of her argument is 
that “we are part of the ideal of humanity no matter what we do” (“Facing” 173). By this logic, 
too, the terrorizing practices of the Bush Administration and its pre-emptive class aggressions on 
behalf of U.S. capital against workers—and women—all over the world are also dissolved into 
this ideal humanity! In the “roundtable” discussion, “Restoring Feminist Politics to 
Poststructuralist Critique,” between Susan Lurie, Hortense Spillers, Tania Modleski, Ann 
Cvetkovich, and Jane Gallop (and introduced by Carla Kaplan), several of the participants 
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suggest that feminism has now arrived at a “post-poststructuralist” historical moment in which 
the lessons of poststructuralism have been thoroughly assimilated and, echoing the sentiments of 
the ailing Democratic Party, declare that it is time to “update” feminism to focus on moral values 
(Lurie et al, 679; 680; 688).  
At each stage contemporary feminism does not openly declare an “end” to feminism as 
such, but feminists have alluded to an “end” by invoking a “crisis” in the “old” mode of 
feminism under the weight of its immanent contradictions and positing a “new” and “improved” 
mode of feminism. In much of contemporary feminism the so called “crisis,” “end,” or 
“impossibility” of feminism, in fact, has been and continues to be considered the sine qua non of 
feminism itself. For example, the notion that feminism is “in crisis” and has arrived at a moment 
in history in which any terms through which it is possible to define a coherent project of social 
transformation are no longer historically available—that is, that they have been “exhausted” and 
“ended”—is itself taken as a sign by many contemporary feminists that feminism is working. 
“The change marked by ‘post’,” Kavka remarks in her discussion of the crisis of feminism, “thus 
happened while we were doing feminism; the change happened because we were doing 
feminism” (xi). This, however, is itself a “progress” narrative of feminism. Feminism, in this 
story, has been on an autonomous discursive and ethical pilgrimage toward the spiritual 
resolution of material contradictions in capitalism. Through this pilgrimage away from 
modernism and toward postmodernism and now “transnationalism,” feminism (it is assumed) has 
made progress: it has now, so the story goes, transitioned from a movement once solely absorbed 
with valuing the desires and discontents of white, upper-middle class, heterosexual women to 
one that values the differences in desires and discontents of races, classes, sexualities, ethnicities, 
(trans)nationalities and so on. The transitions in the dominant canonical conceptions of feminism 
 13 
from “modern” to “postmodern” and increasingly to “transnational” theories of feminism is 
offered as a story of the “success” feminism has made and continues to make as a movement. 
The historical “evidence” offered by contemporary feminists for the “success” of 
feminism as a result of “the change marked by ‘post’” is that feminism has now achieved an 
unprecedented level of “success” in various cultural and political institutions around the world. 
In her recent Signs article, “The Semiotics of Premature Burial: Feminism in a Postfeminist 
Age,” Mary Hawkesworth reinforces this position by suggesting that feminism after the “post” 
has experienced “unprecedented growth.”  It is now a major feature of government institutions, 
the media, the academy, and non-governmental organizations (961-962). In her book Literature 
After Feminism, Rita Felski suggests contemporary feminism’s success can be measured by the 
fact that “Feminist criticism is a widespread and well-known field of study that […] has had 
more impact on the teaching of literature than any other recent school of criticism. It has 
generated innumerable books, conferences, and articles and has its own phalanx of superstars” 
(5). Now, the institutional “success” of feminism after the “post”—the canonization of “post” 
modes of feminism—is considered to be constitutive of the effectivity of these canonical 
discourses toward bringing about “progress” for women. So much so that as I marked above, 
many contemporary feminists are suggesting that it is now time to move on to a new era of 
feminism; by which they mean feminism free from “old” debates about economic exploitation 
and social injustice. Rita Felski argues that now that feminism is “an established institution, not a 
fragile and delicate seedling,” it is time to “sort through” feminism and determine “what is worth 
keeping and what is not” (5). In a recent interview for Stacy Gillis et al’s Third Wave Feminism 
(2004), Elaine Showalter argues that feminism “cannot pretend anymore that no women have 
power” (“Interview” 61-62). Thus, she concludes, it is time to “let go of feminism” altogether 
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and its “out of date” focus on the “powerlessness” of women which, she claims, has “gotten in 
the way” of making alliances for real change. Similarly, in her anthology Women’s Studies on its 
Own, Robyn Wiegman remarks that feminists today work “within […] positions of power that 
feminism in the academy has made possible” (2).  Moreover, she contends that on the basis of 
working within these positions of power, feminism (particularly in the academy) now can turn 
away from the questions of power and inequality that dominated the discussion of feminism in 
earlier generations and up through the 1980s and 1990s and “think about the field otherwise” (3).  
While contemporary feminists formally distance themselves from narratives of 
“progress” and “end,” they in fact assume various “end(s)” to feminism by virtue of its own 
success (progress) within capitalism. Although they don’t openly declare an end to feminism, 
and therefore keep talk about feminism alive, the dominant understanding of feminism’s 
“crisis”—and the transition from the “old” to the “new”—is grounded on the assumption that 
feminism (or at least earlier generations of feminism) has achieved and accomplished what it set 
out to and that in the contemporary historical situation the “older” goals of social transformation 
for the emancipation of women from social injustice and economic inequality are no longer 
relevant today.  
These perceptions of feminism and its “crisis” are part of a class narrative of feminism 
that puts forward the interpretation of “free” and “freedom” in purely cultural and legal senses. 
For example, since, at least on the social surfaces, (some) women in transnational capitalism are 
seemingly more “free” to express their differences and desires in cultural values—from 
miniskirts to hijab, from subsistence farmers to corporate C.E.O.s, from hip-hop artists to 
Secretary of State, from “soccer moms” to queer urban tribeswomen—women are deemed to 
have material freedom. But “freedom” of expression (whether the expression of desire or the 
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expression of discontent) is an empty freedom because it is a conversion of the material into the 
cultural. It suppresses the material conditions under which specific freedoms become possible. 
While contemporary feminism has received increasing institutional support and “freedom”—as 
have some women—over the last several decades in the university and other social institutions in 
the culture of capitalism, the material conditions of the majority of women’s lives in the 
international division of labor have severely deteriorated. While in the last 30 years capitalism 
has pulled more women than ever before into the paid workforce–and given new cultural 
freedoms to women to accommodate these shifts—the gap between rich and poor has grown 
astronomically and along with it the vast majority of women have sunk deeper and deeper into 
poverty. For instance: “Working outside the home and being economically independent means 
[women] don’t have to answer to any man, but the ‘race to the bottom’ on which the expansion 
of global capital is being built means that, typically, this work entails long hours at low wages 
and makes caring for children very difficult” (Horgan). 
It is its conversion of the material into the cultural—that is, the translation of the 
economic contradictions of capitalism into “new” cultural values—that is really at the heart of 
the crisis of feminism today and is my main object of study: how feminism has been 
appropriated and converted from a struggle for economic equality and freedom from exploitation 
through the transformation of material relations of production in capitalism into a social 
movement for cultural values, whether they are “left” values (open desires, border-crossing, 
performativities of sexualities, hybridities and transnationalities) or “right” values (family values, 
abstinence, motherhood, virginity, patriotism and nationalism). This is also to say that the crisis 
of feminism is the “crisis” of its cultural theory—and of the “Cultural Turn”—and the fact that 
feminism after the Cultural Turn has been increasingly unable to explain the deepening of 
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economic inequality alongside dramatic cultural changes for women in transnational capitalism. 
This dissertation is an investigation into and explanatory critique of the “Cultural Turn” in 
feminism which has converted gender and sexuality into matters of cultural signification, values, 
tastes, affect, aesthetics and confined the material terrain of struggle and freedom for women to 
teasing out local sites of textual and cultural resistance in the culture of transnational capitalism, 
to lifestyle reform, to new transnational-local modes of governance (“state”) within capitalism, 
and to new transnational codes of affect, caring, civility, tastes and consumption.  
 
TWO 
The question remains, how do we understand and explain the crisis of feminism? What is 
the relationship between the “old” and the “new”? What, to put it another way, is the relation of 
gender, sexuality, and feminism to historicity? In facing the prevalence that the “end of 
feminism” (like other “end” projects) has had in the contemporary cultural discussions about 
gender and sexuality, and the question of whether or not feminism continues to be an urgent and 
viable social practice “at all” or is “finished,” we are at the same time confronted with the 
question regarding why this has become a problem to begin with? Why, in short, has it become 
an urgent social and political matter and the focus of extended social and cultural debate? As 
Donald Morton has put it in his essay “Pataphysics of the Closet: Queer Theory as the Art of 
Imaginary Solutions for Unimaginary Problems,” in such situations, 
we face a fundamental philosophical and political question about the status of 
questions: what makes a social question appear on the historical horizon as at one 
stage a question, then at another stage as a significant question, and then at yet 
another stage as an urgent question? Questions simply do not exist in the 
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“timeless,” “a-historical’ realm of “good/bad ideas”; indeed what makes a 
question recognizable as a “good/bad idea” are certain historical and material 
conditions which enable its very appearance. (Morton 7) 
In like manner, I argue that all theoretical problems and questions that are considered to be 
“urgent,” “valuable” or “new” subjects of public discussion and debate, do not make their 
appearance or become the center of heated philosophical, cultural and political debate in society, 
come into “crisis,” or become “passé” because they are trans-historical and trans-social matters 
of the existential human condition. Nor do they do so spontaneously as an effect of a pan-
historical, floating, and self-inventing discourse that collapses under the weight of its own 
immanent textual and cultural contradictions. They are not, to put it another way, endowed with 
an “autonomous” cultural value. Rather, what make particular questions emerge and become the 
subject of political and cultural debate—what makes them “valuable”—are the historical and 
material conditions that enable their production to begin with; namely the class relations in 
which they become possible. 
In his Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, Marx put this 
forward in the following way: humankind “inevitably sets itself only such tasks as it is able to 
solve, since closer examination will always show that the problem itself arises only when the 
material conditions for its solution are already present or at least in the course of formation” (21). 
Whether the issue is “hijab,” “gay marriage,” “weapons of mass destruction,” “the death of 
Derrida,” “terrorism,” “national security” “the ‘crisis’ of theory,” or “the end of feminism” the 
appearance of particular philosophical, social, political, or ethical questions on the cultural and 
discursive agenda of the day—and the urgency or “value” they take on in cultural debate—is a 
product of material developments and transformations in the mode of production and the effect 
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this has on social life. Ideas and values—including our changing values of gender, sexuality, 
what is meant by “feminism,” and whether or not it has a “future”—do not have their own 
autonomous meaning and value.  Instead, they are a product of the material relations of 
production obtaining at the time; class contradictions in production that are “fought out” at the 
level of ideas in public discussion and debate but that can only, ultimately, be materially resolved 
by material transformation (see also Morton 7-15).   
In the canonical understandings of feminism institutionalized by “post” theories, “crisis,” 
the relationship between the “old” and “new” or, to be more precise, the relation of gender, 
sexuality and feminism to historicity, is explained primarily as a re-writing which has not ended 
but is an interminable and indeterminable process (having no origin, presence, or end) of 
repetition and substitution. For several decades, contemporary feminism has invoked what it 
understands to be a constitutive “crisis” of the category “woman” and, as a consequence, 
declaring what Judith Butler (following Ernesto Laclau’s article “Beyond Emancipation”) has 
called the “unrealizability of emancipation” (“Poststructuralism and Postmarxism” 8) as a way to 
explain the various “phases” or “waves” of feminism and moreover, the relation of gender, 
sexuality, and feminism to historicity. Feminism as a historical and collective project of social 
transformation to emancipate women from economic inequality and social injustice in capitalism 
has “ended,” so this argument goes, because it is constitutively impossible.  Such a project of 
social transformation is constitutively impossible, it is assumed, on the grounds that the subject 
of feminism—women—is always already in conceptual and epistemological crisis.   
In the classic poststructuralist feminist interview of Jacques Derrida by Christie 
MacDonald, “Choreographies,” Derrida advanced the notion of a constitutive impossibility of 
feminism as a coherent theory or political project of emancipation of women from conditions of 
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oppression and exploitation on the grounds that “woman” and her “history” are textualities that 
are in a state of permanent conceptual crisis:  
Perhaps woman does not have a history, not so much because of any notion of the 
“Eternal Feminine” but because all alone she can resist and step back from a 
certain history (precisely in order to dance) in which revolution, or at least the 
“concept” of revolution, is generally inscribed. That history is one of continuous 
progress, despite the revolutionary break—oriented in the case of the women’s 
movement towards the reappropriation of woman’s own essence, her own specific 
difference, oriented in short towards a notion of woman’s truth. Your “maverick 
feminist” showed herself ready to break with the most authorized, the most 
dogmatic form of consensus, one that claims (and this is the most serious aspect 
of it) to speak out in the name of revolution and history. Perhaps she was thinking 
of a completely other history: a history of paradoxical laws and non-dialectical 
discontinuities, a history of absolutely heterogeneous pockets, irreducible 
particularities, of unheard of and incalculable sexual differences; a history of 
women who have—centuries ago—“gone further” by stepping back with their 
lone dance, or who are today inventing sexual idioms at a distance from the main 
forum of feminist activity with a kind of reserve that does not necessarily prevent 
them, from subscribing to the movement and even, occasionally, from becoming a 
militant for it. (167) 
“Woman” is, according to this classic poststructuralist narrative, first and foremost a literary 
category—an indeterminable and undecidable text that cannot be explained on the basis of 
conditions of material necessity. That is, according to poststructuralism, “woman” cannot be 
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explained on the basis of any determinate historical and material conditions that produce gender 
and sexuality without re-inscribing an illusory notion of female “existence” (the “Eternal 
Feminine”). To situate women in terms of a definite material history of social relations, and 
locate women in a structure of material conflicts—for example, to locate “woman” as an 
historical subject of class relations—is understood to project an a priori and fixed identity of 
woman, a pre-conceived notion of woman’s place in social relations and an idealist notion of 
historical progress. Such concepts of “woman,” “history,” “material conditions,” “revolution,” 
“emancipation,” were all considered by Derrida to be a form of metaphysics on the grounds that 
all conceptualization—all explanation—is a fantasy of reason because explanatory concepts 
presuppose that one can go beyond language and explain its outside. It presupposes a “referent” 
or “outside” to language that, according to the speculative philosophy of poststructuralism, is 
itself produced by the textualities of the inside of language. The “concept of the concept,” 
Derrida continues, “along with the entire system that attends it, belongs to a prescriptive order” 
(175). Thus, for example, to explain gender and sexuality in terms of an underlying history of 
material relations that produce gender and sexual difference is not only to posit an illusory 
“origin” it is also to re-inforce a “law of the proper place” for woman (168). In other words, it 
unleashes a form of discursive violence against women by re-inscribing a closural understanding 
of sexual difference and in doing so it confines women to a prescriptive order of sexual 
difference (167, 174-175). Unable to transcend language and provide any reliable knowledge of 
an outside, feminism constitutively—by necessity—ends before it begins by the play of the sign. 
That is, feminism as an historical project of social transformation to bring about economic 
equality and social justice becomes “impossible” owing to the constitutive “crisis” of “woman.”  
“End” is not actually eliminated rather, it is translated into a process of indeterminable repetition 
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and substitution: the notion that there is no historical and material outside to feminisms, there are 
feminisms, that there have always been feminisms, and that there will always be feminisms. 
Feminism, in other words, is not historical—it is not a historical project of social change that 
intervenes in and transforms historical, and therefore, changeable material relations—rather it is 
an interminable and undecidable mode of talking, writing, and knowing.  
But what is the notion of “constitutive crisis” embedded in the theory of history as an 
interminable and undecidable process of repetition and substitution, except itself a theory of 
necessity/non-necessity? Indeed, “Choreographies” is riddled with re-inscribing—as “other,” 
“unnecessary,” “inappropriate,” and “outside” to feminism—questions about historical material 
relations outside of literary configurations of “women.”  For example, in his elaboration of 
poststructuralist feminist reading through the trope “hymen,” Derrida suggests: 
One could say quite accurately that the hymen does not exist. Anything 
constituting the value of existence is foreign to the ‘hymen.’  And if there were 
hymen—I am not saying if the hymen existed—property value would be no more 
appropriate to it for reasons that I have stressed in the texts to which I refer. (181-
182) 
In the course of deconstructing a historical material “outside” or “referent” to the “literary” (the 
textualities of the inside) and specifically “woman” as a literary category, Derrida presupposes 
all sorts of binaries between accurate/inaccurate, existence/not-existence, constitutive/non-
constitutive, foreign/native, property value/hymen-al value, appropriate/inappropriate—all of 
which reproduce a binary “inside/outside” and a foundation or notion of “causality” (i.e., “for 
reasons that I have stressed in the texts to which I refer”), but an “inside” and “foundation” now 
cleansed of their relationship to historical and material relations for women in transnational 
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capitalism. Namely in the process of deconstructing an “outside,” that is, “anything constituting 
the value of existence,” and naming the textualities of the inside “hymen,” Derrida excludes as 
“inappropriate” and “foreign” to “hymen” (and really, in this sense, also as OTHER to feminism 
which is reduced in poststructuralism to a mode of reading and writing called hymen) all sorts of 
questions about how the “textualities of the inside” become the inside. On what grounds (and 
Derrida does assume a “ground” and “cause” since he refers to reasons), can anything or any 
question (such as the question of “property value”) be said to be inappropriate (which assumes a 
notion of appropriate and the proper!) or foreign (which constructs an other to what is inclusive 
of value) to ‘hymen’—without also turning hymen (which is one of many terms that Derrida uses 
to advance a historically specific mode of speculative idealist reading in the West called 
poststructuralism) into an unquestioned, transhistorical value and fixed identity—if indeed one 
cannot explain an outside to the assumed value? In short, poststructuralism assumes a value to 
the textual maneuvers and mode of reading Derrida calls hymen over, for example, a mode of 
reading that assigns a property value to hymen. It excludes from historical explanation and marks 
as “outside” and other to what is “appropriate” any question of where its own mode of reading 
(and what is understood as an “appropriate,” “native,” “inside” reading) gets its “value.”  In 
doing so it assumes a fixed identity and self-evident value to a particular brand of speculative 
philosophy in the post-War years in the West.  Moreover, what poststructuralism does is bypass 
the question of how “value” becomes “value”—the historical material “outside” that produces 
values as “valuable”—and simply displaces one mode of valuing (e.g., property value) with 
another (e.g., literary value) and treats the latter as a self-producing and, therefore, self-evident 
value. 
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How does “value” become “value”? How, for example, do we explain what is valued as 
“valuable” without turning it into a fixed identity which tautologically or self-evidently presumes 
that value has to be recognized as valuable—that it is a self-evident “value”—unless we explain 
it from its historical and material outside? What, for example, determines the “value” of 
disbursing the National Guard with “shoot to kill” orders into hurricane ravished New Orleans to 
protect private property from so called “looters”—those who managed to survive Katrina with 
only their lives and, by necessity, had to collect food and other necessities to sustain human life 
wherever they could find it? Or for that matter why did Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice 
consider it “valuable” to go shopping for a pair of shoes in the thousands of dollars at the 
Ferragamo in Manhattan as thousands of New Orleans’ predominantly African-American poor, 
now starving, homeless, and destitute, languished locked in the Superdome—and so “valuable,” 
in fact, that it also became “valuable” for her to have security physically remove from the store a 
woman who challenged Rice’s notion of “value” by questioning why Rice would “shop for shoes 
while thousands are dying and homeless” (“Breaking: Condi Rice”). These terms and 
conceptions of value get their values from the private property relations of capital and therefore 
from historical and material relations outside of the immanent play of signification. Hurricane 
Katrina—not as an “act of god,” a “natural disaster,” or even a social disaster (an “event”) but as 
an articulation of the social relations of capital—is part of the historical and material outside that 
explodes the inside of racial segregation, poverty and sickness and throws into sharp relief their 
relation to production for profit and the protection of private property over material need in 
transnational capitalism through global militarism.  This class relation is hidden by the inside of 
New Orleans “culture” (of Jazz, Mardi Gras, Bourbon Street, etc.) and now by the “inside” of the 
culture of “humanitarian relief” (of FEMA, Walmart, Amazon.com, Clinton-Bush Sr. etc.). It is 
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part of the outside that unmasks the inside at all levels and begins to reveal the class interests of 
feminist and other cultural theories that have canonized the poststructuralist notion that 
“differences” such as “gender,” “sexuality,” and “race” are discursive categories or errant tropes 
with no outside (and in doing so have marked out all questions of the “outside” as 
“inappropriate”). The direction that our concepts (e.g., of “value,” “race,” “inside,” “outside,” 
“women,” “race,” etc.) take (whether, for example, they are used to “shoot to kill” or feed 
people) is not determined by the immanent textualities of knowledge and is not a “self-evident” 
value rather, as Marx argued, it is set by the material relations and level of class struggle in 
transnational capitalism.  
The canonical or “post-” understandings of gender and sexuality in contemporary 
feminism, such as poststructuralism, have instituted a culturalist analytic of gender, sexuality, 
difference—and of feminism and its “crisis”—that cleanses from feminism knowledges of the 
historical and material relations that produce gender and sexuality from its “outside” in 
transnational capitalism. This does not, as I have marked, get outside of fixed identity. The 
opposition of poststructuralism to conceptual explanation of a material outside—to theory as 
explanatory critique of an objective world not its own immanent textualities—has been an 
opposition to explaining the historical and material relations that produce “woman” as “woman” 
and “women” as “women.”   
Presenting feminism as having no origin and no end puts feminism, and the material 
conditions through which women are oppressed and exploited, outside of the reach of history—
outside of the historical and material conditions that produce them and through which they are 
transformed—and turns feminism into a theology. If feminism is “originless” or “endless” it is 
“always already” which is another way of saying that gender and the exploitation and oppression 
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of women—to which feminism is an historical response—are also “always already.”  This 
represents the conditions that oppress and exploit women as outside the reach of historical and 
material transformation—as existential conditions of life as such. It cleanses feminism of its 
relationship to the material contradictions of capitalism and to class struggle. In the notion of the 
“crisis” of feminism as a process of discursive repetition and substitution, the social and 
economic inequalities which are an effect of class contradictions that are integral to bourgeois 
social relations of production (the property and class relations of capitalism) are presented as the 
“normal” condition of life as such. To think that crisis will end (after capitalism) is therefore, 
from this perspective not just utopian but rather naive. In the cultural aftermath of 
“postmodernism,” the canonical feminisms normalize and de-historicize the conditions of life for 
women under capitalism and its exploitative division of labor as life as such and then obscure the 
historical character of crisis (contradiction in production) by the un-said of an existential move. 
It is important to note here that the canonical modes of feminism and cultural studies 
institutionalized in “post” theories, deny that they make such a move since they are formally a 
rejection of the existential and existentialism, but they do so by putting forward the notion that 
all contradictions are ultimately the result of an interminable, endless, epistemological crisis. The 
implication is that that life IS crisis and since life is an on-going process, then crisis is itself 
an on-going process not end-able by revolution (which will put an end—by change of social 
practices—to the crisis). By insisting on crisis as process, life as such is equated with social life 
under the class system (wage-labor). 
These assumptions institutionalized in much of feminism today are a contemporary 
version of what Eleanor Burke Leacock called “myths of male dominance.”  The “myth of male 
dominance,” Leacock explains, is founded on “the dominant view […] that women have always 
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been to some degree oppressed—the usual term is “dominated”—by men” (17). Contemporary 
feminism seems to have dealt with this view not by challenging its basic assumption that the 
historical conditions and material relations of oppression and exploitation of women (that 
develop as a result of private property relations) are “always already” a basic condition of life as 
such.  Rather, it has done so by pluralizing within this framework the range of dominations and 
social inequalities that are “always already” in play. In feminism today, following the inculcation 
of women en masse into the paid labor force in the post-World War II years and, in the cultural 
imaginary, the dismantling of identity in the wake of poststructuralism, it is not necessarily 
assumed that women are the subjects only or even mainly of male domination. However, what 
continues to be assumed as a matter of commonsense is, as transnational feminists Caren Kaplan 
and Inderpal Grewal claim, that “there is no such thing as a feminism free of asymmetrical 
power relations” (“Transnational Practices” 73)—by which they mean that there is no historical 
possibility of social relations free from inequality for women and between women. While the 
“causes” of economic and political inequality in the class relations of capitalism have been 
“deconstructed” in this view, the existence of it is presupposed to be a permanent feature of life. 
As Leacock explains, such assertions “casually relegate to the wastebasket of history […] 
questions about women’s status,” by which she means questions about the material relations of 
production and the historical conditions under which production takes place, that reproduce 
“gender,” “sexuality,” “race” and the position of women in society.  
 
THREE 
In recent years the questions of “materialism,” “history” and a historical material 
“outside” to discourse have returned to feminism with renewed urgency. Contemporary 
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feminism is having to confront the fact that the reduction of “woman” to a literary category—and 
the notion of the terrain of feminism as a terrain of interpretation and the teasing out of textual 
“resistance”—in the canonical understandings of gender and sexuality has coincided with the 
historical and material deterioration of women’s conditions of life in transnational capitalism. 
Feminism has to confront the fact that, in capitalism now, its dominant understandings of gender 
and sexuality have become so redefined and emptied of any explanatory content and relation to 
the historical development of material contradictions and a coherent project of social 
transformation to bring about social justice and economic equality for women that feminism is 
now easily used in the service of transnational capitalism and U.S. imperialism. The wars in 
Central Asia and the Middle East (which are a thinly disguised armed mugging of the surplus-
labor of the “other”), the sexual torture by female soldiers of male inmates at Abu Ghraib prison, 
the iconization of “Bushwomen” such as Condoleezza Rice and Karen Hughes, and the 
“remaking” of transnational capitalists such as Martha Stewart—all of which have been defended 
by transnational capital in the name of “feminism” and “freedom for women”—are impossible to 
exclude from a feminism cleansed of the relationship of gender and sexuality to class, labor, 
production and exploitation in transnational capitalism. On what grounds can they be excluded if 
feminism is not only to be so undecidable as to be rendered open to all interpretations but also if 
feminism is to be reduced merely to a matter of (re)interpretation?  
In an interview for Signs (Summer 2004), Nancy Fraser, like many feminists today, 
distances herself from what she calls the “standard,” “ahistorical” and “self-congratulatory” 
narrative of progress in feminism in which feminism, through a series of progressive waves, has 
shifted from a movement dominated by “white middle class heterosexual women” and 
increasingly become an “inclusive movement that better allows for the concerns of lesbians, 
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women of color, and/or poor and working-class women” (1109). This story, she points out, is 
“pre-occupied exclusively with developments inside the movement [and] fails to situate interior 
changes in relation to broader historical developments and the external climate” (1109). Instead 
of the “standard” interpretation of progress in feminism, Fraser’s analysis of the phases of 
feminist history suggest that they should be explained in terms of what she calls the “life cycle of 
social movements” in which the various so called “waves” of feminism go through an inevitable 
process of radicalization, normalization, then crisis. For example, in reference to “second wave” 
or “modern” feminism and the prevalence of social movements which argued for women as part 
of a social collectivity and the notion that it is possible to fundamentally transform existing 
material relations, Fraser argues that: 
Such moments, of course, do not and cannot last. The heady spirit of the early 
second wave was followed by a period of normalization in which feminism 
eventually became more or less integrated into the existing political structures of 
the various countries in which it was situated. (1107) 
Indeed, as I discuss in greater depth in Chapter 2, much of second wave feminism—despite the 
prevalence of revolutionary rhetoric compared to the feminism of today—limited itself to and 
became part of the existing structures of capitalism at the time. However, what is of interest for 
the moment is the way in which Fraser explains why this happened. According to Fraser, what 
accounts for the institutionalization and normalization of respective “waves” of feminism is that 
such a process is an inevitable part of the ebb and flow—the “life cycle”—of radical social 
movements. Feminism in the post-WWII years, she contends, has gone through a series of 
“phases”—from modernism, to postmodernism, to “post-nationalism” or “globalization”—each 
of which has started out as a “radical resistance” to the limits of the last phase but, by an 
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interminable and indeterminable process of substitution and repetition which she calls the “life 
cycle of social movements,” each ends up normalized in the structures of capitalism, brought to 
“crisis” (exhausted) for its failures to continue to advance freedom for women, substituted with a 
“new” version of feminism for “new” conditions, and then the inevitable “life cycle of social 
movements” repeats. 
This notion of history does not break with the canonical understanding of gender, 
sexuality, and their crisis rather, it is a cultural updating of them that de-historicizes feminism in 
the name of materialist analysis of history. For example, the fact that the “New Social 
Movements” worked on disarticulating gender and other social differences from class and the 
welfare state at the very same time that a fledgling transnational capital was dismantling the 
welfare state, deregulating the nation-state, breaking up unions, and incorporating women and 
persons of color into the workforce en masse as cheap labor in order to stave off a period of deep 
stagnation and decline in its rate of profit is treated in mythical and theological terms. In Fraser’s 
“story” of “phases” of feminist history, the explanation that is offered for why specific phases of 
feminism were brought to crisis and lost their political effectivity for social transformation—why 
the old became the new—is a mystical one of “bad timing” (1112), of “tragic historical irony” 
(1111), of the “miraculous resurrection” of neo-liberalism in the face of radical social 
movements (1110), of the “decline” of “utopian energies” (1109), and of history mysteriously 
bypassing projects that were once valued as “radical” social movements making these values no 
longer “make sense” (1110). In place of materialist analysis of history, Fraser offers a truncated 
genealogy of feminism in which there is no historical and material relation between the “old” 
and the “new.”   
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In this story, “crisis” again becomes “crisis-as-usual” in which the social contradictions 
of capitalism—and what capitalism does to adjust itself to new conditions of production and 
maintain profit—become the normal working of feminism. The “cure” for the “crisis-as-usual” is 
the usual cure to install a “new.”  In the face of “crisis,” it is taken for granted as “given” that for 
feminism to matter again its task is to update itself to produce a “new” feminism—a new set of 
cultural values of gender and sexuality—for the “new” times. The task of feminism as each so 
called “wave” begins to unfold, and prior to being brought to crisis, is according to Fraser to 
produce a “Zietdiagnose” (a diagnosis of the times)—a diagnosis of the cultural politics and 
values that prevail at a particular historical juncture—and on the basis of this Zietdiagnose to 
update its gender and sexual politics accordingly. For instance, according to Fraser, during the 
time in which social democracy and the welfare state were prevalent, it “made sense to try to 
marry a feminist perspective with the New Left critique of the welfare state” in order to “extend 
its egalitarian ethos from class to gender to beyond” (1110, 1111). When “social democracy 
[was] on the defensive” owing to a “miraculous” return of “neo-liberalism” from the historical 
dustbin, and feminists were “unable to make headway against the injustices of political 
economy” it then “made sense” for feminists to give up on questions of political economy and 
shift focus onto issues of “recognition” and “cultural value” of “difference.”  Now that we are 
moving into a new era of “globalization,” so the story goes, it “makes sense” once again to 
“update” feminism to the global values and concerns of “the times” by turning to questions of 
new forms of “state” in “non-governmental organizations” and transnational “civil society.”   
This breaking from the “old” and positing of a “new” without examination of their 
relationship to the material relations of production is part of the social contradictions of capital 
which—just as it seeks to repackage commodities which can no longer be sold on the market—
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also works to update and repackage its culture to reproduce the conditions necessary to maintain 
social relations of production based on profit. The culture of capital constantly remarkets, 
repackages, and “renews” itself and, in so doing, represents its culture as “new” and beyond the 
reach of the history of class relations (exploitation).  At the same time, capital is also updating 
and “renewing” its cultural practices in order to more effectively adjust the workforce to new 
strategies used to exploit surplus-labor.  What the “re-newing” of capitalist culture—the 
remaking of its “commonsense”—conceals over is that the “new times” in capitalism have 
always been undergirded by the same old social division of labor between wage-labor and 
capital—that is, private property relations between those who own the means of production and 
command over (exploit) the surplus-labor of others who only own their labor to sell in order to 
survive. What has changed is the level of historical development of laboring practices, the modes 
in which exploitation takes place, the cultural forms deployed in order to update workers for 
exploitation in capitalism now. But, as I demonstrate throughout the dissertation in an 
examination of “new” modes of gender and sexuality—from clothing, to diet and health, to new 
gendered caring and service labor forces—the basic division between exploiter and exploited has 
not been transformed and “new” relations and modes of gender and sexuality in transnational 
capitalism bear the marks of this exploitation and their relation to private property relations. 
The notion of “crisis” as a mechanical and interminable process of cultural substitution 
and repetition is one of the ways in which the structure of intelligibility in contemporary 
feminism instituted by the canonical—that is, “post”—conceptions of gender and sexuality have 
bypassed the questions of class, labor, production, capitalism, and exploitation. Fraser’s 
culturalist analytics of history marginalizes the fact that for example, the focus on an “ethics of 
difference” and disarticulating gender and sexuality from class and private ownership of the 
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means of production, “made sense” when a fledgling transnational capital was in need—in order 
to maintain profit—of the dismantling of the welfare state, the breaking up of workers solidarity, 
and new modes of gender and sexuality to update women as collective producers for capital. This 
was a time in which, at the end of the long boom, capital fell into stagnation and decline and 
needed to pull women and more workers of color as cheap producers of suplus-labor into the 
wage-work force and re-arrange the social division of labor and, therefore, transform gender, 
sexuality, and race practices to accommodate its emerging methods of producing for profit. The 
old division of labor useful for production for profit which produced the language of “woman” 
was in the process of being superceded by new divisions of labor useful for production for profit 
that required a plurality of differences and a new language of “woma/en” (i.e., gender with a 
differance—the ethics of difference and the irreducibility of singularity of the letter “a”). These 
means of disarticulating the difference of gender from class “made sense” for capital at the time 
and, as a result, they also “made sense” for some class-fractions of women that capital was 
willing to invest in at the time, so that it could (re)secure the material conditions necessary for 
production for profit.  
The relation between “woman” and “wome/an,” between the old and the new, and the 
relation of gender, sexuality, and feminism to historicity, is the relation of labor. Capitalism as a 
social relation based on turning the labor power of the “other” into profit—that is exploitation—
has not been transformed, what has changed are the modes through which exploitation takes 
place and the cultural practices required to update the “other” for new modes of exploitation. 
“Women” is one of these practices. To put this another way gender is not a literary category or 
an irreducible cultural difference, it is a social relation of capital. Gender, sexuality and other 
social differences have become spaces of historical agency and sites of social struggle not owing 
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to an irreducible difference or inviolable singularity but owing to the division of labor and 
property relations.  
As I have marked in the beginning of this chapter, these practices are also part of a 
broader tendency in contemporary feminism not particular to Fraser. What Fraser’s argument 
does is indicate the degree to which the dominant historical tendency of feminism to adjust itself 
to the new cultural values that are valuable to capital is institutionalized and normalized as the 
limits of the possible in the discourses and practices of contemporary feminism. The cultural 
updating of feminism by means of a process of substitution and repetition is a mode of class 
cleansing of feminism—a ferreting out of feminism its historical and material relationship to 
class, labor, production, exploitation and class struggle. It is, to put it another way, a means for 
identifying the class contradictions endemic to capitalism—and the cultural values it produces to 
maintain production for profit—as the material interest of women for freedom from exploitation. 
It is this class cleansing of gender and sexuality that enables (at the level of culture and ideas) 
the onslaught of transnational capital and private property relations against social justice and 
economic equality to be “unwritten” in gender and sexuality today as it is in the discourses of the 
Bush Administration and its war to transfer wealth from the Middle East and Central Asia into 
the hands of U.S. capital. 
 
FOUR: 
In her book Myths of Male Dominance, Eleanor Burke Leacock critiques the way in 
which the historical and material “outside” to gender relations get obscured in culturalist theories 
and as a result the way in which transformable relations of production get taken for granted as 
transhistorical and mechanical life processes. For example, in her critique of the “monolithic 
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structuralism” of Lévi-Strauss’s cultural anthropology, she argues that “the problem arises from 
his universalization of an historically specific set of relationships” by, for example, “assuming as 
given male exchange of women, and masculine control of women’s economic and sexual 
activities” (215). “By taking the exchange of women for granted,” she continues “Lévi-Strauss 
rules out the necessity of explaining the sexual division of labor itself and of analyzing changes 
in its form and function” (215). The “sexual division of labor,” she explains, is itself an effect not 
of a “fixed” set of conditions:  “To postulate the relations of men to women as universally 
relations of people to commodities mystifies the processes whereby marriage took on the 
character of a commodity relations, and women became ‘objects in men’s transactions” (216). 
The task of feminist theory for Leacock, is to explain the material causes of “women’s status” 
and the materialist conception of history advanced in Marxism is integral to doing so, she argues, 
because Marxism examines the “historically specific” as “evolved sets of relationships among 
people as they work under different constraints to maintain and reproduce themselves” (214). 
Leacock argues that: 
Marxist oppositions are never static, reflecting each other at different levels; they 
are active interrelations, processes that subsume other relations. Rather than 
endlessly involuting and inverting, Marxist oppositions lead to change, they move 
to qualitative transformations that involve changed relationships among different 
levels of social reality as well as changed relations within them. And Marxist 
dialectics are used to describe processes as they unfold in the context of specific 
historical circumstances, seen not in the Lévi-Strauss sense of ethnographic 
context, but in the fully structural sense of production relations. (213) 
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The historical materialist conception of history in other words understands the “outside” as a 
structure of material conflicts within which people act not according to an independent will, but 
on the basis of their material relations of production.  Yet, at the same time, these relations 
themselves are not “fixed” rather, they are materially produced by people as they work—as they 
labor—under different material constraints and are transformable.  
 Marxist theorizations of an historical and material outside to “women” such as Leacock’s 
argument that the outside is a set of relations of production, however, have been buried and all 
but completely forgotten in the cultural intelligibilities of contemporary feminism. “Marxism,” 
after all is taken to be one of many discourses, values, or modes of interpretation. To use Marxist 
analysis to understand different “locals” has, for example, been read widely in canonical 
feminisms as a Eurocentric narrative of history and an instance of “cultural imperialism.”  This is 
the case, for example, in Chandra Mohanty’s now classic postcolonial feminist essay, “Under 
Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourses.”  For Mohanty differences are 
explainable only on the basis of local conditions and thus to explain them on the basis of a 
structure of relations of production is to construct them as a “preconstituted” transhistorical fact 
(203). By addressing the local in a “case-by-case” way as having its own materiality autonomous 
from a broader social series, Mohanty claims to locate the production of “gender” in “material 
histories” rather than in either idealist, metaphysical, or “discursive histories,” which she locates 
as part of Eurocentrism. Yet, Mohanty’s own mode of explaining the “local” differences is a 
discursive one.  In fact, from the outset of her essay she abandons understanding “colonialism” 
and “imperialism” as material structures of social contradictions over the exploitation of people’s 
labor for understanding them as “predominantly discursive” and, in doing so, “focusing on a 
certain mode of appropriation and codification of ‘scholarship’ and ‘knowledge’ about women in 
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the third world by particular analytic categories” (196). In other words, from the outset the 
primary concern of this “materialist” text is the question of cultural “values” and “coding.”  To 
be clear, it is not Mohanty’s concern with values coding, as such, that is the root of her own 
discursivism rather, it is that cultural values and coding are understood as the fundamental basis 
of the material reality of women’s lives: they are the materiality that makes the “local” local. 
Mohanty locates the “crucial forgotten point” for a materialist analysis of “women” in Michelle 
Rosaldo’s argument that “‘woman’s place in life is not in any direct sense a product of what she 
does (or even less, a function of what, biologically, she is) but the meaning her activities acquire 
through concrete social interactions’” (qtd. in Mohanty 203; emphasis added). In other words, it 
is not material relations but the production of meaning that is of central importance: gender itself 
is a product of “value” coding. For example, Mohanty argues that the fact “that women mother in 
a variety of societies is not as significant as the value attached to mothering in these societies. 
The distinction between the act of mothering and the status attached to it is a very important 
one—one that needs to be stated and analyzed contextually” (203). But what Mohanty “forgets” 
in her separation of “act” and the “cultural value” attributed to practical activity is that the act of 
“mothering” itself is historically produced through a social division of labor—material relations 
of production. The act of “mothering” itself is not a natural given that gets its differences through 
local values. It is not primarily a discursive activity—a matter of signification and meaning. 
“Mothering” is an economic activity that does not simply have a local “cultural value” but a 
global economic value in the material relations of production in transnational capitalism. 
“Mothering” in class based societies is one of the means by which the ruling class can make a 
greater profit off of workers—by pawning off onto individuals the cost of reproducing the next 
generation of labor-power. “Mothering” to put this another way is not autonomous from the 
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structure of the “family” in capitalism. Moreover, the “family” as an economic unit in which the 
vast majority of people in the world are economically compelled to survive, is itself an historical 
and material relation dependent on the social division of labor and property relations in 
capitalism. In taking these practical relations behind “mothering” as ahistorical “givens,” 
Mohanty reifies the historically produced labor and property divisions in class society in which 
women are inculcated, and out of which they are produced as women. Furthermore, in divorcing 
meaning production from practical activity and labor divisions Mohanty reproduces a self-
generating notion of “cultural difference” (in this case “gender”) as she cannot explain why, 
historically and materially, seemingly “local” and “isolated” phenomena such as sexism, racism, 
heterosexism and class exploitation persist all over the world. In doing so, the material processes 
of production in class society and their relation to the reproduction of economic inequality and 
social injustice on a global level in transnational capitalism are themselves left unexamined as 
untransformable givens—which has itself become part of a Eurocentric narrative of capitalism as 
the “end of history”1 and the understanding that its injustices as a consequence of an inevitable 
“clash of civilizations.”2 
Part of what is necessary is to begin to “de-localize” history. Rather than fetishizing the 
local (difference) as “autonomous” and abstracting it from the material processes of exploitation 
in transnational capitalism it is necessary to begin to unpack its relation to these processes. 
Leacock understood this in her Marxist historical analysis of women cross-culturally. 
“Consider,” she remarks, “how the history of capitalist development has been written as if 
wholly white, deriving almost totally from internal European processes. Relations with Africa, 
                                                 
1 For the “end of history” thesis, see Francis Fukuyama’s The End of History and the Last Man. 
2 For the “clash of civilizations” thesis, see Samuel P. Huntington’s The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of 
World Order. 
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Asia, and the New World are seen as . . . unimportant until quite late when they set off Europe’s 
final explosion” (15). In much historical analysis it is “agreed that English capital which made 
industrialization possible” was itself “derived in major part from the triangular trade in slaves, 
rum, and sugar (produced in what were models for European factories, the sugar mills of the 
Caribbean plantations” and then “the significance of this fact is forgotten” (15). One dimension 
of the “significance” of this is that the cultural values that have their history in cultural contexts 
outside of North Atlantic capital are no more autonomous from the material conditions of 
exploitation in class relations and do not serve as a autonomous local resistance to these relations 
when the material conditions upon which they are produced are part of the history of class 
relations.  
In the discourses of contemporary feminism, as I have implied, the material processes of 
capitalism, specifically the economic crisis of capitalism, the position of women in this crisis, 
and the relation of differences such as gender, sexuality, race, ethnicity, transnationality to this 
crisis are converted into a cultural “crisis” of local values—a “clash of civilizations”—abstracted 
from the material processes of global capitalism. Moreover, this cultural crisis is taken to be the 
material terrain of freedom and struggle for women. It will be helpful here in order to further 
unpack this matter and demonstrate the historical and material urgency for women of bringing 
back concepts of class, labor, production, and exploitation into feminist theory, to momentarily 
pause the broader discussion of “crisis,” “end” and “historicity” of feminism and examine a 
specific instance of the way in which the culture of transnational capitalism is currently 
ideologically converting the economic contradictions for women’s lives in the international 
division of labor into questions of contesting local values and aesthetics and in doing so 
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embroiling women and feminism into cultural mediations of economic contradictions in ways 
that shore up capitalism from all sides.  
In class society, the position of women has long been regarded as exclusively a cultural 
matter: a matter especially of morals, ethics, and values. One of the ways in which the culture of 
capitalism converts gender and sexuality into matters of cultural values can be seen in the 
contestations that re-emerged in public discussion in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, between 
the cultural practices of western fashion and the burqa or, for that matter, any mode of hijab 
(Islamic “modest dress”) that requires women to put on some level of covering to “veil” their 
morality (from the full coverage of the burqa used under the Taliban, to the chador of Iran, to a 
simple headscarf). In the United States, for instance, hijab has been regarded by many women as 
a sign of a “barbaric” and “evil” culture that “hates” the difference of women and is therefore 
undemocratic. Women’s individual freedom to be “unique” and to buy and wear what they want 
has, moreover, been elevated to an act of moral resistance to “terrorism” and “evil”: something 
along the lines of “shop or the terrorists win.”  By contrast, many Muslim women have argued 
that hijab is itself an act of moral resistance to the cultural imperialism of the “West,” including 
the routine commodification of women, their bodies, and their sexuality under capitalism. 
Morality, modesty and piety in sexual relations, and family values are considered to be material 
determinants of women’s economic and social position (its elevation or degradation) in society, 
as if sexual relations outside of marriage on the part of women are the root of the economic 
inequality.  
Despite what has been understood in the cultural commonsense (in, for example, the 
United States) to be a fundamental moral opposition, both arguments are ideological modes of 
legitimating capitalist production. This is because at root, the moral and ethical debate over 
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women’s clothing—hijab and western fashion—and the seemingly opposed cultural practices 
that this debate represents, together form a united position.  In the course of this discussion I am 
calling this united postion “(anti)hijab” and, I argue, that it serves as a strategy for transnational 
capitalism to update the international labor force. More specifically, both of the culturalist 
positions on hijab and “western fashion” are ideological positions addressed at women as a 
“reserve labor” force that can be pushed in and pulled out of productive labor, to meet the needs 
of capital to control its access to labor-power. 
To put this another way, (anti)hijab is a class issue and an articulation of capital’s 
fundamental reliance on the exploitation of human labor-power in order to make a profit. The 
reduction of the veil to a matter of moral laws (not an economic and labor matter) ideologically 
shores up capitalism by putting forward the ideological illusion that moral values determine 
class. The (anti)hijab debate is an instance of what Frederick Engels called the “application of 
morality to economics” (Introduction 6).  It reads the “concrete” of the economy on the basis of 
cultural values not on the basis of economic relations and historical conditions. In doing so, it 
treats morality ahistorically as “an eternal, ultimate and forever immutable ethical law on the 
pretext that the moral world too has its permanent principles that stand above history and the 
differences between nations” (Engels, Anti-Dühring 118). By retreating into ahistorical notions 
of values as “above” class and production relations, (anti)hijab conceals the theft of workers’ 
surplus-labor by owners and the increasing disparity between classes through moral and legal 
codes of conduct. As a consequence, it conceals the economic laws and historical conditions that 
determine women’s lives, making the economic conditions of women’s lives appear to be a 
consequence of their moral and ethical choices. Both Islamic family law and liberalism, for 
instance, see “fairness” and “equality” in economic relations to be derived from moral and 
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ethical behaviors on the part of individuals: how individuals conduct themselves in business and 
personal relations and how they regard others. In short, they are efforts to promote an “ideal 
human” as the basis of agency and change. In actuality morality and the “ideal human” always 
reflect the social relations and, in class society, the interests of the ruling class. Whatever choices 
an individual has are shaped by the material conditions she is in, especially those which 
determine to what degree she will command material resources: whether only so much as to 
allow her to be an exploited wage-laborer or more than enough so that she may have command 
over the labor of others as a capitalist. 
For instance, liberal feminists who oppose hijab, shore up capitalism by approaching 
women’s position in society as a matter of inherent “rights” to individual freedom, “unique-ness” 
and “choice.”  This position supports the existing relations of production in capitalism, which are 
based on private property, by substituting a formal justice and equality of “individual rights” and 
“uniqueness,” for economic equality, freedom from necessity, and social justice for all. Liberal 
feminists see freedom for women as autonomous from the mode of production and whether all 
people own the means of production and therefore collectively determine the social uses toward 
which labor-power is put, or only some people privately own the means of production and, 
therefore, use the labor-power of others to produce profit. This means that they do not think that 
freedom of labor from exploitation and freedom from necessity for all are requirements for the 
emancipation of women. Instead, they support capitalism through reforms, by advancing 
women’s “rights” to individual freedoms and promoting an “ethical” or “caring capitalism,” 
which puts the freedom of bourgeois women to exploit others before the needs of the majority of 
women who are exploited as workers. 
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In their arguments that hijab is an unethical practice, liberal feminists have held up as a 
sign of classlessness and justice that women in the West are “liberated” to choose how they want 
to dress and to wear cosmetics and fashionable clothing. In fact, freedom of choice regarding 
fashion and cosmetics—aspects of lifestyle—has been regarded as the epitome of freedom for 
women and is offered as evidence that women are determined by their own “individuality” not 
by class. This is because class is understood to be an act of consumption and the freedom of the 
individual that is defended by liberal feminism is identical to the freedom to go shopping: to buy 
whatever one wants, to wear whatever one wants, to consume. Hijab is too restrictive for 
consumption, which is why liberal feminism opposes it. 
But freedom from class for women is determined by the material relations of production, 
not the image of the “ideal human” put forward in fashion magazines!  What seems to be an 
“unrestricted” freedom for women in the U.S. to “wear” and “buy” what they want is actually a 
product of economic compulsion in class society. In fact, as Evelyn Reed has shown, Western 
fashion and cosmetics have always been used as a way to naturalize class antagonisms and 
production relations based on private property (105-131). Western fashion is exclusively a 
product of class society and, since its inception, it has signified economic inequality. Both 
fashion and cosmetics in the West arose under feudalism as a privilege of the aristocracy and 
were used as a mark of class distinction by both men and women of the aristocracy, in contrast to 
the serf labor upon which the aristocracy’s wealth depended. Once the bourgeoisie overthrew the 
aristocracy and feudal relations of production were displaced by capitalist relations of 
production, the majority of laboring women were displaced of their productive role in society as 
the household ceased to be the center of productive labor. Cosmetics and fashion became an 
expression of women’s economic dependence on men in capitalism and sexual competition 
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between women for men, brought on by their displacement from productive labor with the onset 
of commodity production and exchange. 
Now, with the advance of the productive forces in capitalism, “beauty” products and 
“fashionable clothing” which once distinguished one class from another, are produced for the 
mass market making it appear as if all women now also have access to equal class positions, 
because they all have market access to beauty and fashion. Liberal feminists, such as Elaine 
Showalter who defend the class privileges of women who can afford to wear haute couture 
clothing such as Prada and Armani, argue that “once fabric and clothing were mass produced, 
they became matters of choice rather than class” (“Fade to Greige”). Class, in other words, is 
normalized as a matter of lifestyle and one’s consumption choices, cultural values, and aesthetic 
tastes. 
As in all cases, however, consumption is limited by production. Cosmetics and 
“fashionable” attire for women are an unspoken requirement in most workplaces in order to gain, 
and often retain, employment. Keeping up-to-date is not a “choice” for women who do not own 
the means of production but must sell their labor-power in order to survive. Contrary to the 
ideological representation, it is not possible to determine your class position through “dressing 
for success.”  The fact that one’s position in the social relations of production is what determines 
class, and not one’s attire, becomes quite clear when the fashion and beauty industry changes the 
standard in order to create a new “need” for their commodities—for example, by adjusting a 
hemline or altering the acceptable color scheme—and thus “outdate” the previous season’s 
clothing before they have outlived their usefulness as protective covering. What may be a form 
of entertainment for ruling class women, who can afford to discard their wardrobe for the latest 
fashions is extremely costly for working class women who are required to adhere to corporate 
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“beauty” in the workplace. The “fashionable feminism” advanced by elite academics such as 
Showalter erases the real conditions of need for the majority of women in class society who 
either produce the clothing and cannot afford basic necessities of life from their wages or who 
are required to wear “fashionable” clothing at work and must go into debt doing so. What seems 
like “freedom of the individual,” and evidence that class no longer determines the lives of 
women, is actually the subordination of women to commodity production and exchange and the 
freedom of the corporation to turn over a profit at the expense of workers. At most what it offers 
is the limited freedom for working class women to “look classy” while they are being further 
impoverished economically by the transfer of wealth away from social resources in education, 
healthcare, social security, … and toward the defense budget, tax-credits for the rich, corporate 
welfare—all of which defend the interests of transnational capital. 
On the other hand, hijab is also an articulation of private ownership of the means of 
production and the wage-labor/capital relation as the basis for women’s “rightful” place in 
society. Islamic feminists, such as Fadwa El Guindi in her book Veil: Modesty, Privacy, 
Resistance, appeal to abstract notions of “individual rights” and “morality” by supporting hijab 
as a “resistant” agency for women and defending hijab for both men and women as a matter of 
the “private spiritual space” of the individual in the public sphere; for women, specifically their 
freedom from the male gaze and sexualized attention. By defining people as “private spiritual 
beings” who stand “outside” of the public sphere, this position also conceals the increasing 
disparity between classes and capitalism’s material determination of the conditions of women’s 
lives worldwide. 
It is telling that an Islamic revival and a turn to hijab within nations that do not legally 
require women to wear the veil, such as Egypt, are gaining ardent support among wealthy young 
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men and women. It has been argued that hijab gives spiritual security to women regardless of 
their class position. Heba Kandil’s view, in discussing the uses of the veil in Egypt in the 
webpages of Free Republic, is quite telling: “for some poor people who live in nasty 
neighborhoods, the veil protects women because it sends a message that they’re conservative and 
not easy prey.” Not unlike the assumption in the West that “dressing differently” is a material 
terrain of freedom, in Kandil’s view it is women’s clothing and their moral values, in short, that 
are considered to serve as protection of women from crushing poverty and the blows of domestic 
violence and rape. I leave aside the fact that domestic violence and rape rates remain high in both 
nations where hijab is widely practiced as well as in nations, such as the United States, that see it 
as “oppressive” to women. The “spiritual protection” and “inner peace” that has been attributed 
to hijab is actually an effect of the economic security of some (ruling class) women who benefit 
from class inequality—an economic security that is allowed to some women that is represented 
as a “spiritual” and “moral” security of all women. 
This may seem like a contradiction since the popular interpretation of “Islam” in the 
United States is that it is against capitalism and “free trade”—most sharply signified by the 
events that led to the destruction of the World Trade Center. Moreover, this view has been also 
codified in the arguments of Islamic feminists who defend and wear hijab and argue that it is an 
expression of “freedom” of women from the “male gaze” and the commodification of their 
bodies and sexuality in capitalism, and therefore serves as a “resistance” to the effects of 
“imperialism” on women. But, Islamic Family Law (Shari’ah), which regulates and defines 
contemporary practices of hijab, is a legal and moral expression of private property relations. Its 
rules for gender relations, the family and reproduction, and inheritance laws and rights—while 
widely interpreted and contested among Muslims in general and Islamic feminists in particular—
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presuppose the historical development of private ownership of the means of production and, 
therefore, class society. The moral laws articulated in the name of “Muhammad” on issues of 
ethical trading, price controls, taxation of markets, etc.—that have also become sites of intense 
conflict between various cultural and religious groups over how to interpret the Qur’an—all 
presuppose the existence of trade and private property. Moreover, one of the claims of Islamic 
feminism has been that Islam in its “pure form” is the most progressive of all religions regarding 
women specifically because the Qur’an explicitly grants women private property rights: the right 
to own their own business, to inherit wealth, choose marriage partners and divorce them; rights 
which have not always historically been granted to women in the history of the West. But this, 
too, is a ruling class freedom for women—it is gender equality for property holders and equal 
exploitation for those who are denied ownership of the means of production. 
The unfreedom of class relations for the majority of women is in the practical relations 
behind both the ethics and the aesthetics of clothing; material relations which are not transformed 
by what women wear. The veil and the seclusion of women appeared many centuries prior to 
Islam in the class societies of Assyria, classical Greece, the Byzantine Christian world, Persia, 
and India. Like Western fashion, veiling has been used since its inception as a mark of class 
distinction. For instance, Assyrian Kings introduced the veil and the seclusion of women in the 
Royal harem. Moreover, prostitutes and slaves were forbidden from veiling and could be slashed 
if they disobeyed this law (“The Bruqa, Chador, Veil and Hijab!”). Its original adoption by Islam 
also followed this historical trajectory: it was used by women of the ruling class to distinguish 
themselves from women of exploited classes. Hijab morality grew out of imperatives of private 
property relations and the concentration of the social surplus into the hands of a few. It was used 
to support the interests of the ruling class by marking the class position between women and, 
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accordingly, adjudicating the inheritance rights of their offspring in order to help maintain the 
concentration of wealth into fewer hands. Today, these marks of class distinction reassert 
themselves even in countries where all women are required to wear some form of hijab, such as 
in Iran, where wealthier women are starting to wear designer chadors of fine, colorful fabrics 
and intricate embroidery (now promoted in Iran’s first fashion magazine since 1979: Lotous). 
Upon closer examination, it becomes clear that both Western fashion and hijab (and the 
codes of morality that these draw from) are not autonomous cultural values rather, they are 
historical and have their roots in class society. Moreover, inequality and injustice for women is 
not, in the final analysis, rooted in ethical imperatives or aesthetic choices but in material 
relations of exploitation and the division of labor—the private property relations founded on 
private ownership of the means of production. It is not ethics that determines women’s economic 
position; rather, ethics derives from what Engels calls the “practical relations on which their 
class position is based—from the economic relations in which they carry on production” (Anti-
Dühring 118). For example, ethics that grant women of the property owning class equal 
ownership of private property cease to make any sense at all in a society which has done away 
with private property relations altogether. Instead, they are historical and “in the last analysis [...] 
the product of the economic conditions of society obtaining at the time. And just as society has 
so far moved in class antagonisms, so morality has always been class morality” (118-119). 
The “practical relations”—that is, the production relations—of capitalism are not 
constituted by moral values; they depend on the exploitation of human labor-power. What makes 
a capitalist wealthy is not that he is an “ethical citizen” or has “democratic ethics,” but that he 
owns the means of production and can, therefore, appropriate the surplus-labor of those who do 
not own the means of production but must sell their labor-power to survive. It is not morality, 
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ethics, or aesthetics but the exploitation of human labor-power that is a necessary condition for 
capitalism because only labor-power can produce surplus-value. That is, at a specific stage of 
historical development of the productive forces, labor-power can produce more value than the 
labor necessary to produce articles required for its own reproduction. It is the theft of this 
“surplus-labor” (exploitation) that is the basis of profit in capitalism. What is necessary for 
capital to make a profit is, therefore, access to a continuous supply of exploitable labor-power, 
and the capacity to control this supply depending on the historical conditions of the productive 
forces of society. Because only labor-power can produce surplus-value the increase of the 
laboring population is a necessary condition, if capitalist accumulation is to be a steady, 
continuous process. But the “absolute growth” of the laboring population in reproduction, as 
Marx makes clear, itself depends upon definite material conditions in production: for instance, an 
increasing population “presupposes an average wage which permits not only reproduction of the 
labouring population but also its constant growth” (Theories 477). If economic conditions are not 
developed enough (or have been deteriorated, for instance, through warfare) capitalism needs to 
make provisions so as not to disrupt its capacity to extract surplus-labor. Thus, “Capitalist 
production provides for unexpected contingencies by overworking one section of the labouring 
population and keeping the other as a ready reserve army consisting of partially or entirely 
pauperized people” (477). 
(Anti)hijab is not explained by a semi-autonomous “ethical” or “aesthetic resistance” 
which can be turned against capitalism because, upon closer examination, the seemingly 
contesting cultural practices are all articulations of the exploitative labor relations of the 
capitalist mode of production. Instead, it is explained by the dependence of capitalism on the 
exploitation of human labor-power and the fact that it must use “reserve labor forces” to manage 
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its access to and control over a continuous supply of exploitable labor-power in order to make a 
profit. Western fashion’s moral imperative of “uniqueness” is an articulation of capitalism’s need 
to pull reserves of previously reproductive workers into productive labor—specifically by 
incorporating women as collective producers into wage-labor—and, at the same time, ensure that 
women will be a compliant labor force that see themselves not as exploited labor (and, therefore, 
part of a class) but as cultural singularities. The morality of hijab, “modesty” in sexual relations, 
and romanticizing of motherhood, translates into cultural and religious values the economic 
imperatives of capitalism, specifically, its economic imperative for controlling the rate if profit 
by using the “reserve labor forces” of women in reproduction in order to control the rate of 
growth and development of the supply of labor-power. Its emphasis on “family values,” 
moreover, helps to limit the cost of social reproduction to within the privatized family so that an 
increased population does not serve as a drain on profit for capitalists. 
The cultural differences over hijab and women’s dress do not have to do with 
fundamental oppositions over private property, the basic process of exploitation, or the use of 
women as “reserve” labor for capital. Rather these cultural debates are the effect of increasing 
systemic crisis and instability in capitalism brought on by the concentration of wealth into fewer 
hands and resulting in increased inter-capitalist competition around the globe and uneven levels 
of development of the productive forces internationally. What is read in contemporary feminism 
as acts of “cultural resistance” that can be teased out within capitalism are actually ideological 
strategies that address different sectors of the international working class, depending on the 
historical level of development of the productive forces under which capitalists must work to 
make a profit. 
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Hijab and its emphasis on “family values” and “private spiritual space” has grown in 
many nations of the South as a response to deteriorating economic conditions, brought on by 
imperialist assault and the concentration of global production into fewer hands. In Iraq, for 
instance, the return to religion and the donning of hijab by working class women has increased 
dramatically from the deterioration of its productive forces as a result of Gulf War I and 
prolonged economic sanctions (to try and force out national capitalist competitors that stand in 
the way of U.S. capital’s access to Iraqi oil reserves and labor-power). The severe deterioration 
of economic conditions has led to a situation in which the social resources necessary in order to 
reproduce the laboring population have seriously declined. State-funded programs of childcare, 
public education, etc. that the Iraqi government established in the 1970s and 1980s to pull 
women into skilled productive labor in order to address labor-shortages for the developing 
national bourgeoisie have now been cut. The increasing acceptance of pro-hijab morality and 
“privacy” of gender relations (rather than understanding gender as social and historical) is an 
effect of economic compulsion of class relations and increasing class contradictions. Although it 
is taken up by many working class women in Iraq, hijab is a ruling class morality that has served 
to help ideologically bolster the interests of the struggling national bourgeoisie in Iraq, which is 
facing severe labor shortages as a result of the human slaughter of U.S. led imperialist war and 
needs “absolute growth” of the labor force, without dipping into the surplus-value that the ruling 
class needs to reinvest in capitalist ventures in order to accumulate profit. 
Western fashion and liberal feminism with their emphasis on “individualism” and 
“choice” on the other hand, are useful for articulating the labor needs of capitalism under 
different conditions of development of the productive forces.  Liberal feminism is used as a 
ideological means for helping capital to incorporate reserve labor forces of women into the 
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workforce, while maintaining the ideological illusion of “classlessness” for working class 
women that covers over the theft of their surplus labor. But, in its economic content, the 
projection of “classlessness” for women on capitalist relations of production is a defense of the 
class relations of capitalism, which becomes increasingly evident as liberal feminism is used to 
defend the imperialist interests of U.S. capital. The “moral outrage” on the part of liberal 
feminists of the United States in the wake of 9/11 toward the use of hijab in Afghanistan and 
Iraq, for instance, has helped serve to put a “progressive” spin on U.S. capital’s imperialist 
interests in Central Asia and the Middle East. It covers over the economic relations in 
transnational capitalism behind the resurgence of hijab and, moreover, helps to inculcate the 
international labor reserves of women into labor that is productive of surplus-value for the 
capitalists of the imperialist nations. It represents not the end of women’s oppression in class 
society, but a different mode of it suited to the interests of U.S. capital. It is, in short, a moral 
expression of the fact that as capitalist production has developed into imperialist capitalism, 
higher levels of productivity at the same time have made capitalist accumulation more difficult to 
maintain. The advanced productivity of workers (brought on by advances in labor saving 
technology) and intensified concentration of capital into fewer hands, means that capital starts to 
invest more in machinery and raw materials and less in labor-power, since less is needed in order 
to produce the same commodities for exchange. But, this leads to a crisis of profitability since 
without increased labor-power, there is no increase of surplus-value, and capitalist profit tends to 
decline. Liberal feminism has helped to justify the export of capitalist production into new areas 
under the name of “advancement for women” when capital needs access to more and more 
quantities of productive labor at a cheap price, and it has more or less exhausted the current labor 
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reserves within its own national boundaries (or these reserves are more costly to use) and must 
seek them out elsewhere and transform previously unproductive laborers into productive ones. 
(Anti)hijab morality, in other words, has become a way to cover over the instability of 
capitalist productive processes and its increasing periods of crisis, and normalize the theft of 
workers’ surplus-labor which is a necessary condition of capitalism. Even the moral objection 
that the oppression of women is “wrong” is enabled by the contradictions in the economic 
conditions of production of capitalism. As Engels put it in his Preface to the First German 
Edition of Marx’s The Poverty of Philosophy: “If the moral consciousness of the mass declares 
an economic fact to be unjust, as it has done in the case of slavery or serf labour, that is proof 
that the fact itself has been outlived, that other economic facts have made their appearance, 
owing to which the former has become unbearable and untenable” (6). On the one hand, the use 
of “reserve labor forces” is increasingly made practically unnecessary by the development of 
productive forces in capitalism. There is, for example, enough productive capacity of the world’s 
workers for all 6 billion people on the planet to have their needs met for nutrition, shelter, 
education,... without the constant threat of “unemployment.”  But the maintenance of private 
property and production for profit leads to continuing economic crisis, insecurity, and instability 
for both workers and capitalists (who must compete more aggressively to maintain profit levels) 
as the productive forces develop. Unemployment, starvation, destitution, economic stagnation 
and decline, bankruptcy, and the maintenance of economically insecure “reserve labor forces” 
that can be pushed in and pulled out of employment to drive down the cost of labor-power are all 
the inevitable results of maintaining capitalism. 
What this goes to show is that the position of women in society is not a cultural matter of 
ethical values and moral codes of conduct, but of economic conditions of necessity. Capitalism 
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needs to keep workers economically insecure in order to drive down the cost of wages. Using 
women as a “reserve labor force” is one way to help do this. But doing so does not actually 
“resolve” the contradictions and crises in capitalism: both the wealth gap and the instability of 
capitalist ventures are growing. Changing the position of women in society is not, at root, 
founded on “moral demands” regarding their position, but on “the inevitable collapse of the 
capitalist mode of production which is daily taking place before our eyes to an ever greater 
degree” (Engels, Preface 6). It therefore requires not “ethical negotiation,” but heightening the 
fundamental contradictions in capitalism between wage-labor and capital, bringing them to 
crisis, and fundamentally transforming them. 
In concealing class antagonisms in the international division of labor, however, 
capitalism translates economic inequality into a matter of “negotiable” cultural values. Ruling 
class academics put forward a “cultural materialism” that claims that if morality derives from 
“economic relations of production,” and moral codes of conduct differ across nations, this must 
mean that the “relations of production” themselves are “undecidable” relations; that is, Marxist 
political economy is unreliable as a guide for global social change because it emerged from a 
very different European context that no longer exists today. 
For instance, it is said among globalization theorists that the “nation” has been 
“outflanked” in an era of transnationalism (see, for example, Peter Drucker’s Post-Capitalist 
Society). That is, global capitalism has “surpassed” national difference, thus, the continued 
existence of “difference” in an era of globalization can only mean that, at root, it is based on 
cultural identity and preference (not uneven developments within capitalism). Capitalism, in 
other words, has led to its own “transcendence”—a capitalism beyond capitalism—and all 
matters of culture are now matters of taste and preference, not labor and class. The shift of 
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women in the North Atlantic to Islam and hijab, and the loosening of hijab among some women 
in predominantly Muslim nations who are taking up western dress, for instance, is seen as 
evidence that (anti)hijab is a matter of cultural preference and taste and a sign that global 
relations are undecidable and follow no necessary logic, especially the logic of economic laws of 
motion of capitalism. Resistance to capitalism is, therefore, thought to be brought about by the 
local, individual, reversibility of cultural practices within capitalism. 
But this cultural determinist theory is a ruling class theory that embraces capitalism 
through a cultural relay. It covers over the exploitation of workers behind profit and conceals 
why capitalist production goes all over the globe, crossing national boundaries: because the 
nation is the geography of labor-power, historical conditions of necessity in the development of 
the productive forces of capitalism, making it “more or less expensive to use” (Marx and Engels, 
Manifesto 115). It is not the cultural agency of hijab or western fashion that enabled freedom for 
women from the material constraints of capitalism, but the emancipation of their labor from 
material relations of exploitation. Contrary to the ideological claims of (anti)hijab to 
“classlessness” or resistance to capital, it is not possible to move beyond material contradictions 
on the basis of cultural values or practices. This is because classlessness (and freedom of women 
from the commodification of their sexuality) is a structural relation of production, not an 
autonomous cultural value. As Engels put it, a “classless morality” is an effect of praxical 
relations of production, thus, under capitalism “we have not yet passed beyond class morality.”  
A “classless” ethics or morality “which stands above class antagonisms and above any 
remembrance of them becomes possible only at a stage of society which has not only overcome 
class antagonisms but has even forgotten them in practical life” (Anti-Dühring 119).  
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What this discussion of “(anti)hijab” begins to reveal is that behind the seemingly 
autonomous cultural differences in transnational capitalism there is a structure of material 
relations of production in capitalism of which both are a part. Difference, to put it another way, is 
difference within a social totality of material relations. Rather than translating the material 
relations of this totality into tropes and treating totality as a “master narrative” that is, by way of 
the performativity of language, brought into being by discussing it, it is time for feminism to 
begin to openly examine, analyze and confront its own material relation to the social totality of 
capitalism. 
 
FIVE: 
“Crisis” is a contested term and cannot serve as the basis for a cultural critique that goes 
beyond the notion of a “self-evident” and “fixed” set of social relations nor can it serve as an 
explanation of the state of contemporary feminism, without sustained theorization that locates it 
in the historical conditions and material relations in which it is produced, and through which it is 
transformed. The significance of the concept of “crisis” for feminism, I argue throughout this 
dissertation, is that it points to a social totality, by which I mean a system of material relations 
and, moreover, to the material instability of this system of relations—more specifically, the 
breaking to the surface of the fundamental material contradictions in capitalism between wage-
labor and capital. It marks the difference between “what is” and “what is becoming”—a 
historical change in material relations. “Crisis” is a historical and material relation; a structure of 
conflicts that is not an abstract, ahistorical, mechanical or permanent process of life as such but is 
historically and materially produced and therefore transformable through material praxis. 
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This dissertation is an investigation into and explanatory critique of the theoretical 
assumptions of the “Cultural Turn” in feminism and material conditions which have allowed 
feminism to equate “crisis” with cultural “crisis” and freedom with cultural freedom—the 
transformation of cultural values. The “Cultural Turn” in feminism and Cultural Studies has 
actively marginalized and dismantled historical materialist—that is, Marxist—knowledges that 
explain the relationship of gender and sexuality to class and the crisis of labor in capitalism. It 
has ideologically “unwritten” in differences of gender, sexuality, ethnicity, and (trans)nationality 
the material contradictions in the production (private property relations) of capitalism and 
converted (in the cultural imaginary) differences into matters of values, aesthetics, lifestyle, and 
consumption. So much so that to critique the fusion of feminism with a “values movement” is 
looked on within contemporary feminism as a betrayal of women, as a betrayal of persons of 
color, as a betrayal of multiple sexualities…—in short as an erasure of difference. Yet, at the 
same time, this very mode of “valuing” difference in feminism has come into “crisis” because, as 
Lindsey German has put it in her essay “Women’s Liberation Today,” feminism has: 
run up against the limits of class society: the existence of a small minority of 
women with access to top jobs and all the material advantages that these bring 
with them is perfectly compatible with the continued existence of class 
exploitation. (35) 
Contemporary feminism has increasingly ceased to be a material force for social transformation 
and increasingly become an instrument of capital for updating women as collective producers for 
the contemporary workforce of capitalism.  
Feminism needs to break with its debilitating culturalism and its obsession with “post” 
theories and bring back into its analysis of the conditions of women’s lives in the 21st century 
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Marxist concepts and debates over the relationship of gender and sexuality to class as ownership 
of the means of production, labor, production, exploitation, imperialism, need, and ideology that 
have been buried in the cultural intelligibilities of capitalism today on both the “left” and the 
“right.”  What this requires, among other things, is clearing out what have become sedimented 
notions of gender, sexuality, culture, and difference institutionalized in the culture of capitalism 
by “post” theories. However, to address these issues only at the level of culture is, I argue, not to 
heed a fundamental materialist argument that is necessary in struggles for social 
transformation—as Marx puts it: “Just as one does not judge an individual by what he thinks 
about himself, so one cannot judge such a period of transformation by its consciousness, but on 
the contrary, this consciousness must be explained from the contradictions of material life” (21). 
This is another way of saying that to deal only with contemporary feminist theory on its own 
terms (immanently) is to only address a theory in terms of what it says about itself:  it is to 
develop a deeply one-sided analysis. What I aim to do is deal not only with the immanent terms 
of contemporary feminism and its canonical “post” conceptions of gender and sexuality, but with 
the “outside” of the dominant consciousness. Throughout the dissertation, therefore, I bring to 
bear on the presumed cultural crisis of feminism and its cultural theory and the strategies 
deployed to deal with it, the economic crisis of capitalism: the breaking to the surface of 
capitalism’s fundamental material contradictions between wage-labor and capital brought on by 
crisis of profit.  
 I argue that feminism, in its most effective moments, has not simply been a struggle over 
cultural values—it has been a struggle over economic freedom from exploitation, which 
is denied to women not because of cultural matters but because of the difference of class: the 
difference of surplus-labor. Economic freedom—including freedom of gender and sexuality from 
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being used as tools of exploitation—is denied to women, in other words, as long as they can be 
used as collective producers of surplus-labor for profit. This feminism has not “ended” because 
material relations of exploitation in transnational capitalism have not ended. But to make this 
argument and contribute to bringing back the knowledges needed to do so is an enormously 
difficult task in the material conditions of capitalism now. These times—of imperialist warfare 
and brutal assault by capital to redivide the surplus-labor of globe and (among many other 
consequences of these material contradiction in transnational capitalism) of the Patriot Acts—are 
not friendly times for such an investigation. Yet these times—which are not at all “new times”—
are precisely the times in which “root” knowledge for making feminism and other social 
struggles matter again as projects of social transformation is urgently needed. 
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PART II: CURING THE CRISIS (AS USUAL)  
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2.0  THE CULTURAL TURN AND LABOR IN TRANSITION 
My marking of “so called” or “what have been called” waves of feminism in the previous 
chapter is to indicate that “wave theory” is itself a contested terrain. By this I do not mean simply 
the observation that the respective “waves” of feminism have been constituted by multiple, 
conflicting, and competing approaches to social change.3 Nor do I mean what has become a 
commonplace in Cultural Studies in the West in the aftermath of poststructuralism: that the 
concept of “wave” is—like all concepts—an allegory of the play of cultural signification and 
therefore cannot be explained (i.e., its meaning cannot be “pinned down”) on the basis of 
objective relations outside of it.4 Rather, I mean that the dynamic of history is class not culture 
and therefore, the relation of feminism and gender to historicity is a relation of labor not a 
relation of culture, values, knowledge, the episteme, etc.  As I marked in the previous chapter in 
my discussion of the way contemporary feminism has made sense of its own changes (and 
particularly in my discussion of Fraser), “wave” theory—whether in its “modernist,” 
                                                 
3 See, for example, Benita Roth's Separate Roads to Feminism: Black, Chicana, and White Feminist Movements in 
America's Second Wave. 
4 This is, in fact, one of the major themes of what is now, albeit contradictorily, self-identified as “third wave 
feminism.” See, for example: Stacy Gilles et al Third Wave Feminism: A Critical Exploration; Lesile Heywood and 
Jennifer Drake Third Wave Agenda: Being Feminist, Doing Feminism; and Rory Dicker and Alison Piepmeier, 
Catching a Wave: Reclaiming Feminism for the 21st Century. For example, in their contribution to Third Wave 
Agenda: Being Feminist, Doing Feminism, Gillian Howie and Ashley Tauchert suggest that “to perceive a wave at 
all, we artificially arrest the movement by which it is constituted, and separate out one of the myriad manifestations 
of that movement” (37). They proceed on this basis to tease out multiple meanings of “wave”—from an “energy-
carrying” disturbance to “an attempt at nonverbal communication”—as a means of indicating that the metaphor of 
wave is useful to feminism as a “paradoxical” metaphor. That is, “wave” is an allegory for the disclosure of 
established meanings in culture and the representations founded on those meanings. This is, of course, not so much 
an explanation as it is a substitution of the discursive resonances of “wave” as a metaphor and trope for the 
explanatory critique of the material conditions of gender, sexuality, and women's lives. It is, in other words, to 
reduce cultural theory and historical explanation to metaphor, albeit a metaphor not with a singular referent but with 
a network of multiple and shifting references. 
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“postmodernist,” or “transnationalist” articulations—sees gender and sexuality as primarily 
(semi)autonomous cultural differences and understands the phases of feminist history in largely 
cultural terms in isolation from economic developments and contradictions in the social relations 
of production in capitalism. I am arguing, by contrast, that the cultural phases of feminist history 
need to be reunderstood in dialectical relation to the labor and property relations confronting 
women in capitalism.  
 One of the implications of my argument is that “cultural phases”—of modernity, 
postmodernity, and globalization—need to be reunderstood in relation to the social relations of 
production in capitalism. “Modernity,” “postmodernity,” and “globalization” are not autonomous 
cultural phases or formations nor do they constitute the material relations of capital, rather they 
are cultural apparatuses of capitalism at different stages in the development of its material 
relations: of its forces of production as they come into conflict with its relations of production. 
Modernism, postmodernism, and transnationalism—and the respective modes of feminism and 
dominant theories of gender and sexuality articulated within them—are part of the cultural 
apparatuses of capital made possible by material developments in capitalism (dialectical turns in 
production) and deployed at particular stages of the material development of class contradictions 
in capitalism, for the subject of capitalism to come to terms with, to locate herself within, and 
adjust to the contradictions of wage-labor and capital.5 They do not exist autonomously from the 
economic relations of capital: the social relations of production within which these cultural 
apparatuses develop, and the development of contradictions between wage-labor and capital. 
Specifically, in the case of “modernism,” this is the period of capitalist development from 
                                                 
5 In my discussion of “waves,” I draw from Teresa Ebert’s discussion of “modernity” and “postmodernity” as 
cultural apparatuses in her contribution to Shaobo Xie and Fengzhen Wang’s collection of interviews, Dialogues on 
Cultural Studies. See especially, pages 51-54. 
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laissez-faire capitalism to monopoly capitalism. In the case of “postmodernism,” it is the period 
of the development of a fledgling transnational capitalism in which not simply commodities but 
capital is increasingly exported from one “nation” to another and production is starting to be 
integrated on a global scale. In the case of “globalization” it is a more advanced stage of 
transnational capital.  To be clear I use transnational to mean globalization as consumption—
turning the world into a global market with local “national-states” acting as local law 
enforcement on different sectors of workers of the world.  Contrary to the way transnationalists 
represent it, transnationalism (world market) is a class-based globalization based on the 
integration of capitalist production. 
As cultural apparatuses of capital and its exploitative labor relations, modernism, 
postmodernism, and “globalization” are sites of contradiction, conflict and contestation (Ebert, 
“Interview” 52)—part of what Marx called becoming conscious of material conflicts and 
“fighting them out.” However, these changes in the cultural apparatuses are the effects of 
dialectical developments in capitalist production, but not permutations or fundamental changes in 
the structure of wage-labor/capital relations; in short they are not an index of a supersession or of 
a “fundamental break” in capitalism but the effect of the intensification of class antagonisms in 
production (see also Ebert, “Interview” 51). To abstract these cultural apparatuses from their 
relation to the material conditions of capitalism, as is done in culturalist feminism is to 
dehistoricize culture and reproduce an ahistorical notion of waves of progress within capitalism.  
As Teresa Ebert has also argued, to continue to explain material history—and feminism’s 
relation to historicity in terms of “modernity,” “postmodernity,” and “globalization” is to mystify 
history by substituting a description of changes in the culture of capitalism for an explanatory 
critique of the underlying relations of exploitation (the private appropriation of surplus-labor) 
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that continues under the changes on the surface (“Interview” 51).  The history of contemporary 
feminism, I argue, is best explained by different levels of class contestation within capitalism that 
have produced these cultural apparatuses and their attending conceptions, practices, and modes 
of gender and sexuality. The different and conflicting modes of feminism have all been various 
attempts to come to terms with, grasp, or what Ebert calls “locate,” and explain in “practical 
consciousness” the material position of women as subjects of capital (51). Even those forms of 
feminism that have denied the existence of capitalism or at least marginalize the position of 
women as subjects of capital and re-understand women, for example, as literary subjects—
subjects of the performativity of language—are part of the cultural apparatuses of capital, 
enabled not primarily by discursive contradictions but by material contradictions in the social 
relations of production of capitalism.  
This is also to say that material change for women is not homologous to changes in the 
cultural apparatuses of capitalism, but requires transformation of the social relations of 
production.  This is because, as I explain further below, social differences of gender, sexuality, 
race, ethnicity, and nation are not autonomous cultural differences rather, they are social 
relations of capital. Differences, in other words, derive not mainly from cultural productions, 
values and discursive constructs but from the social division of labor. In order to contribute to 
the development of transformative social praxis, therefore, feminism must re-understand gender 
as a social relation of capital and start by re-examining its own history in relation the economic 
relations of capitalism. 
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TWO 
Before moving on to further discuss feminism and the Cultural Turn, I would like to first 
conceptually clarify at length what is only implied above: In my critique of the limits of 
canonical feminist understandings of the relation of feminism and gender to “historicity” and the 
“role of history,” I am making a distinction between history and historicism. Historicism is a 
bourgeois practice of regarding history as a self-enclosed series of events, each of which is an 
effect of the other. This version of historicism, which Foucault (following Nietzsche) calls 
“monumental history,” is now theorized, updated and instituted as genealogy. Genealogy is 
historicism without a transcendental subject: a historicism without teleology but nonetheless it is 
historicism because “events” here are treated as autonomous from and unrelated to a structure. 
By history, on the other hand, I mean a structure of conflicts—specifically a conflict over the 
appropriation of social surplus-labor between workers and owners. History (not historicism) is a 
class analytics and it is to discredit this analytics that Foucault in his most famous essay, 
“Nietzsche, Genealogy, History” argues that history is “alea” (chance) and “regulative 
mechanism” (88). He uses the phrase “regulative mechanism” as a marker of a repressive history 
that does not allow the freedom of events. However what is actually involved here is that by 
discrediting “regulative,” he is obscuring the dynamic of history which is class.  
“Genealogy,” Foucault elaborates, “must record the singularity of events outside of any 
monotonous finality” (76). Foucault remarks further that: 
If the genealogist refuses to extend his faith in metaphysics, if he listens to 
history, he finds that there is ‘something altogether different’ behind things: not a 
timeless and essential secret, but the secret that they have no essence or that their 
essence was fabricated in a piecemeal fashion from alien forms. Examining the 
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history of reason, he learns that it was born in an altogether “reasonable” 
fashion—from ‘chance’ […]. (78) 
Part of the purpose of Foucault’s dismantling of the concept of “essence” is to dispute a 
transcendental subject of history and a “transcendental ideal”—the ahistorical idea that history is 
the effect of a “miraculous origin” and develops in a preordained fashion. Moreover, in 
developing “genealogy,” Foucault is the heir of Nietzsche in such writings as Nietzsche’s 
posthumously published “Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense,” where he argues that: 
Every concept originates through our equating what is unequal.  No leaf ever 
wholly equals another, and the concept “leaf” is formed through an arbitrary 
abstraction from these individual differences, through forgetting the distinctions; 
and now it gives rise to the idea that in nature there might be something besides 
leaves which would be “leaf”—some kind of original form after which all leaves 
have been woven, marked, copied, colored, curled, and painted, but by unskilled 
hands, so that no copy turned out to be a correct, reliable, and faithful image of 
the original form. (46) 
Here, Nietzsche is criticizing the positivism of empiricists such as John Locke who argues in An 
Essay Concerning Human Understanding that sensory experience combined with the private 
individual’s transparent reflection on this experience gives rise to concepts (such as, in Locke’s 
words, “‘whiteness, hardness, sweetness, thinking, motion, man, elephant, army, drunkeness’ 
and others”) that constitute universal positive knowledge (186-187). Instead of this kind of 
thinking, Nietzsche argues that concepts (e.g., “leaf”) are not a transparent reflection on 
experience (e.g., of leaves) but are an abstraction imposed onto the irreducible singularities of 
the concrete (“leaves”).  Abstract knowledge, according to Nietzsche, is only ever a positing of a 
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transcendental ideal rather than an explanation of an independent material reality.  When 
examined further, the “truth” is (in Nietzsche’s view) actually a “mobile army of metaphors, 
metonyms, and anthropomorphisms […] without sensuous power” (46-47). Against abstract 
thinking, Nietzsche posits the irreducible singularities and particularities of the concrete.  This is 
the framework of the genealogical analytic and the sense in which Foucault discusses the 
historical “event.”  Unlike Derrida, who argued “il n’ya pas de hors-texte” or (in Spivak’s 
translation of Derrida) “there is nothing outside the text” (of Grammatology 158) and, moreover, 
that what disrupts the concept (of the “event” or “history”) is the immanent play of language, for 
Foucault (like Nietzsche), there is a material “outside” to writing that “resists” conceptual 
explanation.   
It is on these terms that Foucault goes on to elaborate on the “effective history” of 
genealogy as a point of departure from the historicism of “monumental history”: 
“Effective” history […] deals with events in terms of their most unique 
characteristics, their most acute manifestations.  An event, consequently, is not a 
decision, a treaty, a reign, or a battle, but the reversal of a relationship of forces, 
the usurpation of power, the appropriation of a vocabulary turned against those 
who had once used it, a feeble domination that poisons itself as it grows lax, the 
entry of a masked “other.” The forces operating in history are not controlled by 
destiny or regulative mechanisms, but respond to haphazard conflict. (88) 
Foucault’s concept of “effective history” presents history—and the event—as “effects” without 
any systemic material causes.  If, according to Foucault, one analyzes into the “causes” of events 
one finds other “events” (which are themselves effects) an increasingly intricate, internecine, and 
aleatory array of events. At the same time that Foucault is working to dismantle the concept of a 
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transcendental subject of history he is, therefore, also getting rid of an analytics which 
understands history as a material relation and structure of conflicts independent of “will” (i.e., 
independent of a transcendental subject).  For example, Foucault states, following Nietzsche, that 
the “relationship of domination is no more a ‘relationship’ than the place where it occurs is a 
place; and, precisely for this reason, it is fixed, throughout its history, in rituals, in meticulous 
procedures that impose rights and obligations” (85)  Relationality itself is, for Foucault, always 
already “regulative mechanism” imposed from the outside onto events which have no necessary 
material relation to other events but, rather, are grounded in “disparity” (79).   
Contrary to the way Foucault presents “effective history,” his theorization of the 
“singularity of events” (76) not grounded in a material structure of conflicts is itself not a “non-
reductive” or “non-abstract” theory of history.  It reduces history to localities, singularities, and 
micro-causes—to alea.  The “chance” and “singularity of events” becomes the abstract macro-
logic (the “grand narrative”) of Foucault’s analytic of history.  The “problem” with this, to be 
clear, is not the immanent contradiction that Foucault in the end “reduces” or has an abstract 
theory of history; all theories—including theories of history—reduce in the sense that they 
analyze and/or explain seemingly disparate phenomena on the basis of proposed conditions of 
possibility (whether those conditions of possibility are proposed to be “psychology,” “class 
relations,” “gender,” “the play of language,” or “the singularities of events”).  Moreover, abstract 
concepts are necessary to explain the material structures that enable seemingly disparate 
phenomena.  While the tools of abstract thinking, namely language, place historical limits on 
knowledge of material relations (just as any instrument—such as an x-ray machine or a 
telescope—places limits on knowledge), this is not a reason to conclude that these limits 
constitute material relations or to conflate these limits with the object of knowledge or the truth. 
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Foucault (in contrast to Derrida), on one level, understood this by pointing to a non-discursive 
reality outside of the historical limits of language (against which monumental history could be 
brought into sharper relief).  Yet, at the same time, in his elaboration of genealogy in “Nietzsche, 
Genealogy, History,” he also ultimately assumed that all structural relations are “regulative 
mechanisms” rooted in discursive invention (which was later reworked and solidified into the 
notion of “power/knowledge” apparatuses) and that, ultimately, historical reality has no structure 
of conflicts other than discursively imposed ones and that it is otherwise founded on the alea of 
events. 
But this is exactly where genealogy returns to historicism.  To read history on the terms 
of the genealogical analytic cuts the events which occur in one “locality” off from the material 
structure of conflicts that produce “events” in the next and their relation is understood to be only 
contingent, aleatory, and accidental.  I discuss the limits of a localizing view of the “concrete” 
for feminism in greater detail in Chapter 4, but to provide a brief example in capitalism now: on 
the terms of a genealogic analytic of history, for example, the emergence of the events which 
now fall under the sign of “suicide bombing” have no structural relation through which they are 
necessarily related to other events.  According to a genealogic analysis an “event” can trigger 
other “events” but this is a relation of chance and contingency.   
Uri Avnery—the Jewish founder of Israel’s Gush Shalom (Peace Coalition) and a 
vociferous critic of Israeli occupation—in his careful and historically aware reading of “suicide 
bombing” (“The Revenge of a Child”) written in the immediate aftermath of the events of 
November 10, 2002 when a young Palestinian, Sirkhan Sirkhan, broke into Kibbutz Metzer and 
shot to death a mother and her 4 and 5 year old children as they clung to her, points to the urgent 
need to move beyond the acausality and “alea” of events and, instead, to locate events in the 
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material contradictions which make them possible.  With great sympathy and respect for the 
dead, Avnery argues that “nothing in the world can justify a Palestinian who shoots at a child in 
his mother’s embrace, just as nothing can justify an Israeli who drops a bomb on a house in 
which a child is sleeping in his bed.”  On no uncertain terms, he argues against the notion of “a 
child for a child.” 
Yet, he also points to the blindness of an analytic that sees “events” in isolation from the 
material relations that make them possible. Avnery starts by disputing some of the most 
commonsensical “explanations” in Israeli society for why Palestinians have undertaken such 
actions (e.g., that they are “crazy killers,” “blood thirsty from birth,” “their genes our different 
from ours”) used to dissolve history into a “pathology” of the Palestinian “biology” or “culture” 
against the monumental superiority of Israeli “biology” or “culture.” He then goes on to explain 
the systemic conditions of the Israeli occupation: homes are demolished, and Palestinians are 
turned overnight into the homeless; fruit trees which are the products of generations of labor and 
the main source of livelihood for many, are razed to the ground; children are kept from attending 
school; adults are robbed of any reliable means of employment and subject to daily harassment 
and humiliations at checkpoints; the sick are kept from hospitals; ambulances are prevented from 
entering at checkpoints leaving the injured to die of otherwise preventable and curable causes; 
people are shot at for being out past the curfews imposed on them.  All of these conditions, he 
argues, create the potential for suicide bombers.  Moreover, these conditions, his analysis 
implies, are not “random” occurrences in a relationship of contingency and chance—they are not 
the effect of “culture” clash—they are systemic conditions that are caused by the contradictions 
created by the Israeli occupation. Avnery concludes his analysis of the material conditions that 
enable “suicide bombing” by emphasizing: “All this does not justify the killing of children in the 
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arms of their mother. But it helps to grasp why this is happening, and why this will go on 
happening as long as the occupation lasts” (emphasis added).  In other words, “suicide bombing” 
is not an event best understood through the analytic of “chance” but by its necessary relation to a 
definite material structure of conflicts. 
Avnery, in the above statement, demonstrates awareness that an inquiry into why events 
occur—i.e., an inquiry into their historical and material origins and causes—is not an ex post 
facto moral justification of events with no material basis (a placing of them in a “monotonous 
finality” of “monumental history” as Nietzsche might say) rather, it is a contribution to an 
explanatory critique of events and the material structure of conflicts that produce them.  
Moreover, his analysis implies that to change events requires not moral outrage but 
transformation of the material basis of events—in this case, according to Avnery, by ending the 
Israeli occupation. Avnery is, in this way, offering a critique of the dominant analytic of history 
in contemporary Israeli society (legitimated by the State of Israel) which takes “events” out of 
their historical material relations and presents them as “unrepresentable” affect reducing them to 
trauma—to which the only response is more trauma (Avnery remarks “The chiefs of the IDF 
have a simple solution: hit, hit, hit”).  In the dominant discourses—just as in the mainstream 
presses in the U.S. in the wake of 9/11 and the Patriot Act—any probing analysis into “why” 
(into origins, causes, and material relations of necessity) is dismissed as lunacy or “terrorism.” 
Not only does this inquiry into why offer an intervention into the “monumental” history 
of biological and cultural superiority, but it also, I think, points to lessons in the limits of 
genealogy as an analytic of history; lessons important in the course of all struggles for social 
transformation, including the development of a transformative feminism. Genealogy is, to be 
clear, quite different from the monumental analytic that explains history according to biological 
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destiny or a “pre-ordained” cultural superiority.  According to its proponents, 6 it is aimed to 
“elaborate” or “inventory,” as Edward Said put it, “the formidable structure of cultural 
domination and, specifically for formerly colonized peoples, the dangers and temptations of 
employing this structure upon themselves or upon others” (25) and in this way to dismantle or 
“advance a little in the process of […] ‘unlearning’“ it (28). Yet, on the terms of the genealogical 
analytic, the history of the Israeli occupation and its brutal oppression and exploitation of 
Palestinians can only ultimately be understood as a nexus of power and knowledge or “cultural 
domination,” ultimately derived on the basis of “minute deviations” and “incalculable errors” 
that have been solidified into rituals and a fixed axis of action (Foucault 81). 
Avnery points to the politics of “accident” and implies that “accident” and “error” as an 
analytic of historical events is quite consistent with “all the hundred and one pretexts of 
professional spokesman.” “Accident” as an analytic of events, to put this another way, has 
become a way to legitimate the continuation of class rule by pre-empting probing analysis into 
the historical and material (that is, structural) relations that produce events and mapping them 
onto matters of chance (and by pre-empting such analysis, making it less possible for people to 
grasp the material contradictions in which they live in order to more effectively transform them).  
“Alea” is also, for example, the main mode through which the collapse of “Enron” and the 
transfer of millions of dollars of workers pensions into the hands of a few corporate owners was 
explained away by auditors at Arthur Anderson (friends of the audited) who in Nietzschean 
fashion read the criminal destruction of Enron documents as an effect of the corrupt practices 
and calculation errors of a handful of renegade accountants and their corporate CEOs.  By 
                                                 
6 One of the most rigorous and well known applications and developments of the genealogical analytic of the history 
to the question of Palestine in particular can be found in the writings of Edward Said.  See, for example, 
Orientalism. 
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contrast, the collapse of Enron is, instead, an effect of the systemic crisis of capital—the fall of 
the rate of profit.  The corrupt practices merely hide this structural crisis from the public; they 
are not the cause of it.  “Error,” too, has become a means of explaining away U.S. capital’s class 
war in Iraq as the effect of “misunderstanding,” miscalculations, corrupt CIA reports, errors in 
judgment, the limits of investigations into weapons of mass destruction, caprice—when it is the 
effect of U.S. capital’s falling rate of profit; it is not a culture war between the “west” and the 
“rest” but a class war to transfer the wealth produced by the “rest” into the hands of the “west” to 
bolster its falling rate of profit. Because genealogy, in the final analysis, dissolves history into to 
the disparate and aleatory, it covers over the material structure of conflicts propelling history. 
It is important to point out here, for the historical record, that while Avnery discusses the 
relationship of “suicide bombing” as having a necessary relation to the material contradictions 
brought on by the Israeli occupation, he does not himself situate the Israeli occupation in relation 
to the material contradictions of capitalism.  However, the material conditions that he mentions 
that have contributed to the production of “suicide bombers” are made possible by the material 
contradictions of private ownership of the means of production (production for profit).  It is not, 
in the final analysis, a conflict over religion, heritage, values, affect, or desire for power.  These 
explanations ultimately dissolve the history of the conflict into a culture war or clash of 
civilizations—an explanation perfectly compatible with the Israeli and U.S. security juntas that 
are now defending the interests of North Atlantic capital. Moreover, it is not “land” that is the 
dynamic of Israeli occupation or of the struggle of the Palestinians against the occupation. 
“Land” is the geography of labor-power and the conflict over the “land” is an effect of an 
imperialist class war over the appropriation of the surplus-labor of the Palestinian people (labor 
made “cheaper” than the Israeli worker by a long history of occupation and deterioration of the 
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Palestinian’s material conditions of life) to bolster the rate of profit.  Palestinian “suicide 
bombers” and the Israeli occupation are not best grasped by “alea” or “singularity of events” in 
which events trigger other events with no necessary material relation.  It is not, in other words, 
“minute deviations” and “errors” (Foucault, “Nietzsche” 81) that give rise to the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, but a structure of material conflicts based on private ownership of the means 
of production and the exploitation of surplus-labor that have enabled the Israeli occupation.  
Capital is the dynamic of the conflict and, in this case, is fronting as the State of Israel.  In this 
context, as well, it is important to mention that ending the occupation is an urgent historical 
necessity; but it is not an end in itself; while it is an advancement of what is in essence a class 
struggle of the Palestinian people with capitalism, it does not transform the material 
contradictions of wage-labor/capital upon which the continued exploitation of Palestinian 
workers—and all workers—rests (and if left as an end in itself leads to new class contradictions). 
The dynamic of history, to put this another way, is neither a transcendental subject nor 
“regulative mechanism” subverted by alea (the “singularities of events”) but a material structure 
of conflicts.  It is better grasped by the materialist conception of history which understands that 
“the determining factor in history is, in the last resort, the production and reproduction of 
immediate life” (Engels, The Origin 6). This analytic of history starts with the premise of “the 
existence of living human individuals” who produce in definite material conditions and definite 
relations of production that exist independent of their will: 
The fact is, therefore, that definite individuals who are productively active in a 
definite way enter into these definite social and political relations […] the social 
structure and the state are continually evolving out of the life-process of definite 
individuals, however, of these individuals, not as they may appear in their own or 
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other people’s imaginations, but as they actually are, i.e., as they act, produce 
materially, and hence as they work under definite material limits, presuppositions 
and conditions, independent of their will. (Marx and Engels, German 41) 
Historical forces are not brought into being by consciousness, ideas, values, or chance but 
by means of “productive” or “praxical activity”—labor—which is also an historical relation. 
Labor is, as Engels puts it, not only the source of all wealth but the “prime basic condition for all 
human existence” (Dialectics 170). This is the case since men and women “must be in a position 
to live in order to be able to ‘make history’”; they must be in a position to satisfy needs of 
“eating and drinking […] habitation, clothing and many other things” (Marx and Engels, German 
42). There is no “human existence” that is prior to labor and labor is itself not outside of history 
it is a dialectical relation:  
Labour is, first of all, a process between man and nature, a process by which man, 
through his own actions, mediates, regulates and controls the metabolism between 
himself and nature. He confronts the materials of nature as a force of nature. He 
sets in motion the natural forces which belong to his own body, his arms, legs, 
head and hands, in order to appropriate the materials of nature in a form adapted 
to his own needs. Through this movement he acts upon external nature and 
changes it, and in this way he simultaneously changes his own nature. (Marx, 
Capital 283) 
It is important to explain further what this means since, in Cultural Studies today, and 
particularly in feminism, after a long history since Marx’s writings of the rearticulation of 
“essence” and “nature” as essentialist terms that “construct” an “outside” of history (in biology, 
etc.), this argument is often read as its inverse: the existentialist notion articulated by Heidegger 
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and Sartre that there is “human existence” (Being) prior to “essence” (what one becomes in 
history)—that we are “thrown” in this world and through our daily struggles we make our 
“essence” (we become who we are). Marx’s theorization of the dialectical praxis of labor, by 
contrast, is an explanation that “human existence” is itself a historical and material relation of 
labor which is to say that it is not “naturally given.” Even, for example, the “natural forces” of 
the “body,” “arms,” “legs,” “head,” and “hands” are the product of a history of the dialectical 
praxis of labor and its historical and material development in response to specific conditions of 
production as Engel’s points out in his analysis of the role of labor in the transition from ape to 
human and the development of the opposable thumb on the human hand (Dialectics 170-183).  It 
is, to put it another way, an explanation of historical material necessity: the fact that “human 
existence” and its course of development never exists independently of the material conditions of 
production prevailing at the time (the forces of production) and the social relations within which 
this production takes place (the relations of production or property relations).  And these 
conditions and relations are themselves the product of past labor and, in turn, shape the course of 
all other aspects of social life. But labor conditions never remain static: as the forces of 
production develop this results in the production and satisfaction of new needs which come into 
direct contradiction with the relations of production, requiring transformation in the relations of 
production. Human existence is not prior to the social “metabolism” between the forces of 
production and the relations within which this production takes place and are transformed. It is 
on this basis that Engels also argues that “the final causes of all social changes and political 
revolutions are to be sought, not in men’s brains, not in men’s better insights into eternal truth 
and justice, but in changes in the modes of production and exchange. They are to be sought not 
in the philosophy, but in the economics of each particular epoch” (Engels, Socialism 54). 
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Seen on these terms “agency” and “freedom” of any kind are neither naturally “given,” 
nor are they a product of volition, will, or spirit rather, they require material conditions to be in 
place and, therefore, they are ultimately dependent on and limited by the material relations of 
production. Freedom is in dialectical relation to material relations of necessity; which means that 
it requires material conditions to be in place.  Freedom for women is not simply freedom from 
“moral constraint” (Nietzsche) or “regulative mechanism” but freedom from material constraint. 
Freedom, in other words, from the material constraint of the relations of production.  In a world 
in which the productive forces have developed to the point in which it is possible to provide all 
persons with food, clean water and irrigation, clothing, shelter, healthcare, transportation, 
childcare, freedom from greenhouse gasses and global warming, and so on… freedom is freedom 
from the private property relations (production for profit) that have become fetters to these forces 
and prevent all persons from having access to this.  It on this basis that history is a structure of 
material conflicts and specifically a conflict over the appropriation of social surplus-labor 
between workers and owners. Class, in short, is the dynamic of history including the history of 
feminism. This is the case because private property in the relations of production is the material 
limit beyond which human freedom—and therefore freedom for women—cannot go without 
transforming the material relations of production (and abolishing class relations) by means of 
transforming social praxis (revolution). 
 
THREE: 
To many, my claims regarding feminism, culture, and history will appear completely out 
of sorts at this point in the historical development of Cultural Studies in general and feminist 
Cultural Studies in particular. After all, the concept of “modern” and “postmodern” have been 
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used to mark historical and material change for several decades, with “globalization” gaining 
increasing use in the last 10 years, so that it is almost unheard of to conceive of historical change 
otherwise.  Moreover, as I have discussed extensively in the previous chapter much of 
contemporary feminism sees itself as already having surpassed “wave” theory and its notion of 
“progress” for women within capitalism by its adoption of especially poststructuralist and 
postmodern modes of feminism in which “culture” is read as a semi-autonomous from the 
economic and is primarily understood as a realm of signifying practices that does not follow a 
logic of progress. Most significantly, the objection to my critique is that examining culture in 
terms of capitalism is a late form of economism and economic reductionism and that culture is 
the terrain of material struggle, freedom and social transformation. As I have marked in the 
previous chapter, as a result of the “cultural turn” in much of contemporary feminism in the U.S. 
(which has been reinforced by the canonical understandings of gender and sexuality 
institutionalized by “post-” theories including poststructuralism, postcolonialism and post-
Marxism), differences are thought largely to be cultural—and quite often discursive—and 
change for women is also understood primarily in terms of cultural and discursive changes. My 
argument that “class” is the dynamic of history will, therefore, be read by many contemporary 
feminists as a violent exclusion of differences of gender, sexuality, race, ethnicity, disabilities… 
As I aim to show, however, the culturalist views of “difference” and the relationship of 
differences to historicity produces as feminist politics based on class rule and in doing so limits 
its changes to changes for some women who have gained within capitalism at the expense of the 
majority. 
It will be useful to start here to unpack the central lines of contestation for the Cultural 
Turn in feminism, in the prominent late 1990s debate over the relation of culture to the economic 
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between Judith Butler and Nancy Fraser, both highly influential postmodern feminists. It is 
important to mark here that the Cultural Turn (as I discuss further on in this chapter) really 
begins much earlier on; Butler and Fraser are rehearsing (in relation to debates over sexuality) 
what began to develop in feminism in the West during the New Social Movements.  In her essay 
“Merely Cultural,” Butler argues against the conceptual distinction between culture and the 
economic on the grounds that it renders struggles other than class, namely sexuality, as “merely 
cultural.” The “economic/culture” divide, she contends, is a conceptual and analytical 
anachronism and invention that has presented culture as “immaterial,” situated struggles for 
freedom of (homo)sexuality in this domain of “immaterial culture,” and in doing so, has 
marginalized these struggles as derivative and secondary. To put this another way, Butler’s 
contention is that the emptying of struggles for freedom of sexuality of their economic content is 
really an effect of the conceptual distinction between “economics” and “culture.” To deal with 
this problem, Butler proposes that it is necessary to deconstruct and abandon the conceptual 
distinction between “economics” and “culture” in favor of, as Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri 
have also put it, “the increasing indistinguishability of economic and cultural phenomena” 
(Empire 275). “Is it possible,” Butler asks, “to distinguish, even analytically, between a lack of 
cultural recognition and a material oppression, when the very definition of legal ‘personhood’ is 
rigorously circumscribed by cultural norms that are indissociable from their material effects?” 
(41). On this basis, she contends, it becomes clear that “sexuality must be understood as part of 
[the] mode of production” (41). For Butler, the (mis)recognition of sexuality—both “normative 
sexuality” and the “non-normative sexualities it harbors within its own terms . . . [and] the 
sexualities that thrive and suffer outside of those terms—are not “merely culture” but are 
constitutive of economic relations themselves. Moreover, in this view, it is only by 
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understanding sexuality and gender as “part of the mode of production” (and expanding the 
definition of the economic beyond relations of wage-labor/capital), that struggles over social 
inequalities of sexuality and gender can be returned to struggles for economic freedom and not 
reduced to the “merely cultural.” 
But of what, according to Butler, do “economic struggles” for freedom of sexuality 
consist? The “material” and “economic” struggle for freedom of sexuality, for Butler, is a 
struggle over cultural recognition and legal personhood. To put this another way, in proposing to 
redefine sexuality as an economic struggle not “merely cultural,” Butler in actuality rewrites the 
economic relations in cultural terms by, for example, arguing that struggles over “cultural 
recognition” and “legal personhood” for gays and lesbians are “part of [the] mode of production” 
itself (41). What this argument does is equate the cultural struggles that appear on the surface of 
capitalism, particularly for inclusion in private property rights, with fundamental changes in the 
private property relations themselves and the relationship of sexuality and gender to them. 
In her “Heterosexism, Misrecognition and Capitalism: A Response to Judith Butler,” 
Nancy Fraser contests Butler’s evacuation of the culture/economic conceptual distinction on the 
grounds that such a maneuver posits the indistinguishability of cultural and economic 
phenomena “by definition,” not through historical analysis and analytical grasping of material 
practices. Struggles over sexuality, for example, do not alter the relations of class inequality in 
capitalism because the regulation of sexuality “structures neither the social division of labour nor 
the mode of exploitation of labor-power in capitalist society” (145). The historical evidence, she 
firmly establishes, is that “capitalist society now permits significant numbers of individuals to 
live through wage labour outside of heterosexual families” (147). Moreover, multinational 
corporations such as Apple, Disney and American Airlines have shown that they are not 
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incompatible with the recognition of sexual difference by instituting policies such as domestic 
partner benefits. “Contemporary capitalism,” she maintains, “seems not to require heterosexism” 
(147).  
In the absence of historical evidence that changes in cultural recognition of sexuality 
have a transformative effect on the social relations of production in capitalism, Fraser concludes 
that the cultural theory that is most useful for understanding struggles over gender and sexuality 
is, therefore, one which sees sexuality as strictly a matter of cultural change and, moreover, 
culture as materially autonomous—not coterminous with and indistinguishable—from the 
economic. Culture and, therefore, sexuality, she maintains, have their own, independent, 
materiality. For Fraser, economic inequalities (what Fraser euphemistically calls “economic 
disabilities”) for homosexuals are “better understood as effects of heterosexism in the relations 
of recognition than as hardwired into the structure of capitalism” (147). The material inequality 
of gays and lesbians, according to Fraser, is not connected to the structure of wage-labor/capital 
relations but a matter of how gays and lesbians are culturally valued. The larger lesson of 
Fraser’s text is that culture and cultural values should be the terrain of struggle for economic 
equality and social justice for those marginalized on the grounds of sexuality and gender. She 
writes, “The good news is we do not need to overthrow capitalism in order to remedy those 
disabilities” (147). Capitalism can continue exploiting the labor of workers for profit, and private 
property relations can continue, with no effect on material inequalities of gender and sexuality 
and the economic, social, and political equality of homosexuals and women. In other words, she 
writes the struggle for freedom of sexuality as purely a struggle for cultural, legal and political 
equality within capitalism. This evacuates feminism as a struggle for freedom from economic 
exploitation: it re-inscribes it as a ruling class movement based on equality of “values.” 
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Despite their local differences in how they define the relationship of culture to the 
economic, what unites the arguments of Fraser and Butler is that, as part of the Cultural Turn in 
feminism, they convert the economic contradictions of women’s lives into matters of cultural 
values. Their arguments are based on the notion that it is the struggle over cultural norms and 
values that is the terrain of economic and material freedom on the basis of sexuality and gender. 
To be clear, the “difference” between Butler and Fraser is that Butler contends that changes in 
cultural recognition of sexuality and gender “constitute” fundamental changes in wage-
labor/capital relations, while Fraser argues that such changes have little or no effect on the 
relation of wage-labor to capital but, she contends, such changes do constitute material and 
economic change for women and homosexuals (if not for all workers). These are really formal 
differences in their main argument: while Butler defines the cultural as constituting the 
economic, and Fraser defines it as autonomous from the economic, their main argument is that 
the struggles for material freedom of gender and sexuality are waged on the terrain of battles 
over legal personhood, cultural recognition, and the way in which human beings are morally, 
ethically and culturally valued, respected, or esteemed. In other words, material freedom and 
social justice in the dominant cultural theory are founded on cultural values.  
How effective is this “value theory” of gender and sexuality as a theory of inequality, 
historical change, and the material relations and social praxis through which this occurs? Have 
the dramatic cultural changes in gender and sexuality relations, values and mores that have taken 
place for some—particularly in the West and in cosmopolitan centers of commerce—over the 
last 50 years (from so called “modernity,” through “postmodernity,” to “globality”) constituted 
material freedom for women and material freedom of sexuality, thereby offering historical and 
material evidence that gender and sexuality are best addressed on the terrain of cultural values? 
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Moreover, have these changes in culture, as theorists such as Hardt and Negri seem to maintain, 
fundamentally transformed the very structures of production in capitalism so that it is no longer 
based on the exploitation of surplus-labor and is now constituted by the desires of a 
multicultural, polysexual, transgendered, and transnational “multitude”? 
On the cultural surfaces of capitalism, (some) women’s lives, indeed, appear to have 
changed dramatically since the end of World War II. Women around the world, in the North and 
in the South, have been more thoroughly incorporated into the waged workforce over the last 50 
years. Moreover, owing to greater participation in the workforce, the economic status of many 
women is not dependent on the income of a husband. In many regions of the world women are a 
more visible part of public life than in previous generations, with increased political and legal 
freedoms to take part in political office, business, public institutions, public demonstrations and 
civilian life. Some women have more freedoms, comparatively speaking, to express their desires 
or discontent with respect to sexual relations: including pre-marital sex, living outside of 
monogamy and/or marriage, legal right to birth control and abortion, bearing children outside of 
marriage, the right to divorce, and sexual relations and/or domestic partnerships with women.  
 Yet, these increased “cultural freedoms” of gender and sexuality for (some) women have 
not freed women from material inequality and economic exploitation. At the same time that 
women have gained “cultural freedoms” to participate in the paid workforce and women all over 
the world have become part of the wage-labor force in increasing numbers, women also 
constitute some of its most exploited sections. Moreover, not only for the majority of women, 
poverty has increased for all workers:  the top 100 CEOs who 30 years ago made 39 times the 
average workers income, now make 1000 times their income (“Ever Higher Society”). The wage 
gap between men and women workers has narrowed, but 59% of this is owing to men’s falling 
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wages rather than rising wages for women (“Working Women in the Global Economy”). The 
moving of women into the workforce and “cultural freedoms” that have coincided with this, in 
other words, have taken place in the context of a transnational capitalist economy in which the 
gap between rich and poor has grown astronomically, suggesting that alongside increased 
employment for women, and increased working hours for those who are employed, wealth is 
being transferred upward. The incorporation of women into the workforce, in other words, has 
coincided with increased exploitation—the private appropriation by the few of the surplus-labor 
of the majority—and the concentration of wealth into fewer hands. Economic freedom is an 
illusion when women—while culturally and legally “free” to work—make less than men and, 
along side the majority of men, are subject to exploitation. Moreover, the cultural and legal 
freedom to wage-work is only a formal freedom not only when women still get paid less than 
men, but when their increased workforce participation is used as a means to lower wages and 
increase the rate of exploitation, and when it has coincided with increased poverty of women 
worldwide. While in the last 50 years capitalism has pulled more women than ever before into 
the paid workforce–and given new cultural freedoms to women to accommodate these shifts—
the gap between rich and poor has grown astronomically and along with it the vast majority of 
women have sunk deeper and deeper into poverty. For instance, as Goretti Horgan has argued in 
her essay “How Does Globalisation Affect Women?”: “Working outside the home and being 
economically independent means [women] don’t have to answer to any man, but the ‘race to the 
bottom’ on which the expansion of global capital is being built means that, typically, this work 
entails long hours at low wages and makes caring for children very difficult.” 
While some women have gained increased cultural freedoms to live and have sexual 
relations outside of marriage, monogamy, “mono-culturalism” and heterosexuality these 
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polysexual and multicultural “kinship” relations have also coincided with the deeper 
subordination of sexuality, kinship, and family relations to commodity relations and production 
for profit. As of 2001, in the United States for example, while less than 25% of the population 
(compared to 45% in 1960) lives in the traditional “nuclear family” of two married, heterosexual 
parents with biological children (Benfer “The Nuclear Family Takes a Hit”), the increased 
diversity of the family has not freed kinship and sexual relations from economic inequality under 
capitalism. According to a report from the University of Dayton’s School of Law, between 1977 
and 1999 “the after-tax income of the richest 20 percent of American families increased by 43 
percent, while that of the poorest 20 percent decreased 9 percent, allowing for inflation. The 
actual income of those living on the lowest salaries was even less than 30 years ago” (“Widening 
Gap Between Rich and Poor”). “New” polysexual, multicultural, transgeneration kinship, 
affective, and family relations are not so “new”: they do not constitute the transformation of the 
material structure of the family under capitalism. The family is still an economic unit of 
capitalism in which (multicultural, polysexual, transgenerational) workers shoulder the cost of 
social reproduction out of their wages while the socially produced wealth is appropriated by 
owners. Households headed by women, for example, while increasingly common represent one 
of the fastest growing poverty groups around the world (Horgan).  
 Moreover, what for some is increased cultural acceptance of multiple sexualities, and 
transnational kinship arrangements, has come hand in hand with the growth of the transnational 
sex industry, mail-order-brides, domestic labor migration and the deeper subordination of all 
modes of sexuality, kinship, and family to commodification and production for profit. When one 
looks at the historical evidence of “sexual freedom” under capitalism, on one level sexual 
freedoms appear to have increased and some sexual mores appear to have to relaxed. On another 
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level, in the material structure of social relations, sexual relations have become more 
subordinated to commodity production and exchange suggesting that it is not so much freedom 
of sexuality that had been won but freedom to deploy sexuality on the market and to be ever 
more subjected to the relations of wage-labor. 
For example, not only “family values” but also “queer values” are enabled by capitalism 
and marked by its class contradictions. Gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgendered (glbt) values 
have been depicted in television programs such as Will and Grace and in films such as 
Transamerica as increasingly part of mainstream life, particularly in the West. But closer 
examination reveals the class divided structure of the material relations producing the changing 
values over glbt. The material conditions of freedom are quite different for instance for an upper-
middle class queer urban tribe in Manhattan, Paris, or Tokyo and a brothel of transgendered 
multi-cultural sex workers in the same cities. While both may be marked by multiple sex partners 
and both serve as an extended “kinship” structure and are historically speaking a response to the 
contradictions and failures of the nuclear family and monogamous marriage under capitalism, 
they are also markers of the limits to and contradictions in “sexual freedom” and “values 
recognition” under class relations. The transgendered sex workers are otherwise 
“unemployable,” owing to their marginalized status. Their sexuality and “daring,” while giving 
them “freedom” from conventional family values, does not give them economic freedom and, in 
fact, is used as a tool of exploitation against them, making them “more or less expensive to use.” 
The marker of this economic unfreedom—is that sexuality is subordinated to the 
commodification of sexual relations, to economic compulsion, and the subordination of sexual 
relations to financial considerations. These constraints are not simply matters of “cultural values” 
with economic repercussions rather the cultural values are themselves an effect of the social 
 86 
relations of production in capitalism and the fact that all levels of human existence—including 
sexuality—are subordinated to production for profit. The increased cultural acceptance for some 
has really been an articulation of class freedoms for a now polysexual managerial class living in 
the West, not sexual freedom for all which requires freedom of sexuality from private property 
relations. 
The seeming exception to the general deterioration of women’s conditions of life in 
transnational capitalism is that there is now a small minority of women, alongside and 
independent of ruling class men, who own and control the material wealth of society and, 
therefore, wield tremendous power over the life conditions of other men and women. Moreover, 
some women have also increasingly joined the ranks of upper-middle class managers and receive 
substantial remunerations from capital for their services of managing workers (both men and 
women) to adjust to the imperatives of transnational capital and production for profit. For this 
small minority of women, changes in cultural values have meant the opportunity to wield class 
power and privilege independent of men. However, their “freedoms” are themselves not 
representative of freedoms for women or freedom of sexuality but of class freedoms, which are 
materially dependent on the exploited labor of others including the vast majority of women. For 
example, the “freedom” of ruling class and high managerial women from the constraints of the 
family under capitalism and for leisure time either entirely away from or in addition to work is 
made possible not by material freedom for all women but by the exploitation of others, including 
women employed as domestics and caregivers. Exploitation, in other words, has continued along 
into “new” social and cultural relations of gender and sexuality. While on the surface of 
capitalism, there appear to be new freedoms that suggest a break within capital from its 
exploitative past, if we go into the “hidden abode of production” we find that the same, 
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fundamental division between capital and wage-labor still shapes social difference, culture and 
cultural freedoms (Capital 279).  
 
FOUR 
These historical and material developments throw into sharp relief the theory in 
contemporary feminism that, as Stuart Hall once put it, “the word is now as ‘material’ as the 
world” (“New Times” 233). The “value theory” of gender and sexuality, which argues that 
cultural change—and particularly discursive change in established meanings in culture and the 
social representations and cultural values of recognition “founded” on those meanings—is 
economic change has been unable to explain the fact that exploitation and increasing economic 
inequality have been brought along into changed social and cultural relations and have 
accompanied new cultural representation and “freedoms” of gender and sexuality. Changes in 
cultural representations, values, and “everyday” practices of gender and sexuality, in other 
words, do not constitute material and economic freedom for women from the exploitation of 
their labor and increasing poverty in capitalism. Moreover, the counter-part to this culturalist 
argument—that what is lacking and, therefore, what is needed for freedom are the further 
extension of “cultural freedoms” of “recognition” and “ethical value”—has been unable to 
explain why, historically, new “cultural values” of recognition (including new “left” modes) are 
produced and why they have coincided with increased impoverishment of the majority of women 
worldwide, the deterioration of the economic conditions of the majority of men and women in 
transnational capitalism, and the transfer of wealth away from social resources in education, 
childcare, healthcare, social security and toward corporate welfare, the defense, and other 
measures that defend the freedom of transnational corporations to make a profit. 
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 Feminism in the wake of the Cultural Turn has been and is increasingly unable to explain 
and work to transform the deepening social and economic contradictions of gender and sexuality 
in capitalism now because it has bypassed issues of labor and abandoned a materialist 
conception of history for culturalist conceptions of gender and sexuality as autonomous 
signifying practices and cultural singularities. It has abandoned knowledge of the relationship of 
differences such as gender and sexuality to the material relations of production in capitalism, to 
the contradiction between the forces and relations of production, and particularly to class as a 
material relation of the subject of labor to ownership of the means of production; a social relation 
based on the exploitation of surplus-labor. In doing so the canonical feminisms have helped 
transnational capital to dismantle feminism as a movement for social transformation to end 
economic exploitation and have converted feminism into a cultural values movement to update 
women to contemporary modes of exploitation. 
It is important here to further clarify what I only mentioned briefly earlier: that class is 
the dynamic of history including the history of feminism.  Class, to be clear, is not an “identity” 
it is a material relation of production. Class is the relation of the subject of labor to ownership of 
the means of production: whether one owns the means of production and privately appropriates 
the surplus-labor of others, or whether one only owns one’s labor-power in order to survive.  
This is the root issue for feminism and struggles for economic equality and social justice because 
class (the relation between those who own the means of production and exploit the surplus-labor 
of others who only have their labor-power to sell in order to survive) is the material relation that 
structures all other social relations in capitalism. This is because it is the material relation that 
determines whether or not people own the means of production and therefore command over the 
labor of others and the ends and interests toward which the socially produced wealth is put or 
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whether they are exploited and live in abject poverty. The capitalist mode of production, which is 
at its root a social relation of production for profit, does not fundamentally rely on the exclusion 
of difference rather, it relies on the exploitation of surplus-labor for profit. In the course of its 
historical development, moreover, capitalism produces differences: it produces increasingly 
complex divisions of labor in order to increase its capacity to extract surplus-labor and with these 
complex divisions of labor, in turn, it also produces the cultural means and “practical 
consciousness” through which the subject of labor adjusts to these divisions. The “differences” 
that are acquired in the formation of “identities” are a culturalizing of the material relations of 
capitalism and its divisions of labor. 
 The reason that the materialist conception of history and the distinction between the 
“economic” and the “cultural” is necessary for feminist theory is because it enables those 
struggling for social transformation to grasp the difference between the cultural changes in, for 
example, gender and sexual relations that occur as a response to the intensification of class 
contradictions in capitalism and the way it extracts surplus labor and material changes that result 
from the transformation of the production relations themselves. To collapse the distinction 
between the “cultural” and the “economic” is to erase the material difference between cultural 
shifts in capitalism, which derive from the development of its forces of production and the 
intensification of class contradictions between the forces and relations of production and 
material transformation, which derives from the transformation of the social relations of 
production (private property relations). In doing so, this collapse substitutes changes in the 
modes through which the subject of labor is given the necessary “cultural skills” to live under 
changing forms of exploitation for the transformation of the relations of exploitation themselves. 
“Feminism,” under these conditions, becomes a means for reforming and updating gendered and 
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sexed subjectivities to culturally, subjectively and psychologically adjust to more complex and 
sophisticated modes of exploitation—and increasingly brutal economic and social inequalities—
as the class contradictions of capitalism intensify, but not of transforming social relations of 
production based on exploitation.  
In order to begin to produce a theory and praxis of transformative feminism it is 
necessary to break from the contemporary feminist embrace of the “Cultural Turn” and its 
reformist conception of social change that we find in feminist theories such as those articulated 
by Butler and Fraser and, instead, produce a materialist theory of social difference and historical 
change. What feminism needs is a labor theory of gender and social differences. This means that 
social differences such as gender, sexuality, race, and ethnicity are not primarily “discursive 
constructs,” “signifying practices,” “literary categories,” or matters of legal personhood, identity, 
affect, values, ethics, or even public policy or law rather, they are social relations of capital. 
Moreover, the way feminism and the transformation of material relations of exploitation and 
oppression of women are articulated in history is not homologous to cultural changes such as 
changes in cultural representations, signifying practices, legal arrangements and public policy, 
management styles and strategies, lifestyles, desires, affects, values and/or cultural productions 
of women.  
To explain gender, sexuality, and other social differences as “social relations of capital,” 
is not to ignore or discount differences rather, it is to explain that they are, as Teresa Ebert has 
argued, “situated in the world historical processes of labor and capital” (“Rematerializing” 34) or 
that they are what Delia Aguilar calls “class-bound” issues. By understanding social differences 
as “class bound” issues, Aguilar more specifically means that they are social relations bound to 
the material relations of production based in the exploitation of surplus-labor (413). In 
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contemporary feminism in the West, Aguilar argues, “The theoretical frames utilized” to explain 
and analyze concrete matters of gender and sexuality “(most of which can be safely classified as 
belonging to the postmodern constellation) are those that carefully steer clear of the vaguest 
notions of surplus labor, so that no matter how eloquently empirical data may speak of 
exploitation, the transcription winds up telling another story” (413). In her analysis of “sex 
work” and “domestic labor”—particularly of the material conditions of Filipina sex workers and 
domestics—she shows that in the absence of a clear grasp between the relationship of gender and 
sexuality to class relations and the exploitation of surplus-labor, postmodern conceptions of 
gender and sexuality end up producing a very moralizing, individualist and idealist 
understanding of difference and social change based on the autonomous agency of the local 
subject abstracted from the englobing material relations of exploitation in capitalism. 
As Teresa Ebert argues in her essay “Rematerializing Feminism,” social differences such 
as gender, sexuality and race are forged out of the material processes of capitalism namely, the 
social division of labor and private property relations (the social relations of production). They 
are produced and change as an effect of these material relations of production. Moreover, they 
become social differences, indexes of social inequality, and “spaces of historical agency and sites 
of social struggle […] because of the divisions of labor and property relations (class)” (Ebert, 
“Rematerializing’ 38). “Gender,” for instance, has what Ebert calls “a material history” in the 
sexual division of labor in the family in class society (37-40). This means that, for example, 
cultural practices of “femininity” and “masculinity” are an articulation and culturalizing of the 
division of labor between “reproductive” and “productive” labor in, for example, early industrial 
capitalism when women are primarily located in reproductive labor in the home.   
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However the “gender division of labor”—e.g., where women are located in the division 
of labor between production and reproduction, or paid or unpaid labor and what occupations they 
hold vis-à-vis men—is not autonomous from class relations nor do they “constitute” these 
relations. The gender division of labor is dependent on and determined by the root division of 
labor and property relations between owners and laborers: in capitalism the division between 
capital (exploiter) and wage-labor (exploited). Engels discusses this in his historical analysis of 
the way in which the transformation of the mode of production and property relations from 
feudalism to capitalism, and the shifting of social production from the patriarchal household 
under feudalism to modern industry under capitalism put the gender division of labor “topsy-
turvy simply because the division of labor outside the family had changed” (Origin 158). This 
transformation of property relations in production transformed the character of women’s labor 
and placed women in a relationship of economic dependence on men. 
 The basic understanding that the “gender division of labor” is itself the effect of class 
(private ownership of the means of production) is also applicable in capitalism now: production 
for profit has now pulled women en masse into the workforce and has altered gender and sexual 
relations to accommodate this shift. Yet, these new modes of gender and sexuality relations are 
still used as tools of exploitation by, for example, placing women into contingent, part-time, and 
low-paid workforces. What underpins not only changes in the location of women in the 
workforce but in reproductive relations and matters of lifestyle, personal relations, and the daily 
practices of “gender” and “sexuality” is, under capitalism, production for profit. Gender and 
sexual relations in this respect are determined by class relations and the division between those 
who own the means of production and therefore command over the material resources and 
conditions of life of the majority of people of the world and those who only have their labor to 
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sell in order to survive and are exploited. For example, “same sex” marriage and family are not 
simply sites of desire, choice, and affect that are autonomous from production rather they are 
“class-bound” sites of economic necessity and compulsion under changing labor relations in 
capitalism. For many, “same sex marriage” has become an economic necessity under capitalism. 
Yet, at the same time, “same-sex” marriage and family—like heterosexual marriage and 
family—is a “private property” relation marked by class inequality. It is not indicative of and 
does not bring about freedom of sexuality from privatized social reproduction in capitalism in 
which the cost of social reproduction of the workforce is the private responsibility of workers 
and in which some families live off of profit while the majority live off of wages and are 
exploited.  
 To restate, gender and sexuality each have a material history in the social division of 
labor. What make “gender” and “sexuality” sites of social struggle and change is that they are 
reproduced as tools of exploitation. They are used in capitalism as a means to raise or lower the 
rate of exploitation. This is both the case in terms of the way in which gender and sexuality are 
used to raise or lower wages as well as, for example, the way in which gender and sexuality are 
used to control the rate of growth and development of the working population and, therefore, 
control capital’s access to the supply of exploitable labor. But these measures are themselves 
dependent on the social relations of production: the fact that capital relies on labor-power to 
produce surplus-labor for profit. Capitalism, in other words, reproduces social differences—and 
requires changes to cultural relations—to pull workers in and out of the workforce, raise or lower 
their wages, depending on what is most profitable. With this in mind, material freedom for 
women is not simply a matter of their relocation in the workforce nor is it a matter of the changes 
in everyday gender and sexuality practices that the inculcation of women into wage-labor has 
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made necessary. Rather it is a matter of emancipation from exploitation through the praxical 
transformation of social relations of production. 
 
FIVE 
 To elaborate on these issues further it will be useful here to re-examine contemporary 
feminism’s increasing embrace of culturalism—which has taken place in what have been 
understood as respective “waves” of feminism—not just in terms of their immanent 
contradictions but to show how the Cultural Turn in feminism is itself an effect of contradictions 
in the social relations of production, starting in this chapter with the “second wave” of feminism 
in the United States and the early stages of its transition from “modern” to “postmodern” 
feminism. What has been called “second wave” feminism came of political and intellectual age 
in the material conditions of capitalism in the decades immediately following World War II, 
particularly during the “long boom” of capitalism—the most sustained economic boom in 
capitalism’s history, roughly spanning from the end of World War II to the oil crisis of 1973, in 
which the world capitalist economy underwent enormous growth in productivity and produced 
wealth on an unprecedented scale. Imperialist nations such as the United States, France, and 
Germany saw their gross national product triple, quadruple, and quintuple respectively. Industrial 
urban centers were produced throughout the globe and the rural populations of not only 
imperialist nations but also nations such as Spain, Italy and Ireland were reduced to less than one 
third of the total population (Harman 75).  
 The institutionalization of Fordist mass production practices—large-scale, mass 
production, with moving assembly lines—in the technical division of labor and of Taylorism in 
management appeared to many at the time to “free” workers (at least those in the West) from the 
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class contradictions of capitalism (in much the same way that more recently, globalization 
theorists believe that “post-Fordism” frees workers from class contradictions). Moreover, with 
production taking place primarily within the respective national boundaries of competing 
capitalist interests, capital maintained an economic interest in supporting the reproduction of the 
domestic labor-supply. Capital is dependent upon the exploitation of surplus-labor of workers to 
produce profit. Moreover, it also needed these workers to act as consumers in an attempt to stave 
off crisis of profit caused by overproduction. In order to deal with labor shortages following the 
war and reproduce a national working population that could both produce at the existing levels of 
production and at the same time actually purchase mass consumer goods in order for profit to be 
realized, it was useful for capital at the time to maintain high wages and moreover, to allot part 
of the wealth produced to economic and social welfare, education, etc. As a result, the wage-
working populations, particularly of the imperialist nations which saw steady increases in their 
gross national production, also saw a steady relatively uninterrupted increase in their wages, 
access to mass consumer goods, an expansion of economic and social welfare and the “welfare 
state,” as well as an expansion of the culture industries aimed at social reproduction of workers, 
such as the university, and a steady increase in the standard of living of large sectors of the 
working population (Pelizzon and Casparis 122-126; Allen 288-289). 
 But the appearance of capitalism does not correspond to the essence of capitalism: the 
root material relations of production based on the exploitation of surplus-labor of workers who 
do not own the means of production and its appropriation into the hands of a small fraction of 
owners. Behind the appearance of equilibrium and progress under capitalism to many in the 
West, this unprecedented productivity and wealth was undergirded by the structure of 
exploitation manifested in sharp class inequality, imperialist conquest and warfare to subordinate 
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new areas and regions of the globe to capitalist production, displace and proletarianize the rural 
poor, and transfer wealth produced by workers throughout the world into the hands of the 
capitalist class. Despite the “boom” in the global capitalist economy, economic inequality 
persisted globally. In Latin America for instance, urban workers lived in a state of frequent 
unemployment, dire poverty, and primarily resided in shanty towns without electricity and 
running water. China and India produced huge urban centers while the majority of their 
populations still resided in rural poverty (Harman 75). Even within nations that benefited 
enormously from the long boom, such as the United States where the wage-working population 
was experiencing a steady rise in wages and employment in what many at the time thought was 
proof of a secure “balance” between labor and capital, economic exploitation still existed below 
the surface. Many women, particularly in the earlier stages of the long boom, were pushed out of 
the waged workforce and back into reproductive labor in the home to help re-supply the depleted 
domestic labor force after WWII. Women wage-workers faced inequality in the workplace, 
lower wages, which, among other things, reinforced economic compulsion into the family, 
heterosexuality, motherhood, and marriage. Workers of color and immigrant workers, moreover, 
faced intense racism and segregation which devalued their labor-power forcing them to work in 
conditions of sporadic employment, low-wages, dead end jobs with the threat of state sanctioned 
brutality for resisting unequal conditions. To put this another way, on the social surfaces of 
capitalism, particularly in the West, there appeared to be a stable balance between wage-labor 
and capital and the notion that capitalism—and the dominant Fordist production practices it 
deployed at the time in order to produce profit—led to increasing prosperity for all. On the other 
hand, this increased productivity on the part of workers and the “prosperity” that was enjoyed by 
the capitalist class and some segments of the laboring population, was not actually founded on a 
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mutual accord but on the private appropriation of surplus-labor (exploitation) which resulted in 
increasing economic inequality, instability and crisis worldwide.  
 What has been called the “second wave” of feminism in the West, and its conceptions of 
gender and sexuality, were forged on the basis of these class contradictions during the “long 
boom” of capitalism and at a specific stage of historical development of its laboring practices—
or “productive forces”—of Fordist mass production. Feminism at this time, of course, used a 
variety of contesting and conflicting analytical approaches to understand and act upon the 
material contradictions and their relation to gender and sexuality in the decades immediately 
following World War II—such as the liberal feminism of Betty Friedan, the radical feminism of 
Shulamith Firestone, the “dual systems” theory of Heidi Hartman, the black feminism of 
Dorothy Joseph and Audre Lorde, and the socialist feminism of Angela Davis, Mary-Alice 
Waters and the members of the Combahee River Collective. But despite their differences, like 
the feminist theories of today, they are all marked by the economic contradictions of the day. 
They are articulations of the social relations of production and class struggle over women’s 
relationship to class, exploitation, and capital.  
 Take, for instance, the classic modernist conception of feminism typified in the liberal 
humanist feminism of Betty Friedan. In her landmark contribution to the inauguration of “second 
wave feminism,” The Feminine Mystique, Friedan critiqued the way in which what she called 
“the feminine mystique” re-defined the “woman question” exclusively in terms of women’s 
“sexual role” and excluded women from being considered, alongside men, as “human beings of 
limitless human potential”: 
[T]he logic of the feminine mystique redefined the very nature of woman’s 
problem. When woman was seen as a human being of limitless human potential, 
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equal to man, anything that kept her from realizing her full potential was a 
problem to be solved: barriers to higher education and political participation, 
discrimination or prejudice in law or morality. But now that woman is seen only 
in terms of her sexual role, the barriers to the realization of her full potential, the 
prejudices which deny her full participation in the world, are no longer problems. 
The only “problems” now are those that might disturb her adjustment as a 
housewife. So career is a problem, education is a problem, political interest, even 
the very admission of women’s intelligence and individuality is a problem. (61) 
The “feminine mystique” that Friedan brought to the fore of public discussion emerged at a time 
in which many women who were previously drawn into the waged workforce for the first time 
during World War II in order to serve as productive labor for capital were now being pushed 
back into reproductive labor in the family. Historic gains made for these women in institutions of 
public education, childcare, social welfare to make it possible for women to participate in the 
waged workforce had been re-privatized in the 1950s to re-secure women’s reproductive labor in 
the home. Friedan’s own analysis of “the feminine mystique,” for example, points back to 
previous historical periods in the United States, such as the 1910s and 20s as well as during 
World War II in which women’s participation in the waged workforce was on the rise and in 
which sexual mores were not always confined strictly to “family values” and women’s place in 
the home. In fact she argued that one of the characteristics of “the feminine mystique” was that it 
contributed to narrowing the scope of women’s participation in public life and the scope of what 
were understood as the problems confronting women of the time.  
 To be clear, Friedan’s argument does not contain an explicit address of the relationship of 
gender, sexuality, and women to class and capitalism and instead defines the “woman question” 
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exclusively in terms of subjective idealism. There is, in fact, no mention of capitalism in 
Friedan’s text at all. According to Friedan’s analysis, the structure of the “woman problem” (that 
is, the terrain of material struggle and freedom for women) was a psycho-cultural one—a 
pathology in women brought on by “the dehumanizing aspects of modern mass culture”—that 
kept them trapped in domestic “purposelessness”:     
it is not an exaggeration to call the stagnating state of millions of American 
housewives a sickness, a disease in the shape of a progressively weaker core of 
human self that is being handed down to their sons and daughters at a time when 
the dehumanizing aspects of modern mass culture make it necessary for men and 
women to have a strong core of self, strong enough to retain human individuality 
through the frightening, unpredictable pressures of our changing environment. 
(305) 
The main problem, as defined by Friedan, was “the new feminine morality” and women’s fear of 
their own “success” which prevented them from equal participation in the workforce and public 
life. In other words, “why” women were oppressed, according to the logic of The Feminine 
Mystique, had to do with cultural values that kept men dependent upon women’s servitude and 
women pathologically fearful of their own success alongside men. The struggle for women’s 
liberation, therefore, was defined primarily as a struggle for redefinition of gender and sexual 
values to allow for the inclusion of women as equal participants in the workforce and public life 
under capitalism.  
 However, the “discontent” and “cultural values” that Friedan marks as an expression of 
internal desires and drives of all women as “human beings of limitless human potential” is 
actually a class desire whose meaning is fought out not in the immanent textuality of Friedan’s 
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text but in the material relations of capitalism outside of the text that enable it. The narratives of 
discontent are laments over such issues as having to ask husbands for money to go shopping and 
out to lunch with friends rather than control their own disposable income to spend, doing the 
majority of housework rather than paying domestic labor to do it, not using one’s ivy league 
education for advancement in the professions and instead attending college to find a husband. 
Such “problems,” however, are not existential conditions of life as such for “women” as “human 
beings of limitless human potential.”  Rather they are the highly determined material 
contradictions of a particular class-fraction of women whose economic privilege in class 
society—though dependent on and controlled by their fathers or husbands—afforded them 
luxuries such as disposable income and ivy league educations to begin with. The existentialist 
and psychologistic—or subjective idealist—approach of Friedan abstracted social contradictions 
of gender, marriage, sexuality, work and so on from the material relations of production based 
on private property. Understanding the “woman question” and the material contradictions of 
“marriage” and “family” under capitalism in these existentialist and subjective idealist terms 
abstracted from the relations of production in capitalism masked the material relations of 
exploitation that bring about these contradictions for the majority of women (who did not have 
the luxuries of Friedan and other upper-middle class women). In doing so, it limited the terrain of 
feminism as such to the material interests and contradictions faced by a class-fraction of women 
for whom independence from their husbands for a position of relative economic privilege was a 
material possibility; women who wanted to maintain this relative privilege on their own by 
gaining a greater “independent” share of distribution.  
 The material reality of the time is that the majority of women—working class women and 
women of color—both in “advanced capitalist” nations such as the United States as well as so 
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called “developing” nations such as Spain, China and India were facing a much sharper set of 
social and economic contradictions than, for instance, the problem of having their own 
independent share of disposable income and being able to enjoy a position of relative class 
privilege in the professions. For the majority of women already working, their conditions of life 
were marked by low wages, economic insecurity and continued economic compulsion into 
marriage and the bourgeois nuclear family not for the class privileges of a disposable income but 
for (limited) protection from homelessness, starvation, and dire poverty under private property 
relations. The Feminine Mystique and the “discontent” that it expressed was in the end a 
lamentation of the bourgeois woman of the suburbs, culturally far removed from—but 
economically enabled by—the class contradictions faced by and the exploitation of women of 
the urban proletariat and the rural poor.  
 The “discontent” that Friedan outlined was, contrary to her own claims, a product of 
changes in the mode of production not, as she proposed, an expression of the fact that (as she and 
other liberal feminists have claimed) women were changing as the result of internal desires and 
drives and that they were finally starting to “wake up” to their “true selves.” The understanding 
of “woman” as “human beings of limitless human potential” is an idealist one from the outset. It 
is based on the notion that people form a concept of the ideal human—or in this case the ideal 
“woman”—and “win freedom” for women “to the extent that was necessary to realize this 
concept.” In actuality, the conception of “woman” and the “value” placed on this ideal are effects 
of the social relations of production. As Marx and Engels put it the notion of an ideal “human” 
(or the ideal for “woman”) “corresponds to the definite relations predominant at a certain stage 
of production and the way of satisfying needs that correspond to these relations” (German 457). 
Friedan’s emphasis on women becoming “full adults” and “human beings of limitless human 
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potential,” through being working mothers was in actuality an articulation of what capitalism at 
that historical moment required of women in the social division of labor as collective producers 
in order to stave off declines in the rate of profit. Women’s incorporation into the workforce of 
capitalism was not in itself a manifestation of their liberation but was an effect of the fact that 
capitalism needed exploitable labor-power at reduced cost. The modern feminism of Friedan, in 
short, covered over the material contradictions confronting women and translated the economic 
interests of capital at the time into “new” cultural values for women. 
 In the more politically and intellectually developed forms of feminism at this time, 
“women” were grasped on historical and social terms as part of a broader social collective of 
exploited and oppressed people against social relations that were at root fundamentally unequal 
and exploitative. The notion of women as a social collective was, in other words, not explicitly 
understood as an “existential identity” as found in the liberal feminism of Friedan. Such notions 
of “existential identity” were critiqued at this time for the way in which they put forward an 
ahistorical notion of “sisterhood” and commonality among women, and for the way in which 
they translated historical and material questions of patriarchy, nationalism, racism, imperialism, 
and heterosexism into matters of the “cultural pathology” of the oppressed and exploited. For 
example, members of the Combahee River Collective argued for understanding “patriarchy” as 
part of interlocking structures of oppression of “white supremist, patriarchal capitalism.” They 
argued that “the liberation of all oppressed peoples necessitates the destruction of the political-
economic systems of capitalism and imperialism as well as patriarchy.” Others, such as the 
Chicago Gay Liberation organization argued that sexual liberation is “inextricably bound to the 
liberation of all oppressed people” (49). 
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 On the one hand, the increased productivity and investment in social and economic 
welfare, and expansion of the culture industries and the universities, among other things, led to a 
growth of questions of collectivity and the notion of the possibility of a society free from 
economic inequality. On the other hand, the collectively produced wealth was still privately 
appropriated by capital and, as it is today, it was distributed and adjudicated in terms of what is 
profitable for capital and the production of profit and, therefore, could not serve as a material 
basis for eliminating economic and social inequality. The contradictions between the increased 
productivity, investment in social and economic welfare and expansion of culture industries on 
the one hand and, on the other hand, the exclusions from the prosperity of the long boom and the 
benefits of the “welfare state” gave rise to increasing resistance on the part of workers, women, 
gays, bisexuals, and lesbians, and persons of color. Moreover, as capitalism came into crisis in 
the late 1960s and early 1970s culminating in the end of the long boom with the oil crisis of 
1973, it became increasingly clear—even within those nations which benefited most from the 
long boom—that the post-war “prosperity,” the “welfare state,” the continuously increasing 
standard of living (for some, albeit large, sectors of the working population) could not contain 
the crisis of capital as its fundamental class relations broke through the surface and began to 
dismantle the economic and social welfare. 
   The increased economic instability as capitalism began to go into stagnation and decline 
at this time burst open the temporary “bubble” created by the long boom and threw into sharper 
relief the fact that capital was fundamentally based on exploitation. These conditions also led to 
open critique of capitalism for the way production for profit fundamentally precluded the 
temporary (and now increasingly illusory) freedoms promised by the long boom and the welfare 
state and arguments for abolition of private ownership of the means of production as a necessary 
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material condition of bringing about economic equality and restoring social justice. So, for 
example, Angela Davis articulated a very different notion of “collectivity” than the existential 
(ruling class) conception of “women.” For example, in her analysis “Rape, Racism, and the 
Capitalist Setting,” she argues that “the violent face of sexism, the threat of rape will exist as 
long as capitalist society survives. If the anti-rape movement is to avoid the dilemma of 
Sisyphus, its current activities—ranging from emotional and legal aid to defense methods and 
educational campaigns—must be complemented by larger offensive measures and situated in a 
strategic context which envisages the ultimate defeat of monopoly capitalism” (Davis 137). In 
this mode of feminism the “women’s problem” is not centered around a universal existential 
identity for women but is articulated by social relations of production in capitalist society and 
requires the transformation of these relation—the ultimate defeat of monopoly capitalism. 
 However, many of the critiques of the classic modernist feminism of Friedan by radical, 
socialist, lesbian, black and Latina feminists of the second wave also shared some of the same 
assumptions about social transformation as a matter of inclusion in the prosperity of the long 
boom of capitalism. I call them “modernist” because they took for granted the historically 
specific but temporary modern capitalist cultural features under which capitalist production for 
profit (the exploitation of surplus-labor) took place at that time and saw these as fundamental 
features of capitalist production as such and its class relations founded on exploitation. By 
assuming that capitalism fundamentally relied on the welfare-state, the Fordist division of labor, 
and the “nuclear” family with its strict allocation of domestic labor as “women’s labor” and, 
therefore, identitarian notion of “woman,” a number of feminisms focused on the reform or even 
transformation of these temporary features of capitalism. For example, many saw the re-
organizing of the welfare state and the technical division of labor (occupations) to include 
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women and persons of color as tantamount to the revolutionary transformation of class relations 
(the division of labor between property owners and workers). In doing so, they left unexamined 
the underlying conditions upon which “modern capitalism”—like contemporary transnational 
capitalism—rests: the exploitation of surplus-labor.  
 Many “second wave” feminisms did explicitly deploy the idea of class but class was 
often used in a modified way so as to allow for the centering of its cultural features. The 
relationship of gender and social difference to class was by and large understood to mean that 
gender is a class, sexuality is a class, race is a class. For example, in what is considered to be one 
of the inaugural books of radical feminism, Shulamith Firestone in The Dialectic of Sex, rewrites 
Engel’s labor theory of gender (as outlined in Origins of The Family, Private Property and the 
State) in order to argue that women form an autonomous, collective “sex-class.”  The goal of 
feminism, according to this theory of gender as a class, was “seizure of control of reproduction: 
not only the full restoration to women of their own bodies, but also their (temporary) seizure of 
control of human fertility—the new population biology as well as all the social institutions of 
child-bearing and child-rearing” (Firestone 11). In her classic socialist feminist essay, “The 
Unhappy Marriage of Marxism and Feminism: Toward a More Progressive Union,” Heidi 
Hartmann builds upon Firestone’s theory of gender as a distinct class by arguing that “the 
material base upon which patriarchy rests lies most fundamentally in men’s control over 
women’s labor power” (15). According to Hartmann, the historical and material evidence of 
women’s separate class position, was that “men have a higher standard of living than women in 
terms of luxury consumption, leisure time, and personalized services” (9). The implication of this 
is that, for Hartman and Firestone, women’s “emancipation” was to be brought about, much like 
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it was for Friedan, by giving women greater reproductive freedoms and a larger share of social 
distribution relative to men. 
In her “Black Feminist” critique of Hartman’s essay, “The Incompatible Menage À Trois: 
Marxism, Feminism and Racism,” Gloria Joseph argued that the “categories of marxism are sex-
blind and race-blind” (93). Joseph argued that the exclusion of race from the socialist feminist 
understanding of inequality for women was to reduce “Black discontent” to a pathology and 
neurosis and conceal over the fact that “discontent” is “a response to a social structure in which 
Blacks are systematically dominated, exploited, and oppressed” (97). Joseph’s critique, to be 
clear, was an immanent critique that accepted the basic assumptions of Hartman’s “dual-
systems” analysis of social relations and difference. The category of “race,” she argued, needs to 
be added to the socialist or “dual-systems” feminist theory of class to account for Black women 
as a separate “class” owing to the fact that “Black females are on the very bottom rung of the 
occupational status ladder” (102). For Joseph, like Hartman, and many other feminists at the 
time, social differences were not explainable on the basis of wage-labor/capital relations but 
rather, they were explainable by understanding race, gender, and sexuality, as their own 
“classes.” As Joseph’s arguments made clear, this was a way of saying that social differences are 
not or are “no longer” determined by economic exploitation and that ending social injustice and 
economic inequality was not dependent on ending private ownership of the means of production: 
As the extensive brutality of women by men does not appear to be reducible to the 
economic factors involved, so the virulent suppression of one race by another 
does not appear reducible to purely economic consideration […] racial differences 
and antagonisms are no longer basically due to economic exploitation. (103)  
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In historical support of her claims that “race…does not appear to be reducible to economic 
considerations” Joseph argues that “Education, professional jobs, and housing are three areas 
where empirical evidence proves that economics is no longer the prime motivator for Black 
exclusion and exploitation” (104).  
 By articulating gender, sexuality, and race as distinct class positions, in other words, class 
itself was understood in much of feminism at the time to be determined by such features as 
income, the number and spacing of children, access to birth control and other reproductive 
technologies, marital status, occupation, access to education. So, for example, for Joseph the way 
to address “Black discontent” was, as it was for Friedan’s notion of “women’s discontent,” to 
address questions of status. The differences between “men” and “women,” “blacks” and 
“whites,” “gay” and “straight” were understood to constitute separate class positions owing to 
the fact that these differences were indicative of inequalities in cultural features of status. While 
different modes of feminism in the second wave—liberal, radical, lesbian, black, Latina, and 
socialist feminisms—emphasized specific cultural features of status to varying degrees according 
to what sector of the population they were addressing, what many of these modes of feminism 
had in common is that their understanding of class was staunchly rooted in the notion of class as 
a matter of “status.” Thus when many second wave feminists spoke of revolution to “overthrow” 
class what this meant in practical terms was to seize control of these features of status—giving 
women, persons of color, and gays, bisexuals and lesbians a greater share of distribution by 
giving them higher wages, wages for housework, access to education, childcare, access to 
middle-class housing and neighborhoods, more social mobility and life chances on the market.  
 At the core of this culturalist conception of “class” is the late 19th century/early 20th 
century notion of embourgeoisment articulated by such thinkers as Thorstein Veblen (The 
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Theory of the Leisure Class) and Max Weber (The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of 
Capitalism)—the idea that the working class moves up the social ladder by the acquisition of 
new wealth (status). The main focus of feminisms informed by this theory of class, to put this 
another way, has been on raising the status of women, persons of color, gays, bisexuals, and 
lesbians by promoting their access to new wealth—what contemporary feminists such as Fraser 
have called “redistribution.” The theory of embourgeoisment is a mediation of class relations 
which presupposes that class is determined by the acquisition of new wealth and therefore, the 
fundamental transformation of “class” is constituted by the transformation of distribution. So, for 
example, class can be cataloged by the articles of consumption owned (houses, clothing, cars, 
etc.). However, the commodities owned by a particular class, or class fraction, at a specific 
historical moment are a historical index of the development of social production but not a 
fundamental feature of its labor and property (class) relations. What is owned by one class at a 
particular historical moment as a “luxury” changes and becomes accessible to others as social 
production develops. However, the ownership of new articles of consumption by the working 
class does not change the social relations of production under which exploitation takes place. It 
does not change the fact that those who own the means of production still privately appropriate 
the surplus-labor of those who only own their labor-power to sell in order to survive. Private 
property is not a catalog of objects it is a social relation of exploitation between those who only 
have their labor to sell in order to survive and those who own the means of production and can 
therefore, as Marx and Engels put it, “command over other people’s surplus labor” (German 
274). 
“Redistribution”—contrary to the popular rhetoric of the time—is not revolution in the 
social relations of production. Redistribution merely transfers the wealth already produced by the 
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exploitation of surplus-labor in production without transforming the relations of exploitation in 
which new wealth is produced. Redistribution without transformation of the relations of 
production is endemic to capitalism: it is the way in which capital transfers a fraction of the 
wealth exploited from some workers to others so as to control the rate of growth and 
development of the working class and regulate access to the future labor supply from which it 
extracts profit in the form of surplus-value. “Redistribution” in other words is dependent on 
exploitation and is a spiritual resolution of material contradictions of class society. It does not 
actually resolve the class contradictions endemic to capitalism it merely temporarily buffers them 
for some workers: the success in “redistribution” of some women, some persons of color, some 
homosexuals and the upper-middle class “way of life” ultimately advocated by the new social 
movements in the U.S. was paid for by the surplus-labor of workers around the world who saw 
their material conditions of life increasingly deteriorate.  
In production for profit, moreover, redistribution and the transformation of cultural 
features of “status”—such as income and access to education—are always, in the final analysis, 
determined by production for profit and what is needed by capital to maintain profit. As the 
“long boom” of capitalism began to come to crisis in the late 1960s—with its sharpest crisis in 
1973—and capitalism entered a period of deep stagnation and decline, U.S. capital moved 
manufacturing offshore in search of new investment and cheaper labor and unemployment 
started to rise among workers in the North who had previously thought their conditions of life 
were infinitely secure. In the years immediately following World War II, capital continued to 
have a strong investment in building the productivity of the “national” workforce by increasing 
its job skills (education), wages (income), standard of living (housing, health, access to consumer 
goods) and so on. However, once many industries grew to a higher level of productivity they 
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began to come into a crisis of overproduction in which they needed to compete more ruthlessly 
on an international level in order to maintain and increase their rates of profit. Under such 
conditions, what was once “profitable” to capital to increase its access to and supply of labor 
power after the war—e.g., the redistribution of a fraction of surplus-labor to workers “at home” 
in terms of social welfare, increased wages, job security, increased standard of living, and other 
features of “status,” etc.—came into severe contradiction with the interests of capital in 
maintaining its rates of profit. 
In order to stave off declines in profit, capital required many of the changes to gender, 
sexuality, and race relations advocated by the new social movement’s turn to culture. To take 
one example of “status” raised by feminists of the second wave: the need to revolutionize the 
“family” by changing the domestic division of labor between men and women, freeing women 
from this labor, allowing them to work, giving them choice for the number and spacing of 
children through access to birth control and abortion, rights to divorce, etc. Both “socialist 
feminists” such as Hartman and radical feminists such as Firestone and Gayle Rubin saw the 
solution to women’s oppression as a matter of a revolution in kinship and “reproduction” which 
they thought was increasingly severed from the transformation of the social relations of 
production. But the history of women in capitalism proves otherwise. Capitalism has itself 
“revolutionized” the family and dramatically transformed it in response to material 
contradictions in maintaining levels of profit while at the same time continuing to exploit the 
majority of the world’s women. 
The onset of the transfer of mass-production abroad and of the dismantling of social 
welfare as capital came into crisis, meant a drop in wages and the incapacity of the “nuclear 
family” to support itself on the wages of a “male head of household.” Out of economic necessity, 
 111 
women were drawn into the waged workforce in increasing numbers by the end of long boom. 
Women’s incorporation into the waged workforce was not itself without economic contradictions 
marked, for example, by lower wages and sporadic unemployment: “The resumption in the late 
1950s of the growth in the share of female labour […] took place against a changed background” 
of the rise of “part-time” and “low wage” employment (Tabak 93). With wages significantly 
lower for women and workers of color, they provided part of the exploitable labor-power needed 
by capital at a cheaper price. These changes, made by capital to maintain profit, led to a “crisis” 
in the “nuclear-family”: the sexual division of labor in the home, the question of access to birth 
control, rights to divorce, access to higher levels of education and skills training for women 
became burning questions not only to women but to capital which was pulling women into the 
workforce to exploit their relatively cheaper labor. In other words, capital required the 
transformation of legal and cultural arrangements of gender and sexuality, without 
transformation of the social relations of production, in order to “free” women from a division of 
labor that was increasingly getting in the way of profit for capital and to update gender and 
sexuality relations for new strategies for securing an exploitable labor force. 
The stripping of gender and social differences of their relationship to private ownership 
of the means of production in the culturalist analytics of second wave feminism was at root a 
private property conception of freedom for women that articulated projects of freedom and 
justice within the confines of private property relations. As a consequence of its retreat into 
culturalism much of “second wave” feminism acted very much the way unions acted: the 
material conditions of capitalist production at the time (for example, the lack of labor-power 
after the war, the post-war economic boom, etc.) allowed unions to argue for and get a “social 
wage” and establish “social welfare.” For example, capitalist production throughout the world at 
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the time was still heavily dependent on national workforces for sources of surplus-labor 
extraction and, therefore, U.S. capital was compelled to invest in the reproduction of the labor 
supply through allotting a greater portion of the social surpluses back into social welfare. But 
these very conditions also limited union practices—they ended up as extensions of state 
apparatuses that helped to maintain capitalist production under the historical and material 
conditions of the time. In like manner, much of “second wave” feminism (and other oppositional 
movements of The New Left) served to critique the way in which women, gays and lesbians, 
persons of color were excluded from the prosperity of the long boom. At the same time, insofar 
as feminists retreated—or were pushed back—into the cultural dimensions of this problem and 
abstracted gender from the social relations of production based on exploitation, they also 
ultimately limited feminism to political practices endorsing reformist policies aimed at helping 
capital by updating women for the contemporary workforces needed by capital.  
As the economic crisis of capital wore on, the class basis of “second wave” feminism’s 
turn to culture became more apparent as feminism retreated further and further into an upper-
middle class identity politics and the protection of the “way of life” of a small minority of 
women in the U.S. at the expense of collectivity and solidarity with the struggle to transform 
capitalism. Identity politics—which Ellen Willis defines in her book No More Nice Girls as “the 
idea that one’s experience as a member of . . . a [marginal] group determines the authenticity and 
moral legitimacy of one’s politics” (xv)—continued the culturalizing of the social division of 
labor under capitalism. In its method of social analysis “identity politics” emphasized personal 
experience of oppression as the basis of knowledge of the social relations producing this 
oppression. Such an empiricist view however obscures that “experience” does not “explain” 
material relations, it is rather what is explained by material relations. In her materialist analysis 
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of racism and race theory, Sue Clegg explains this in the following terms:  “Oppression,” she 
argues, is often “experienced in terms of being black, or being a woman, or being Irish, or being 
gay, but it cannot be explained simply by virtue of this experience. For that we need an analysis 
that goes beneath experience. These oppressions cannot be overcome one-by-one because they 
are connected to the central dynamics of capitalist exploitation” (112). Moreover, “lived 
experience”—feeling, affect, perception—is what Althusser has called the “lived experience” of 
“the reality of ideology” (“A Letter on Art” 223). “Experience,” Althusser argues, is the 
ideological domain of the “individual” in “abstraction from [material] structures.” In this sense, 
it conceals the conditions of its own explanation. Materialist explanation, by contrast, requires 
concepts and analytics that intervene in the ideology of “lived experience” (feeling, affect, 
perception) and go “outside” of experience to uncover the material relations that produce it.  
This approach to the social increasingly led to the detachment in the cultural imaginary 
within which many second wave feminists were working, not only of gender, sexuality, and race 
but also of class itself from the social relations of production. It represented the material 
contradictions women confronted in capitalism less and less as a structural relation of the subject 
of labor to ownership of the means of production and more and more not only as matters of 
cultural features of status but also increasingly as matters of “interpersonal” relations, “choice,” 
and the “care of the self.” The primary way of ameliorating the material inequality for women in 
capitalism became a matter not of transforming collective conditions of exploitation for all but 
giving some class fractions of women in capitalism a greater share in distribution and moving 
them into positions of power to manage other workers on behalf of capital. 
While the universal conception of “woman” advocated by Friedan was not an adequate 
challenge to the exploitation of women, since it obscured the material differences between those 
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women who are members of the ruling class and own and control the material resources of 
society and those who only have their labor to sell in order to survive, the abstraction of social 
differences from class merely updated Friedan’s class politics for capital. Far from increased 
inclusion, the turn away from economics and class to culture and “identity” resulted in what 
Willis called a “logic of fragmentation into ever smaller and more particularist groups” (xv) 
legitimating transnational capital’s assault on movements for social transformation.  This was not 
indicative of the material separation of gender, race, sexuality,… from class as it was an index of 
capital’s class war on movements for social transformation and converting them into movements 
for reforms needed by capital to maintain profit. 
 
SIX 
It is important at this juncture to address at length the objection that will surely arise 
among many feminists and cultural theorists: that the kind of argument I am making displaces 
culturalism with a late form of “economism.”  I would like to pressure this assumption, by 
returning to Gramsci’s historical materialist critique of economism—a notion of “economism” 
which is quite different from the way it is understood in the wake of the cultural turn. But first, in 
my reading of Gramsci, I am implying that there are two and not one Gramsci in Anglo-
American cultural theory. The first is a Marxist writer who, in the tradition of classical Marxism, 
engages in debates and discussions with classic texts and, like all classical Marxists, insists on 
the primacy of the material (labor) in the formation of all social practices, including culture. This 
is the Gramsci that, following Engels in, for instance, Engels’ letter to Joseph Bloch, insists that 
the economic is the basis of all human activities but that this does not mean that once these 
activities are put into place they do not have their own dynamics. Typical of this materialist 
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Gramsci is his reading of Marx’s critique of Proudhon’s economism (i.e., The Poverty of 
Philosophy).  In the course of his critique of “economism,” Gramsci remarks: 
One point of reference for the study of economism, and for understanding the 
relations between the structure and the superstructure, is the passage in The 
Poverty of Philosophy where it says that an important phase in the development of 
a social group is that in which the individual components of a trade union no 
longer struggle solely for their own economic interests, but for the defense and the 
development of the organization itself. (162) 
He then goes on to remark that “The Poverty of Philosophy is an essential moment in the 
formation of the philosophy of praxis” (162).  In the section of The Poverty of Philosophy to 
which Gramsci refers, Marx discusses the way in which competition between capitalists over 
profit puts workers in competition with each other on the market and “divides their interests.”  In 
putting workers in competition with each other, capital also (and more easily) lowers their wages 
to increase the amount of surplus-labor extracted during the workday (the source of profit).  At 
the same time, however, Marx points out, “the maintenance of wages, this common interest 
which [workers] have against their boss, unites them in a common thought of resistance—
combination” (168).  In other words, workers have in common an economic interest in 
maintaining and raising their wages and this brings them together to unite politically. 
Marx clarifies further in this passage, “combination always has a double aim.”  On the 
one hand it is what has been described above: “that of stopping competition among the workers, 
so that they can carry on general competition with the capitalist” (168).  However, and more to 
Gramsci’s main point in his theorization of “economism,” Marx also points out:   
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If the first aim of resistance was merely the maintenance of wages, combinations, 
at first isolated, constitute themselves into groups as the capitalists in their turn 
unite for the purpose of repression, and in face of always united capital, the 
maintenance of the association becomes more necessary to them than that of 
wages.  This is so true that English economists are amazed to see the workers 
sacrifice a good part of their wages in favour of associations, which, in the eyes of 
these economists, are established solely in favour of wages. (168) 
In other words, what starts out as what one might call a united “self-interest” of workers 
who have been politically fractured, alienated, and isolated on the market (at their own expense!) 
but now unite together to each maintain their own conditions of life as workers (wages), 
develops instead into a fledgling collective effort in which workers begin not to unite on the basis 
of a shared or mutual “self-interest” for individual workers survival within capitalism but on the 
basis of their collective interests as a class in which they begin to consider that the condition of 
their own life are dependent on the conditions of life of all.  In turn, they even contribute a 
portion of their individual wages to maintain their collective effort.  This is at the root of what 
Marx means when he goes on to argue that: 
Economic conditions had first transformed the mass of the people of the country 
into workers.  The domination of capital has created for this mass a common 
situation, common interests.  This mass is thus already a class as against capital, 
but not yet for itself.  In the struggle of which we have pointed out only a few 
phases, this mass becomes united, and constitutes itself as a class for itself.  The 
interests it defends become class interests. (168) 
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Gramsci regarded Marx’s The Poverty of Philosophy as a groundbreaking contribution to the 
critique of economism and, moreover, as “an essential moment in the formation of the 
philosophy of praxis” (162) because economism (as I elaborate further below through Gramsci) 
is not the Marxist understanding that human activities have a necessary relation to class rather, 
economism is putting your own self interest first, ahead of workers as a collective, and therefore 
advancing the interest of the owners.  
The second Gramsci is a culturalist Gramsci that is grounded in the reinterpretation of his 
writings by Chantal Mouffe in her edited collection, Gramsci and Marxist Theory, specifically in 
her highly influential essay “Hegemony and Ideology in Gramsci.” This is the Gramsci that has 
had tremendous impact on cultural theory and cultural studies in the West, especially through 
Stuart Hall. In this Gramsci, his insistence on the material is erased by the misinterpretation of 
his concept of “economism.” From the outset of her essay, Mouffe reads Gramsci’s concept of 
“economism” to mean what in contemporary cultural theory is called “economic reductionism.”  
“Economic reductionism,” has become the touchstone for dismissal of classical Marxism (and 
the understanding that culture and ideology are determined by the social relations of production) 
in the Euro-American left including Euro-American feminism.  So it is imperative here to 
unpack the assumptions behind the conflation of “economism,” “economic reductionism,” and 
Marxism. More specifically, Mouffe states that: 
The economistic problematic of ideology has two intimately linked but quite 
distinct facets.  The first one consists in seeing a causal link between the structure 
and the superstructure and in viewing the latter purely as a mechanical reflection 
of the economic base.  This leads to a vision of ideological superstructures as 
epiphenomena which play no part in the historical process.  The second facet is 
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not concerned with the role of the superstructures but with their actual nature, and 
here they are conceived as being determined by the position of the subjects in the 
relations of production. (169) 
To put this another way, according to Mouffe, “economism” is the understanding that the 
economic—and more specifically class relations—determine ideology, culture and, more broadly 
put, the superstructure.  Moreover, on the terms of this view, “economism” is the understanding 
that the positions that one takes in ideological, cultural, philosophical, etc. contestation have (to 
use Mouffe’s words) a “necessary class-belonging” and are ultimately enabled by the mode of 
production.  In short, for Mouffe, “economism” is the rigorous distinction at the core of historical 
materialism that Marx makes between the “material transformation of the economic conditions 
of production” (the base) and the “legal, political, religious, artistic or philosophic—in short 
ideological forms in which men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out” (i.e., the 
superstructure) (Preface 21).  According to Mouffe, this distinction (which she inaccurately 
understands to be at the core of what Gramsci calls “economism” in theory and praxis) is 
“reductionist” and only leads to a “mechanical” understanding of the relationship of ideology 
and culture to the economic and the reduction of the former to “epiphenomena” of the latter. 
However, in Gramsci (and in historical materialism generally), economism is something 
altogether very different from what Mouffe presupposes from the outset.  Economism does not 
refer to the uncovering of a necessary material relation to the economic relations of production 
(class), it means indifference to class relations.  In other words, (and here Gramsci is influenced 
by Lenin) “economism” means putting your own self-interest first—as in Trade unions where the 
union bosses disregard workers as a collective in order to get two extra vacation days for 
themselves.  In his critique of economism, Gramsci argues that when economism discusses 
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“economic facts” in actuality “it means self-interest of an individual or small group […] In other 
words, it does not take economic class formations into account, with all of their inherent 
relations, but is content to assume motives of mean and usurious self-interest” (163; emphasis 
added). Economism, in other words, entails the imagined separation of the “individual or small 
group” from the class contradictions in which they are objectively situated and, in practice, limits 
political practice to seeking to ameliorate the conditions of a small minority at the expense of 
workers as a collective.  When workers engage in “immediate self-interest” over other workers 
they are not advancing their class interests they are actually inadvertently advancing the material 
interests of the owners and, ultimately, at the expense of workers as a collective (including at 
their own expense in production relations; though many do this for a fee).  In his critique of 
economism, moreover, Gramsci vehemently stresses that economism in both bourgeois political 
economy and in “theoretical syndicalism” (by which he means “trade-unionism”) is not rooted in 
“the philosophy of praxis” (by which, as I establish above, Gramsci means classical Marxism) 
but is rooted in laissez-faire liberalism.  Against the theoretical distortions of classical Marxism 
during his day, Gramsci explicitly argues that the connections of “economism” (including “trade-
unionism”) and classical Marxism are “only extrinsic and purely verbal” (159).  
The “econonomistic problematic of ideology,” to use Mouffe’s language, is actually quite 
the reverse of what she argues. Proceeding from her (mis)reading of Gramsci’s concept of 
economism, Mouffe goes on to argue that a “non-economistic” understanding is one in which 
“ideological elements” are understood to have no “necessary relation” to the social relations of 
production and no “necessary class-belonging” (171). In other words, a “non-economistic” frame 
of intelligibility is, by Mouffe’s logic, one that posits the structural autonomy of ideology from 
the social relations of production.  Moreover, for Mouffe, “it is ideology which creates subjects 
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and makes them act” (187) and this process is disconnected from the subject’s relation to the 
material relations of production or, more specifically, to the means of production (class).  
Ideology is, in Mouffe’s discourse, the material condition of possibility for subjectivity and 
agency and ideology itself has no structural basis or necessary relation to the social relations of 
production. 
From this logic, in the course of Mouffe’s argument, Engels’ historical materialist 
argument that the economic always determines the objective conditions of life “in the last 
instance” is re-written to mean that class is ideologically imposed after the fact.  Class, in other 
words, is converted in Mouffe’s logic from a material relation of production into an ideological 
invention.  Mouffe concludes from this that “‘political subjects’ are not social classes but 
‘collective wills’ which are comprised of an ensemble of social groups fused around a 
fundamental class” (196-197).  Mouffe’s basic logic is to sever ideology and hegemony from the 
material relations that produce them and to dehistoricize them. Ideology is understood to have its 
own independent “materiality” divorced from any historical and material conditions outside that 
produce it.  “Collective will”—or what Gramsci calls “consent”—are in Mouffe’s account 
removed from the material relation that produce them under capitalism and what Marx called 
“the silent compulsion of economic relations” (Capital 899).  “Collective will,” furthermore, is 
presented in Mouffe’s logic as the material basis of hegemony.   
In doing so, she actually reverses the entire complex of Gramsci’s discussion of 
“consent” which is an effort to explain the material structure of conflicts in class society that 
produce it.  While Gramsci refers to hegemony as the “spontaneous” consent given by the 
proletariat to the conditions of their exploitation, “spontaneity” itself is not removed from the 
relations of production.  This consent he explains is “‘historically’ caused by the prestige (and 
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consequent confidence) which the dominant group enjoys because of its position and function in 
the world of production” (118; emphasis added).  Here, in other words, Gramsci relates the 
“consent” of workers to the conditions of their exploitation as having a necessary relation to the 
material position of the ruling class in the social relations of production.  One way to re-read 
Gramsci’s notion of “hegemony” and “spontaneous” consent, then, is through Marx’s theory of 
the material basis of ideology in Capital.  For Marx, “ideology” is based on material relations of 
necessity—what Marx explains as a much broader “silent compulsion of economic relations” in 
which “the advance of capitalist production develops a working class which by education, 
tradition and habit looks upon the requirements of that mode of production as self-evident natural 
laws . . . [and] once [capitalist production] is fully developed, breaks down all resistance” (899).  
Consent, on one level of appearance, seems to be “spontaneous” but when one looks at the 
material basis of this “consent” in the structure of economic relations, consent is far from 
spontaneous but is the result of the advance of capitalist production and grounded in material 
contradictions of necessity brought on by exploitation.  
It is exactly this evacuation of a materialist concept of ideology that makes it possible for 
Mouffe to say that a class gains hegemony by “genuinely concern[ing] itself with the interests of 
those social groups over which it wishes to exercise hegemony” (181; emphasis added). Because 
Mouffe has already abstracted “hegemony” and “ideology” from material relations of necessity 
(that is, from their objective relation to the social relations of production), her remark about 
“genuine concern” implies that hegemony represents a material unity of seemingly disparate 
interests rather than, what historical materialism argues: that hegemony is a spiritual unity of 
material contradictions that is, in the final analysis, based on “silent compulsion of economic 
relations.” This is the basis of theories of “consent” and “agency” as a matter of “choice,” 
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“personal consumption,” and “popular will” which are quite different from Gramsci’s notion that 
“consent” and hegemony secured by the place of the ruling class in production.   
Moreover, this is to return to quite an ideological explanation of hegemony and consent. 
It is not “genuine concern” (a moral or ethical question) that is at the basis of the concessions 
that the owners may temporarily make to workers but economic interests in reproducing the 
relations of production founded on exploitation.  This is the case, for example, with Walmart and 
Amazon.com, in the case of its donations to people rendered homeless in the wake of Hurricane 
Katrina. Walmart and Amazon.com in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina are exemplary of what 
Engels in The Conditions of the Working Class in England called “Pharisaic philanthropy” of the 
bourgeoisie. Engels writes in response to the English bourgeois philanthropist: 
As though you rendered the proletarians a service in first sucking out their very 
life-blood and then practising your self-complacent, Pharisaic philanthropy upon 
them, placing yourselves before the world as mighty benefactors of humanity 
when you give back to the plundered victims the hundredth part of what belongs 
to them! (314) 
Walmart has been at the forefront of breaking any fledgling movement on the part of workers to 
organize in unions, of violations of child labor laws, of forcing workers to work off the clock and 
then presents itself as a great benefactor of humanity by “giving” a fraction of what it has 
exploited from workers.  On a broader level, the material basis of capital’s “giving a hundreth 
part of what belongs to [workers]” is actually the transfer of wealth away from workers and the 
concentration of wealth into fewer hands. 
Mouffe claims that “it is this whole anti-reductionist conception of ideology which is the 
actual condition of intelligibility of Gramsci’s conception of hegemony” (172). Her re-reading of 
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Gramsci’s writings empties his writings of their theoretical relationship to classical Marxism 
and, in doing so, de-historicizes Gramsci who dedicated his entire life to struggling to transform 
the material relations of production and end class relations.  Moreover, in the course of his 
contribution to class struggle, he worked to produce historical materialist knowledges of the 
relationship between ideology and the “silent compulsion of class relations”; and the way that 
ideology on the one hand has its own dynamic that inverts the material contradictions that 
workers live in, yet at the same time is a bearer of these class contradictions enabled by them. 
Despite limits, ambiguities or contradictions to his work for the transformation of class relations 
(that are beyond the scope of this project in feminism to discuss further), he did so in an effort to 
help workers see through the cultural and ideological mystification of their material conditions of 
life under this “silent compulsion of economic relations” and the onslaught of fascism and to 
help them see through and break from practices that would ultimately lead to their common ruin 
and, instead, develop more effective revolutionary praxis to transform these relations.   
To be clear, the point of this discussion is not to suggest that there are no ambiguities or 
contradictions in Gramsci’s writings or differences from classical Marxists. Rather, it is to 
examine the way in which historical materialist knowledges have been and are being dismantled 
in contemporary cultural theory, to inquire into the material conditions that make this possible, 
and examine the consequences this has on feminism and the project to transform social relations 
to emancipate women. “Reading” and “interpretation”—such as Mouffe’s reading of Gramsci—
are not, in the final analysis, caused by “mis-interpretation” and “mis-understanding” (a marché 
de dupes).  (Mis)interpretation is not simply accidental, it too is an historical effect of material 
contradiction in the relations of production (the economic) and the relation of the subject to 
them.  To use Mouffe’s words, her “symptomatic reading” of Gramsci is not so much 
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symptomatic of the “actual condition of intelligibility” of Gramsci’s theoretical arguments as it is 
symptomatic of the class interests (“the actual condition of intelligibility”) advanced by the 
dominant tendencies in the Euro-American left in the late 1970s and 1980s.  After the crash of 
the long boom, when capital began to dismantle any semblance of social welfare and solidarity 
among workers and in doing so transfer massive amounts of wealth from workers upward to the 
ruling class, many upper-middle class”7 leftists, including feminists, lost their “interest” in class 
solidarity with workers around the world and instead looked to gaining their own share of this 
exploited wealth in exchange for solidarity with capital and its reforms.  “Left” cultural theory 
has been a bearer of these class contradictions.  Mouffe contributed to articulate a “new” 
theoretical program for the “new” left that would translate the praxical (class) interests of North 
Atlantic capital into “new left” ideals. Mouffe’s theory of “non-reductivism,” in other words, 
returns to precisely what Gramsci critiqued as “economism.”  It is part of an articulation of the 
material contradictions of capital that erased the relationship of ideology to class relations.  This 
development in “theory” has helped to ideologically normalize the prioritizing of the material 
interests of capital and the placing of the self-interests of managers over workers around the 
world as a collective. 
 
SEVEN 
I would like to emphasize here that this does not mean that feminism should abandon 
culture as a terrain of analysis and critique. Rather, it needs to re-understand culture materially 
and historically. Culture, while analytically and materially distinct from the economic, is not 
                                                 
7 I use this term in the dissertation to mean “a special kind of wage-laborer . . . who commands during the labor 
process in the name of capital” (Marx, Capital 450). The middle class, in other words, is exploited wage-labor that is 
paid a larger portion of the social surplus in the form of higher wages (and other benefits) relative to other workers 
in order to act on behalf of capital as managers of other workers. 
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autonomous, it is forged on the basis of labor and property relations and is a bearer of economic 
interests. But culture is also “inversive” meaning that it is a transcoding of material 
contradictions: it cannot resolve the material contradictions that develop at the point of 
production.8  For instance, “cultural freedoms” regarding gender and sexuality, made possible by 
the dialectical praxis of labor, are still forged on the basis of private property relations and the 
exploitation of surplus-labor. Not only does this mean that many of these freedoms are possible 
only for a small segment of society, it also means that when cultural values and mores in gender 
and sexual relations change for the majority and “new cultural freedoms” of gender and sexuality 
are increasingly made available to the majority they are forged on the basis of its exploitative 
labor relations and used as more and more sophisticated means through which transnational 
capitalism works to inculcate women into relations of exploitation.  
Seen in this regard, culture also has a role in reproducing the subject of labor for the 
social relations of production and the historical conditions under which production takes place. 
Culture, to put this another way, is the apparatus through which the subject of labor—and the 
subject is always a subject of the dialectical praxis of labor and the social relations of production 
(property relation) within which labor takes place—is given the consciousness skills made 
necessary by the material relations of production to act within them. But culture is itself 
dependent on labor and the social relations of production and does not constitute these material 
relations and, therefore, it is not the main terrain of material transformation. Culture does not 
transform the material relations of production but culture is a site in which, to use some of 
Marx’s words, people “become conscious” of their class conflicts which are developed in their 
                                                 
8 For an exposition of “inversion” see: Jorge Larrain, Marxism and Ideology, specifically pp. 122-141. 
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material social relations and “fight it out” (Preface 21). As a zone of class conflicts, culture has, 
of course, its own effectivity and as Engels writes in a letter to Joseph Bloch: 
According to the materialist conception of history, the ultimately determining 
factor in history is the production and reproduction of real life. Neither Marx nor I 
have ever asserted more than this. Hence if somebody twists this into saying that 
the economic factor is the only determining one, he transforms that proposition 
into a meaningless, abstract, absurd phrase. The economic situation is the basis, 
but the various elements of the superstructure—political forms of the class 
struggle and its results, such as constitutions established by the victorious class 
after a successful battle, etc. juridical forms, and especially the reflections of all 
these real struggles in the brains of the participants, political, legal, philosophical 
theories, religious views and their further development into systems of dogmas—
also exercise their influence upon the course of the historical struggles in many 
cases determine their form in particular […] We make history ourselves, but, in 
the first place, under very definite antecendents and conditions. Among these the 
economic ones are ultimately decisive. But the political ones, etc. and indeed even 
the traditions which haunt human minds also play a part, although not the decisive 
one. (Marx and Engels, Selected Correspondence 394-395) 
Culture develops its own dynamic but, at the same time, does so under specific economic 
relations of production.  In this regard, culture does have effects in shaping the direction of social 
praxis.  Thus, the way in which people “become conscious of class conflict” and “fight it out” in 
culture—whether, for example, they understand “consumption,” “ethics” or “production” as the 
material basis of “what is” and therefore the material terrain of change—is going to have an 
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effect on how people grasp and how they direct their praxical activity in relation to the material 
contradictions in which they live.  But culture does not transcend these material contradictions 
and cultural change does not transform them; culture does not resolve material contradictions 
that originate in production. Material contradictions can only be resolved by means of “praxical 
activity”—revolutionary transformation of them. 
It is important to interject here that the effects that culture does indeed have are in large 
part why an investigation into contemporary feminist theory and its relationship to the material 
contradictions of capitalism now is necessary for feminism; and why, moreover, bringing back 
historical materialist analytics of gender into feminist theory and praxis is necessary. If culture 
were to have no effect on shaping the direction of social praxis then such investigations into 
culture and “fighting it out” in the cultural arena would not be necessary (or by contrast, 
corporations would not have to spend billions of dollars every year in advertising and the 
production of consumer subjects).  In fact, culture does have an effect: the hegemonic feminisms 
after the Cultural Turn are ruling class feminisms that have instituted an internal cultural 
dynamic that marginalizes women’s class struggles with capitalism by distracting women and 
workers from grasping the relationship of their conditions of life to capitalism. As I have begun 
to show in this chapter and as I elaborate further in relation to more recent permutations of 
cultural feminism, they have ended up advocating for reforms quite useful to capital and quite 
useful to the class interests of some women at the expense of the majority of women. Feminism 
in these articulations, ends up serving as a ruling class means for updating women and gender 
and sexuality relations to the contemporary needs of capitalism. In its most developed 
articulations (after the second wave) it is, in fact, an instance of what Peter Sloterdijk has called 
“enlightened false consciousness” and “cynical reason”: it has in some cases knowingly and 
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wittingly suppressed and marginalized women’s struggles against capitalism from feminist 
theory and praxis in the name of “plurality” and has served as apologism for capital in order to 
maintain the relative class privileges of some women (5-6).9  And such practices also have had 
an effect on misdirecting the struggles of people who are working not to maintain these class 
interests but to transform material relations of exploitation.  
It is therefore necessary to begin to intervene in the ruling class ideology of cultural 
feminisms and uncover the material relations and class interests behind them. In other words, to 
begin to produce transformative theory and praxis, it is necessary for feminism to produce 
rigorous conceptual explanation of the objective material relations and contradictions in which 
women live and critique the ideological means of obscuring these objective contradictions. To be 
clear, knowledge of material contradictions in itself and by itself never transforms social praxis 
because “material force can only be overthrown by material force” (Marx, Hegel 133). 
Moreover, the position one ultimately takes in relation to social relations (whether or not, for 
example, one ultimately takes up practices to maintain or transform existing social relations) has 
to do with one’s material relation to social relations.  However, knowledge of the material 
contradictions (and therefore also critique of ideological mystifications and their relation to these 
material contradictions) is necessary for serving as a guide to effective transformative social 
praxis. 
                                                 
9 See, for example, my critique of Jane Gallop’s Feminist Accused of Sexual Harassment in my essay “Sexual 
Harassment as/and (Self) Invention: Class, Sexuality, Pedagogy, and (Creative) Writing.” Transformation 2 (2001): 
155-216. 
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3.0  THE TEXTUAL HEALING 
At the end of the long boom, the dominant feminism in the West underwent an increasingly rapid 
conversion in the 1980s and the 1990s from a project focused on the collective revolutionary 
struggle to transform capitalist economic relations of production and “inter-locking” social 
structures of oppression and toward a movement based on an “ethics of differences” in which 
social change was re-articulated in terms of matters of changing representations, cultural values 
of recognition, interpersonal negotiation, lifestyle, consumption, and “direct action tactics.”  
While the philosophical and political support for this shift in feminist theory and praxis began in 
the 1960s and 1970s with the “new social movements” of the New Left, “socialist” and “radical” 
feminisms in their varying degrees of support for the notion of patriarchy as “autonomous” from 
capitalism, reproduction as separate from production, social differences as autonomous “classes” 
(status), and “consciousness raising” based on “personal experience” (identity politics), the most 
significant philosophical and political index of this shift has been the institutionalization of 
“postmodern” theories—from poststructuralism, to postcolonialism, to post-Marxism—in 
feminism (and on the Euroamerican left generally) in the 1980s and 1990s. At the center of the 
“post-alization” of feminism lies a fundamental shift in Euroamerican “left” practices from 
politics (the principled understanding of and intervention into existing social structures and 
economic relations) to “ethics” (the understanding of the “social” as a series of incommensurate, 
aleatory, “events”—individual instances that have to be approached “care-fully” without the 
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security of any common and underlying principle of judgment). Ethics, of course, has always 
been in the forefront of social theory. However, there is a radical difference between the 
traditional “ethics” (of Plato, Rousseau, John Stuart Mill, etc.) and “post” ethics. “Post” ethics 
(which is the consequence of a re-reading of Kant by, most notably, Jean François Lyotard) is an 
“ethics” without foundation: an ethics in which its evaluation is completely immanent and has no 
reference to any “outside” principles based on material relations or objective laws of historical 
and material development.  
 Like the liberal, radical, socialist, black, and dual-systems theorists of the 1960s and 
1970s, postmodern feminists also used a variety of analytical approaches from the 
poststructuralist feminisms of Hélène Cixous, Luce Irigaray, Drucilla Cornell, Diane Elam, and 
Judith Butler, to the queer feminism of Diana Fuss and Elizabeth Meese, the postcolonial critique 
in the writings of Chandra Talpade Mohanty as well as Gayatri Spivak’s “deconstructionist-
Marxist-feminist” critique, to the post-Marxist or “post-socialist” feminism of Donna Haraway, 
Nancy Fraser, and J.K. Gibson-Graham. What is common to these positions (despite what has 
often seemed to be sharp contestation between them), and what sets them apart at least formally 
from the dominant tendencies of feminism in the 1960s and early 1970s is the articulation of 
social differences of gender, race, sexuality, ethnicity, nation, class and so on as increasingly 
“irreducible” differences and, especially “signifying practices.” This is to say that in the 
discourses of the “post,” social differences are unexplainable on the basis of an outside 
underlying global logic of historical development or a social totality of material relations and 
particularly underlying relations such as capitalism, the mode of production, economics, class, 
labor, and exploitation. In the wake of the “post-” conversion, therefore, social differences which 
were once understood as “interlocking” social structures of oppression and part of a social 
 131 
totality of material relations such as “white supremacist, patriarchal capitalism” are now 
reunderstood as, at most, “intersecting” and (semi)autonomous differences. The inter-relation of 
gender to sexuality, race, ethnicity, nation, and/or class, in this view, is considered to be a 
network of aleatory and contingent relationships. As a consequence, unlike many feminists of the 
1960s and 1970s, who advocated for collective and mass movements for “revolutionary” social 
transformation, postmodern feminists most often argued that the only possible politics is local, 
contingent, and at most “coalitional” (temporary and strategic affiliations based on affinity, not 
on collectivity and structural relations of material necessity).  
Part of the “reasons” offered for this shift—or conversion—in feminist theory and praxis 
is the understanding that the material relations of capitalism have themselves changed—and 
undergone a “fundamental break”—and that they are no longer determined by wage-labor/capital 
relations. At the forefront of this shift in Western feminism of the 1980s and 1990s, and 
presenting itself as the foundation for a “new socialist feminism,” was the retheorization of 
global material relations themselves. Advanced most notably by such “post-socialist” feminists 
such as Donna Haraway and J.K. Gibson-Graham, this retheorization of material relations claims 
that we have now entered a post-production, post-labor, post-class and post-capitalist society. 
The historical “evidence” offered for this shift was the emergence of “a world system of 
production/reproduction . . . called the informatics of domination” (Simians 163). For Haraway 
“‘advanced capitalism’ is inadequate to convey the structure of this historical moment” (160) as 
the world has been “intimately restructured through the social relations of science and 
technology . . . [which] provide fresh sources of power, [and] . . . need fresh sources of analysis 
and political action” (165). In such a social arrangement, Haraway and other post-socialists 
contend, it is no longer ownership and control over the means of production that is the material 
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basis of power rather, it is the ability to understand and manipulate information technologies—
“the systems of myth and meaning structuring our imaginations” (163). Feminist politics, on 
these terms, was converted from a struggle to transform material structures to what Michèle 
Barrett called a “politics of truth” or what Haraway called “coding” and the resignification of 
cultural norms: “cyborg politics is the struggle for language and the struggle against perfect 
communication, against the one code that translates all meaning perfectly” (176). In short, 
material transformation is considered to be tantamount to a semiotic reorganization of 
representation as if the rewriting of capitalism were enough to end the exploitation of women 
under these conditions.  
Exemplary of the canonic poststructuralist articulation of feminism is Drucilla Cornell’s 
“ethical feminism.” In Beyond Accommodation Cornell attempted to affirm “feminine 
difference” without positing a referent outside language which would secure a ground for this 
difference in an essential feminine identity. For Cornell, “no woman can claim that hers is the 
ultimate reality excluding all others, based on a concept of gender identity or on the uncovering 
of the essence of woman” (2). What is important to recognize in this poststructuralist formulation 
is that the process of deconstructing the construct of an “essence of woman” and “fixed identity,” 
Cornell also denies any material base to the production and reproduction of gender. Moreover, 
she rejects the possibility of producing any conceptual framework—any social theory—that can 
explain the material relations of oppression outside discursive constructs of gender. At the core 
of Cornell’s feminism is a rejection of the very notion of conceptuality predicated on the idea 
that it is a representational apparatus of domination. According to Cornell, even “to 
conceptualize difference is once again to reinstate its identity through its very determination as a 
concept” (182). For Cornell “woman” is a signifier without a signified; gender is a trope that is 
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subject to the play of meaning traces in language or what Derrida calls “différance.” Any 
explanation of gender produces a closure of meaning that serves to enforce a female “identity” 
which merely makes a “simple reversal” of the gender hierarchy without actually displacing it 
(Cornell 11). On these terms, essentialism is not merely understood as the positing of a 
“biological essence”—a transhistorical and unchangeable ontology upon which the oppression of 
women is forever founded—but it is also any situating of “feminine” or “sexual difference” 
within historical and material relations. Cornell goes on to posit that “there is no ultimate outside 
referent in which this process of interpretation comes to an end, such as nature or biology or even 
conventional gender structures.” (83; emphasis added). 
The materiality of “gender” and social differences is, in other words, reunderstood as a 
“materiality” constituted by discourse. Along these lines, in Bodies That Matter, Judith Butler 
advances a notion of “material reality” as an effect of signification. According to Butler, 
 to be material means to materialize, where the principle of that materialization is 
precisely what “matters” about that body, its very intelligibility. In this sense, to 
know the significance of something is to know how and why it matters, where ‘to 
matter’ means at once ‘to materialize’ and “to mean.” (32; emphasis added)  
For Butler and other poststructuralist feminists materialization is itself an effect of 
“intelligibility.” It is a discursive process enabled by the closure of established meanings that 
“stabilizes over time to produce the effect of boundary, fixity, and surface we call matter” 
(Bodies 9). On the terms of poststructuralist feminism to posit a set of determinations (an 
historical truth) such as the social division of labor and mode of production, is simultaneously to 
construct this as an outside cause. In other words, it is to construct through discourse what we 
consequently regard to be a determining cause and, as such, the proposed material cause is 
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actually an “effect” of discourse. To this end, Butler argued that positing causal relations “misses 
the point that the historicity of discourse and, in particular, the historicity of norms . . . constitute 
the power of discourse to enact what it names” (Bodies 187). Informed by Foucault, this theory 
presupposes that discourse “constitutes” objective reality; a particular discourse “finds a way of 
limiting its domain, of defining what it is talking about, of giving it the status of an object—and 
therefore making it manifest, namable, and describable” (Archeology 41).  
 However, in order to attribute to language the “performative power” to “constitute” 
material reality, discourse itself gets theorized as a “self-inventing” practice. Butler argues that 
“materialization [is] governed by principles of intelligibility that require and institute a domain 
of radical unintelligibility that resists materialization altogether or that remains radically 
dematerialized” (Bodies 35). In other words, the “material” in the “post” understanding of 
differences is an effect of discourse. Moreover, these “materializing effects” are governed by a 
logic of discursive supplementarity which contains within itself the means by which its “effects” 
can be deconstructed. So, “precisely because such terms [as “sex”] have been produced and 
constrained within such regimes [as sexism], they ought to be repeated in directions that reverse 
and displace their originating aims” (123). In order to account for the “invention” and 
“reinvention” of the real without explaining the production of meaning in historical and material 
relations, the only “viable” alternative is to posit the immanent repetition of the structure of 
signification itself. As there is no “outside” to discourse, nothing propels this “repetition” except 
its own internal laws, the laws of semiosis. Repetition, resignification, reiteration, rewriting, 
redescription and so on are represented as self-motivating practices: transhistorical, cut off from 
the social, cut off from the economic, cut off from material conditions of necessity (i.e., the 
material conditions in place for cultural values of “gender” to become values). 
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 One of the main consequences of the institutionalization of the poststructuralist 
reunderstanding of material reality and the “performative power” of language has been to 
dismantle from feminist theory its capacity to explain the difference between the “appearance” of 
material relations and the “essence”—or structure—of material relations. All modes of 
explanation that attribute a structure of material and historical causes to “what is” become 
understood as homogenizing discursive constructs. A telling example of this is the conceptual 
framework through which Chandra Mohanty makes her criticism of the limits of “modernist” 
Western feminism and what she called its “discursive imperialism” in her 1984 essay “Under 
Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourse.”  Mohanty argues that to explain 
women as “powerless,” “exploited” or “sexually harassed” is “quite similar to sexist discourse of 
labeling women weak, emotional, having math anxiety, etc.” (338). This, however, is quite a 
reductive reading. By appealing to the performative power of discourse to bring into being that 
which it names, this reduces all historical explanation and critique of the systemic material 
relations in capitalism that exploit women’s labor with “homogenizing” and “essentializing” 
women as inherently unable to act to transform these material relations. To put this another way, 
“perfomativity” conflates historical explanation of the englobing material relations of capitalism 
with its inverse: the pathologizing and individualizing of women’s inequality in which inequality 
is attributed to inherent “psychological” or “existential” characteristics of women. The effect of 
the institutionalization of such discourses was to dismantle from feminist theory its explanatory 
critique of gender, race, and ethnicity as social relations of capital and its critique of capital and 
imperialism as material (not simply discursive) relations. 
 In the wake of poststructuralism, gender and sexuality, and social differences generally, 
have been increasingly abstracted from the material relations and division of labor in which they 
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are made possible. They have been translated and ideologically (not materially or praxically) 
converted into cultural and discursive constructs, tropes, metaphors and literary categories which 
develop and change independently of class, labor, and the material relations of production. 
Moreover, even when “class,” “labor,” the “mode of production,” “exploitation” or an “outside” 
are considered, they have also been translated in the wake of the institutionalization of 
poststructuralism into cultural and discursive constructs that are transformed through changes in 
values. The consequence of this is the understanding among many contemporary feminists that it 
is not the material relations of capitalism that need to be transformed but our values regarding 
these material relations that need to change. A case in point is J.K. Gibson-Graham’s The End of 
Capitalism (As We Knew It): A Feminist Critique of Political Economy. In this text Gibson-
Graham claim that “we hope to counteract the tendency to emphasize the social effectivity of 
property ownership, domination and consciousness, while ignoring exploitation. For a moment 
then, we wish to hold exploitation up to the light and to analyze—not presume—its relations to 
power, ownership, consciousness, and other social dimensions” (52-53). For Gibson-Graham, 
however, “capitalism” is not a material relation within which human beings are situated 
regardless of their will rather, it is primarily a hegemonic “economic and social descriptor”—a 
mode of representation—that gets reinforced by those forms of political practice that seek to 
oppose capitalism (2).  
 For instance, according to Gibson-Graham, “Marxism has produced a discourse of 
Capitalism that ostensibly delineates an object of transformative class politics but that operates 
more powerfully to discourage and marginalize projects of class transformation” (252). On these 
terms, explanation—or explanatory critique—is reification: it is bound to produce an 
“essentialist” representation of capitalism as an “all powerful” and “insurmountable” hegemon—
 137 
a “self-same” identity—that is immune to intervention and change. They contend that by 
explaining all social practices on the terms of a totality of material relations in capitalism, the 
transformation of capitalism is represented as an impossibility (43). 
In order to intervene in what they see as an occlusion of “class transformation” by 
Marxism, Gibson-Graham propose to disarticulate “class,” “surplus labor,” and “exploitation” 
from the material relations of production in capitalism and re-understanding different types of 
labor as “non-capitalist class processes of surplus labor appropriation and distribution” (168). 
Included in these so called “non-capitalist class processes” are, among other things, domestic 
labor, self-employment, and “alternative” forms of distribution that, they argue, are “outside” the 
capital/wage-labor relation. In other words, they aim to pluralize class as classes. This is a re-
articulation of second wave feminism’s notion of gender as a class but now further removed 
from the idea that “classes” are interlocking structures of oppression. Classes instead are diffuse, 
amorphous, social differences. At the core of this, disarticulation of class from capitalism is 
Gibson-Graham’s argument for the necessity of explaining class as a “process” by “divorcing [it] 
. . . from the idea of economic and social ‘systems’ or structures” (65). In this context, multiple 
“relations of production” can occur at the same time. For instance, according to Gibson-Graham 
while wage work may involve capitalist social relations, domestic labor operates under “feudal” 
relations of production, and “self-employment” occurs under yet another set of relations of 
production. They claim that re-understanding capitalism as a “heterogeneity” that exists 
alongside “non-capitalist class processes” but does not subsume them, and retheorizing “class” 
and “exploitation” as social processes, opens up the possibility of a “new” and “different” class 
politics that will actually enable “class transformation” (53). 
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It is important to be clear here that by “transformation” Gibson-Graham do not mean the 
eradication of class, but a reorganization of its form. They make clear that their “new” politics of 
class “transformation” “might not be concerned to eradicate all or even specifically capitalist 
forms of exploitation but might instead be focused on transforming the extent, type, and 
conditions of exploitation in particular settings, or on changing its emotional components or its 
social effects” (53). As a result, the effect of placing the emphasis on “class” and “exploitation” 
as social processes is to shift the focus from eradicating exploitation as such, to changing HOW 
exploitation and the extraction of surplus-labor is performed within specific contexts and 
changing the range of subjective responses that are historically available to the extraction and 
appropriation of surplus labor: “Projects of class transformation . . . do not necessarily involve 
social upheaval and hegemonic transition . . . Rather, they take place whenever there is an 
attempt to change the way in which surplus labor is produced, appropriated, or distributed” (59). 
In the process they shift attention away from WHY surplus-labor is produced and suspend an 
inquiry into the possibility and necessity of entirely eradicating its conditions of possibility. 
Gibson-Graham claim that, “in slaying the capitalist monster, we have eliminated as well the 
subject position of its opponent” (21). Thus, instead of opposing capitalism, class society, and 
exploitation as such, they argue that what is necessary for the advancement of the global 
situation of women is a redefinition of capitalism: a “vision of a capitalist future [that] is not 
predicated on the general eradication of capitalism but simply involves the acknowledged 
coexistence of capitalist and non-capitalist economic forms” (179). For Gibson-Graham working 
to abolish capitalist exploitation (and hence, capitalism) is “too reductive” and “homogeneous” 
compared to the “economic heterogeneity” of preserving and defending capitalism along with 
other so-called “non-capitalist economic forms.” 
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 What Gibson-Graham advance as feminism is a “politics of phrases” that cleanses 
feminism and changes in gender and sexuality relations of their material relation to class by 
transcoding the material contradictions in capitalism and its changing labor relations for women 
into epistemology. They abstract the changes for women in capitalism from the historical and 
material relations that produce them and thus cleanse feminism as a project to transform these 
material relations. They reduce feminism to a politics of “fighting phrases with phrases.”  Thus, 
by a rhetorical sleight of hand they simply redefine and revalue “what is” in global capitalism as 
“what should be” for women. By converting the material contradictions of capitalism into 
epistemology, a politics of phrases, or what in feminism has been called the “politics of truth,” 
excludes a critique of the material interests served by the mystification of the material relations 
of capitalism, or what Foucault in his rejection of Marx dismissed as the “economics of untruth.”  
The “economics of untruth” is a class analysis based on the understanding that the “truth” is not 
determined by the performative power of language but by historical and material relations in 
capitalism. In relativizing all explanation as inherently predicated upon mystification, feminism 
after poststructuralism provides a useful alibi for multinational capital in its efforts to conceal the 
exploitation of workers and promote new strategies of extracting profit.  
 If we move our analysis away from the relatively privileged sectors of the North Atlantic 
petit-bourgeoisie, to rural female piece-rate workers in the Talleres Rurales del Valle 
Precooperative (TRV) just north of Cali, Colombia we can see the way in which this blurring of 
the “economics of untruth” is a means for mystifying the proletarianization and exploitation of 
rural women in global capitalism.  Legally a “co-operative,” the TRV, like other so called “non-
profit” organizations, presents itself as a “worker-operated” and “worker-owned” program with 
the aim of “lend[ing] dignity to peasant women” and promoting development of the production 
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process “through the applied use of co-operative methods” (Truelove 50). In the parlance of 
postmodern feminism and its “ethics of difference” such redefining of women as persons with 
“agency” gives them power. In actuality, as Cynthia Truelove demonstrates, “co-operatives” 
such as the TRV program are sites for “outsourcing” work from national and multinational 
industries that aim to close their plants in urban sites where worker organization and social 
benefits are much higher, and secure sites of “unprotected” labor in rural areas. Despite the 
formal “democracy” and legal responsibility on the part of co-operative members for 
“managing” the co-operative, the actual negotiation of labor contracts and the management of 
day-to-day operations are determined by the executive branch of the TRV in conjunction with 
the subcontracting industry.  
 As Truelove argues, the members of the so-called “co-operatives” are in actuality 
“disguised wage-laborers” and “industrial proletarians” whose “surplus value generated through 
this labor arrangement is directly manifested in the profit generated for industry through the 
employ of cheap labor” (56). The official legal classification of these women as “socias” 
(members of a worker-managed co-operative) instead of wage-workers is “primarily a legal 
convenience for industry” (53). It is a means for exempting national and multinational 
corporations from having to provide social benefits (healthcare, education, etc.) over and above 
wages, as would be the case for legally protected workers. While the piece-rate workers are 
entitled to “benefits,” as “socias” with their own “autonomous agency” they are required to pay 
for these “benefits” out of deductions from their wages. Moreover, insofar as these “co-
operatives” are in actuality functionaries for corporate profit, the ideology of “co-operativism” 
and “teamwork” that they promote is a way to weed out those who attempt to organize for 
greater control of the production process on the part of workers. 
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 For the “disguised wage laborers” in the TRV the knowledge that the reality of their 
material conditions as wage-workers is indeed hidden from them—in the form of “non-profit” 
organizations and “co-operatives” which “affirm” the “difference” of peasant women, and the 
legal classification of their status as “socias”—is an important insight for their political struggle 
against the exploitation of their labor-power. It is the development of this knowledge of the 
economic untruth of the “co-operatives” and the legal classification of women as “socias” and 
the economic reality of their exploitation as wage-workers (not a transhistorical truth but an 
historically produced, and therefore transformable, truth) that has enabled these women to more 
effectively contest the lack of control they have over the sale of their labor-power and the 
production process in general (55).  
 The conversion of the material into the discursive and cultural in “postmodern” 
feminisms is not a direct reflection of the material relations of capitalism rather it is a 
“spiritualizing” of these relations which is to say that it is an ideological inversion of material 
relations. To put this another way, the notion of “constitutive reality” is not actually a praxical 
transformation, a fundamental break, or material supersession of the material relations in 
capitalism, it is a textual healing—or a “spiritual resolution”—of material contradictions. It does 
not actually praxically resolve contradictions that materially develop at the point of production, it 
merely ideologically suspends them and conceals over the material relations that produce them. 
In this way it provides an ideological frame for political practices that focus on surface reforms 
of capitalism that have been quite useful to rearticulating feminism in the interests of 
transnational capitalism and dismantling feminism as a movement of social transformation. This 
“ideological inversion” however, is itself the effect of the material processes of capitalism: “if in 
all ideology men and their relations appear upside-down as in a camera obscura, this 
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phenomenon arises just as much from their historical life-process as the inversion of objects on 
the retina does from their physical-life process” (Marx and Engels, German 42). Poststructuralist 
philosophy and its “ethics of differences,” to be more specific, is the ideology of a fledgling 
transnational capital which was at that time already materially transforming the social division of 
labor in respect to relations of gender, sexuality, race, ethnicity and nation in order to intensify 
exploitation and bolster the declining rate of profit without the transformation of class relations 
(exploitation).  
 The presupposition of a “discrete singularity” (“sign”), with a “self-same identity,” or 
singular correspondence between language and a stable or “fixed” referent or thing—what Kant 
refers to as the noumenon in his book Critique of Pure Reason—that has characterized 
“modernist” philosophy ultimately became the privileged mode of referentiality in industrial 
capitalism, which at its highest level of historical and material development used Fordist 
assembly-line mass production and Taylorized managerial practices that break down the 
production process into “discrete” parts and reduce the subject of labor to the individual of 
calculated mass-assembly time. Singular referentiality—the presupposition of a correspondence 
between “words” and “things”—is the referentiality of mass production. Its “referent”—the 
“thing” which is named—is abstracted from the material relations of production in which 
“things” are produced. To put this another way, the singularity of the noumenon is part of the 
administrative reason of capital which conceals the material relations of exploitation under 
which the commodity is produced and therefore puts forward an idealized understanding of the 
material as abstract “things.”  
 In this same regard however, contemporary cultural theory, including feminism, also 
abstracts the material from the material relations of capitalism. First, as Teresa Ebert has argued, 
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it does not actually break from a “referent” and “referentiality” as it claims. Instead it puts 
forward a different mode of referentiality that rejects a one-to-one correspondence between 
signifier and signified and pluralizes the range of referents into a network of shifting signifiers in 
a relation of textual play, rather than extricating itself from referentiality altogether. In place of a 
singular referent, the canonical feminisms put forward a “post-referential” referentiality that is 
characterized by a series of “object substitutions,” doublings, a network of multiple and shifting 
discursive references (Ebert, “Interview” 48-49). Yet, unless discourse has some form of 
“immanent” theological power which accounts for the formation of objects, but is itself not 
accounted for by the historical and material relations of the mode of production, then this theory 
necessarily assumes the existence of matter outside of any historical relation whatsoever until it 
is inculcated into discursive relations. This is an ahistorical notion of “matter” which reduces it 
to a static, reified mass. In the guise of being “more historical” than historical materialist 
analyses of women’s oppression which were thought to “essentialize” material reality in 
economics, poststructuralist theories of discursively “constitutive” reality obscured the material 
as a structure of material conflicts; what Marx has called the “ensemble of social relations” of 
production (German 122). Poststructuralist feminism reproduced the same theory of abstract 
matterism as Ludwig Feuerbach, that Marx critiqued in his “Theses on Feuerbach.” In 
poststructuralism, material reality is only conceived of as an “object of contemplation,” not as 
practical relations, “hence in contradistinction to materialism, the active side was developed 
abstractly by idealism” (German 121).  
 Like the Kantian “noumenal” theory of laissez-faire and industrial capitalism, 
poststructuralism conceals the material relations under which this matter is produced: the 
capitalist relations of production. In doing so, it occludes exploitation and the material conditions 
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under which the majority of women on the planet live. This is clearly manifested in Derrida’s 
notion that there is nothing behind the text except textuality itself. Signifying practices are 
autonomous from objective reality so that any “outside” (reality) to which we may refer is 
always an extension of the “inside” (textuality). As there is no “outside” to discourse, nothing 
propels the repetition of discursive norms except its own laws, the laws of semiosis. Discursive 
repetition is defended as a “self-motivating” transhistorical practice. Like Feuerbach, 
postructuralism “does not conceive human activity itself as objective activity . . . hence [it] does 
not grasp the significance of ‘revolutionary,’ of ‘practical-critical,’ activity” (Marx and Engels, 
German 121). 
 The “deconstruction” of modernist conceptions of gender and sexuality rooted in 
existentialism, the notion of a natural female “essence,” Hegelian and Kantian philosophies of 
ideal concepts and especially Cartesian binary conceptions—while at the same time 
ideologically abstracting gender and sexuality from any structure of material relations such as 
class and capitalism—by poststructuralist feminisms was taken to be a material transformation 
of gender. But knowledge practices do not transform class contradictions—which can only be 
resolved through the transformation of social praxis (revolution). Instead, this “deconstruction” 
has been an ideological articulation of material changes that became a historical necessity for 
capitalism. The cultural theories of the “post-” were made possible by and helped provide the 
knowledge practices and cultural intelligibilities needed by early transnational capital to update 
the contemporary workforce to dialectical and material developments taking place in production 
for profit.  
 What is most telling in this regard is that at the same time of the initial institutionalization 
in feminism and cultural theory generally of an “ethics of difference,” the “post-referential,” 
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declarations of the “irrelevance” of class, Marxism, and collective struggles for social 
transformation, and the necessity to rearticulate gender and sexuality as “flexible” and 
“irreducible” floating textualities or cultural singularities “resistant” to the authority of the state 
but unexplainable in terms of economics, the social division of labor, and the mode of 
production, North Atlantic capital was engaged in a massive class war on workers’ conditions of 
life by working to dismantle state welfare provisions and labor laws (including social welfare 
and labor laws for women) and re-privatize social wealth that had been allotted to public 
institutions (such as education, social security, day care, health care, welfare, etc); break up 
social collectivity and worker’s solidarity in trade-unions; deregulate “free trade” by, for 
instance, removing legal barriers and tariffs to transnational corporations, as well as deregulating 
labor laws enforced by “nation-states” abroad; and shift manufacturing production sites outside 
of the North where relatively cheaper labor could be secured.  
 For instance, the notion of “categorical crisis” of “woman” which contemporary 
feminism treats as an always already unavoidable and constitutive structure of difference, is itself 
a ruling class articulation of the way the social relations of production determine gender. It is a 
manifestation of the way in which the sharpening of class contradictions, and the drive of capital 
to stave of declines in profit through increasing the extraction of surplus-value, produced 
changes in gender and sexuality relations. The “new” gender order in other words, is not “above” 
wage-labor and capital relations (exploitation) rather it is an articulation of these relations at a 
historically specific level of development of its productive forces: post-Fordism.  
 Particularly during “the long boom” in which productivity and profits for U.S. capital 
increased steadily, and there were labor shortages as a result of the wars, it was profitable and 
necessary for capital to focus on the economic development and regulation of the national 
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workforce for the re-supply of its exploitable labor-power. It was therefore possible for workers 
to collectively bargain for capital to invest a greater portion of the socially produced wealth not 
only directly in production but also in the reproduction of the labor force to support its economic 
needs for an increased supply of highly skilled, but nonetheless exploitable labor power. These 
investments took the form of rising wages or a “family wage” and investments in public 
institutions such as the expansion of education, especially higher education and moving of larger 
numbers of the workers (men and women) into higher education. These investments were 
ultimately supported by capital in order to deal with acute labor shortages and reproduce a 
domestic workforce endowed with the skills appropriate to the current level of production.  
 The construct of a stable and fixed “identity” or “feminine essence” for woman is both an 
effect and an ideological articulation of the division of labor between women who were often 
primarily located in unpaid reproductive labor in the home and forced into positions of economic 
dependence on marriage and the family, and men who were primarily located in paid wage-labor 
outside the home. This division of labor, under the existing historical conditions of capitalist 
production at the time, was useful to support capital’s need for controlling and regulating the 
labor supply needed by production for profit. In such a situation of Fordist assembly-line factory 
production, Taylorist managerial strategies, and a fairly rigid division of labor, the dominant 
mode of referentiality in culture was singular. In these material conditions the dominant 
conception of woman as a “fixed,” “natural” and “singular” identity was useful to capital for 
adjusting the labor force to the economic interests of the ruling class. In this respect, “woman” 
appeared under capitalism, and according to those representations serving the interests of capital 
at the time, to have a relatively fixed meaning in a “feminine essence” or “identity.” In actuality, 
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gender was not grounded in a fixed “feminine essence” but produced by the social division of 
labor.  
 Such an understanding of “referentiality” in general and “woman” in particular, however, 
became increasingly outdated for capital, particularly after the crash of the long boom. At this 
time the world capitalist economy entered a period of general economic stagnation and decline in 
the rate of profit. As a consequence of the economic crisis of capital and dialectical development 
of contradictions in production, the state allocations in social welfare and public institutions to 
support the reproduction and growth of the domestic labor force that were once necessary for 
capital to maintain profit now became a hindrance to profit for the ruling class. Capital that had 
relied heavily on workers “at home” to provide exploitable labor-power during the long boom 
increasingly moved production abroad to seek out cheaper labor and less restrictive conditions of 
production—conditions that had been made more “amenable” to capital in the West owing to 
brutal imperialist conquest and colonization—in order to be competitive with other capitals 
internationally. This also had the effect of giving a fledgling multi-national capital a greater 
foothold to dismantle the workers solidarity and class collectivity in trade-unions that workers 
developed in advanced capitalist nations during the long boom and through which they 
collectively bargained for such measures as a family wage and forty hour work week. The 
economic crisis in production, therefore, resulted in the rapid decrease of full time, steady 
employment in advanced capitalist nations, the shifting of production to colonized and formerly 
colonized nations, and the increase of unemployment and part-time, contingent labor among 
workers in the West.  
 Both “at home” and “abroad” women were pulled into wage-labor in increasing numbers. 
Many women who had not worked previously were economically compelled to work for a wage 
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in addition to unpaid reproductive labor in the family because of the deterioration of the family 
wage. It was also in the material interest of capital to employ women and workers of color in 
increasing numbers and move them into new occupations because, owing to their historical 
position of material inequality in capitalism, they were less expensive for capital to use as 
exploitable labor power. As a consequence of these changes in the material conditions of 
capitalist after the collapse of the long boom, and the drawing of women into the workforce en 
masse, capital produced changes in gender and sexual relations and women’s relationship to the 
family. Capital necessitated and accommodated cultural and legal changes in gender and 
sexuality relations in order to “free” women to join the exploitable workforce in increasing 
numbers.  
 The singular identity “woman,” and the rigid binary between “woman/man” once 
ideologically useful to capital to naturalize a strict division between reproductive and productive 
labor increasingly became a redundant project under economic crisis and the development of 
new conditions of production to increase the extraction of surplus-labor from the workforce. The 
singular referent—between language and a stable object—was and still to a large extent is seen 
as “oppressive,” because this mode of referentiality serves to ideologically adjust the worforce to 
modes of extracting surplus-labor that began to serve as a hindrance to profit. Capital needed to 
break class collectivity on the one hand, but make legal and cultural accommodations for the 
inclusion of differences on the other in order to accommodate drawing workers into new modes 
of extracting surplus-labor. Early transnational capital needed an “ethics of difference” in order 
to break strong trade unions and class solidarity and isolate workers of the world to raise the rate 
of profit for the owners. It did so through the differences of gender, sexuality, age, nationality 
and race. This “ethics of difference” helped to break the notion of fixed social differences that 
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were once useful under capitalism’s “old” modes of extracting surplus-labor which used Fordist 
production practices and Taylorist managerial strategies, and reinstituted a new notion of social 
difference based on “post-Fordist” production practices.  
 The canonical “post-” modes of feminism have been part of the cultural apparatuses 
which provided ideological responses and “spiritual resolution” to material developments and 
contradictions already taking place in the social relations of production. “Post-” theory—and its 
“post-referential” conception of “women”—is not a point of departure from the administrative 
reason of capital manifested in, for example, Kantian philosophy it is, rather, a rationalization of 
the administrative reason of capital. It is a further breaking down of the immanent operations of 
this administrative reason and the assertion of the impossibility of an “outside” to it. This “post-
referential” referentiality is enabled by material developments in the division of labor: the further 
breaking down of the Fordist mass-assembly division of labor and Taylorized managerial 
practices into ever more particularized divisions of labor and complex and layered managerial 
practices. However, these developments are themselves enabled by class relations and the drive 
for the extraction of surplus-labor for profit. This now canonical mode of “post-referential” 
referentiality, however, conceals the class relations of capitalism that have produced changes in 
the culture of capitalism and has led many feminists once again to read surface cultural changes 
in the modes through which capital extracts surplus-labor from the workforce, as “consititutive” 
material changes in capitalism and particularly root changes for women.  
 By putting forward theories that either sever culture from class and the economic or that 
make the cultural changes of capitalism “constitutive” of the economic, contemporary feminism 
has actually retreated into an increasingly localized form of micropolitics and local cultural 
reforms within capitalism. Identity politics (the cultural recognition of differences and the 
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inclusion of the local experience of differences as the limit of politics) is a rationalization of the 
differences that capitalism produces in the division of labor to extract wealth from workers. The 
“differences” of identity politics are a culturalizing of the social division of labor and material 
process of exploitation in production under capitalism (Ebert, “Rematerializing” 39). This 
includes identity politics after “poststructuralism” and the notion of woman as an instance of 
“differance,” a regime of “power/knowledge” networks or of the performative power of language 
without a “referent.”  These theories articulated by poststructuralist (and what one might now 
call “post-poststructuralist”) feminists and queer theorists such as Judith Butler, Diane Elam, 
Drucilla Cornell, Elizabeth Grosz and others are not a departure from identity politics even 
though they are a departure from the notion of “singular” referentiality. Rather, they are an 
updating of identity politics by translating it into an ever more pluralized and localized 
“micropolitics” after the crash of the long boom when capital fell into a period of economic 
crisis, needed access to new sources of cheap labor, relocated women into new areas in the paid 
workforce which required changes in the family and the production of new modes of gender, 
sexuality, race and ethnicity relations and subjectivities that could accommodate these shifts.  
The effect of micropolitics has been to ideologically cut the chain of causality that relates 
the class privileges of some women to the increasing poverty of the majority by abstracting these 
inequalities from class relations and private ownership of the means of production and 
translating them into matters of local desires, affects, values and lifestyle choices. In doing so, 
they accommodate economic inequality between the few and the many, including the majority of 
women, while arguing for “democracy” and “cultural freedom” of “differences.”  In isolating the 
“local” or “micro” from the social relations of production feminism has been converted into a 
project to support the “success” of a tiny class-fraction of women. What is most telling in this 
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regard, is the way in which the “post” ultimately returns to the volitional subject as the basis of 
agency and change. This is evident in Gibson-Graham’s discussion of the “relationship” between 
struggles against the oppression of women via rape and struggles against globalization. In this 
discussion, Gibson-Graham’s reading largely hinges on seeing the oppression of women by men 
through rape as an analogy to the exploitation of labor by capitalism through globalization—as 
an autonomous but comparable set of relations. Having assumed the relationship between the 
oppression of women and exploitation under capitalism to be one of analogy (“unique” modes of 
oppression with no structural relation), Gibson-Graham argue that the “dominant” approaches to 
“rape” and to “globalization” lead, respectively, to constructing “women” and “labor” as 
“victims” that are incapable of any “agency” that enables change. More specifically, Gibson-
Graham draw on Sharon Marcus’ theorization of rape in order to argue that rape a “language 
script” that can be “rewritten” in order to prevent a rape from occurring.10  
For this theory, discourse constitutes material reality, and a discourse that attempts to 
explain and critique the conditions that oppress and exploit women—and restrict their 
“choice”—performatively reproduces such a restriction. Thus, Gibson-Graham oppose feminist 
discourses that work to critique the material conditions of exploitation that prevent “choice” on 
the idealist grounds that it is feminist discourses which critique the oppression of women, that 
are responsible for making women into victims. Like “power feminists” who want to retheorize 
“woman” as a “self-empowered” agent who is not defined by the rape script, Gibson-Graham 
want to theorize class as a discursively reversible and “free-agent” not defined by capitalist 
globalization—a theorization that, they claim, allows greater agency for resistance.  However, 
this is idealist because it assumes that discourse theologically brings into being that which it 
                                                 
10 For Sharon Marcus’ argument see her essay “Fighting Bodies, Fighting Words: A Theory and Politics of Rape 
Prevention” in Judith Butler and Joan Scott’s Feminists Theorize the Political. 
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names: saying and perceiving that women are oppressed and producing knowledges of the 
conditions of oppression, causes our oppression and, by contrast, saying and perceiving that we 
are “freely consenting” and “powerful” causes our “liberation.”  In doing so, this idealism blocks 
the production of the knowledges necessary to effectively intervene in and transform the 
conditions of women’s oppression and exploitation, and moreover, reproduces the reactionary 
ruling class fantasy that people need only look within themselves and “recognize their power” in 
order to be “powerful.”   
What is common to these approaches is the way in which they attempt to resurrect 
“personal choice” as the basis of one’s social position. In fact, Gibson-Graham argue that, 
if it seems bizarre to talk about a ‘choice’ among class positions, that attests to the 
aura of paucity and constraint that surrounds the discourse of class, and the 
prevailing sense that class is thrust upon us by a system outside which we have no 
existence and within which we have no purchase. (168) 
In the (perceived) absence of the possibility of any collective revolutionary transformation of 
material relations of production, Gibson-Graham offer the highly constrained and limited 
“agency” that patriarchal capitalism has always offered in its cultural imaginary: the “choice” to 
pull oneself up by one’s own bootstraps and change “oneself” and “one’s” response to the 
dominant social relations—but not the collective agency to work to transform these social 
relations themselves.  
In theorizing “empowerment” as based on personal choice and a self-motivating agency, 
Gibson-Graham abstract violence against women from the social conditions in the international 
division of labor which continue to make it possible. In doing so they represent violence against 
women as an effect of interpersonal relations between men and women, where class politics and 
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contradictions are hidden from view. However, violence against women cannot be understood in 
isolation from the conditions of women’s lives in the international division of labor. It is a tool of 
class exploitation. In order to naturalize and justify this exploitation, divide the working class to 
prevent it from effectively fighting this exploitation, and produce new specialized markets for 
consumption, capital necessitates the production and reproduction of historical differences such 
as “gender.”  In short, these differences are the result of exploitation and serve in its ideological 
legitimation. In this context, violence against women can be understood as a concentration of 
practices meant to reinforce, exacerbate, and intensify gender differences. It thus contributes to 
the justification of the economic exploitation of women and helps to maintain a politically 
divided labor force that is, as a result, prevented from collectively fighting the entire system of 
social oppression and exploitation.  
 Violence against women is symptomatic of much broader strategies of violence in the 
international division of labor, used to “cheapen” women’s labor-power and keep us more 
vulnerable and less resistant to the global logic of capitalist exploitation. As Maria Mies has 
argued, 
Violence against women and extracting women’s labour through coercive labour 
relations are [. . .] part and parcel of capitalism. They are necessary for the 
capitalist accumulation process and not peripheral to it. In other words, capitalism 
has to use, to strengthen, or even to invent, patriarchal men-women relations if it 
wants to maintain its accumulation model. If all women in the world had become 
‘free’ wage-earners, the extraction of surplus would, to say the least, be severely 
hampered. (Patriarchy 171) 
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Violence against women is a tool for the accumulation of capital. The history of violence against 
women and keeping women relatively isolated and excluded from wage-labor has set up the 
conditions necessary for an extremely cheap labor force that can be easily manipulated 
depending on what will make the most profit for the capitalist. Now, in a time of economic crisis, 
and a subsequent increase in ruthless and reckless inter-capitalist competition on a global scale, 
more women are being proletarianized on this scale than ever before. The crisis of capitalism that 
is the effect of the fall of the rate of profit, requires employment of more women (and other low 
paid workers) to increase or at least maintain the rate of profit. These shifts in the mode of 
production have opened up the possibility for women, who were previously relatively isolated 
from each other, to develop collective practices with each other and male workers to resist, 
intervene in, and transform the conditions of their exploitation. Yet, to suppress the development 
of collective revolutionary praxis, capitalist relations of production require an increase in 
managerial strategies that will maintain gender distinctions to (re)produce a labor force that will 
be more easily exploitable by capital. As part of these strategies there has developed a significant 
backlash against advances made by women all over the globe which includes both covert 
ideological violence through the “repetition,” and “recitation” of gender norms in the media and 
educational systems, and the development and maintenance of practices of overt physical 
violence against women. 
In this context, it is not surprising to see where Gibson-Graham are led by their reliance 
on a postructuralist politics of difference which abstracts gender from capitalism: to the ruling 
class conclusion that it is transnational capital and the multinational corporation that is the 
material basis of the emancipation of women. For Gibson-Graham the activity of MNCs in the 
Third World is “unwittingly generative rather than merely destructive” for the conditions of 
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women’s lives (130). When the oppression of women gets abstracted from the international 
division of labor it becomes possible to assume that women can be emancipated within and by 
capitalism. On these terms they argue that, “involvement in capitalist exploitation has freed 
[women] from aspects of exploitation associated with their household class positions and has 
given them a position from which to struggle with and redefine traditional gender roles” (132). 
But what they totally erase here is that capitalism necessitates these changes. They do not 
question the social relations in which some women have more “choice” and “power” than others 
and thus they ignore the reorganization of relations of production in the international division of 
labor in which capitalism is perfectly supportive of enabling some women to succeed within its 
ranks so as to more effectively manage the majority of women as free and cheap labor. 
It is important to note that the “textual healing” offered by poststructuralist and post-
Marxist feminists in many ways is a translation of the dominant bourgeois theories of post-
Fordist political economy and the reigning post-Taylorist managerial philosophies prevalent at 
the time articulated in such books as Daniel Bell’s The Coming of Post-Industrial Society and 
Peter Drucker’s Post-Capitalist Society—or today Thomas Friedman’s The World Is Flat—into 
gender theory and politics. Post-Fordist and post-Taylorist managerial theories celebrate the 
development of new technologies and post-Fordist managerial practices as fundamental 
transformation of exploitation in production and progress (a material supersession) beyond the 
material contradictions and class relations of capitalism. These theories have been an updating of 
the Weberian theory of class for new developments in the productive forces of capitalism. They 
take changes in which commodities are owned (computers instead of typewriters), what means of 
production are used, and changes in the managerial strategies of capital to extract more wealth 
from workers as a material transformation of the basic relations of exploitation. The theory of a 
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fundamental break from capitalism to a “post-class” “informatics of domination”—or what has 
similarly been called “New Times” (Hall), “post-industrial society” (Bell), “post-capitalist 
society” (Drucker), or “post-Fordism” (Amin)—has, among other things, entailed the abstraction 
of cyber and information technologies from the material relations in which they are produced. To 
stave off declines in profit competing capitals have had to revolutionize production practices by 
producing labor-saving technologies—in this case information and cybertechnologies—to extract 
more wealth from the working population. These developments in the forces of production have 
also led to new technological and occupational divisions of labor and conditions of production or 
what have been called “post-Fordist” production practices and “post-Taylorist” managerial 
strategies based on flexibility and plural organization. The production of new technologies, 
changes to the technological division of labor, and the development of new managerial practices, 
however, are not actually an index of material changes—i.e., a “fundamental break” as Hall has 
called it—or a supersession of capitalist production (a supersession of the exploitation of 
surplus-labor) with a “knowledge economy” based on control of information.  
Far from fundamentally restructuring the material relations of capitalism, and offering 
“freedom” from exploitation, information, knowledge, and cybertechnologies such as the 
“computer” are themselves the effect of social relations of production based on the exploitation 
of labor for profit. In his article “Capitalism, Computers, and the Class War on your Desktop,” 
Bob Hughes remarks on the fact that cybertechnologies are not a transformation of the material 
relations of production in capitalism: 
The machine on which I write this was massively subsidised by the sweat, tears, 
taxes and poisoned aquifers of the people of Taiwan, Malaysia, Thailand, 
Singapore and China. It was assembled in Taiwan’s notorious Hsinchu “science 
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park,” into which $60 billion of public money has been pumped, and from which 
perhaps 40,000 tons of toxic water is pumped into local waterways every single 
day. Its silicon chips have consumed 700 times their own weight in water, 
hydrocarbons, toxic gases and solvents. Its hard disk was made in a factory in 
Thailand, where women have actually dropped dead at their work benches from 
lead poisoning. It’s a laptop, so at least its display contains no lead (5-8 lbs in a 
typical CRT); instead, it contains about 30mg of mercury: either a lethal dose, or 
several times the lethal dose, depending on how you ingest it. It has perhaps 30 
capacitors containing tantalum: very likely part of the spoils of Congo’s civil war, 
which has killed around 4 million people. The price of tantalum, and almost 
everything else in a computer, varies wildly; legitimate production is expensive 
and inflexible; so there will always be a role in the supply-chain for discreet, ever-
flexible militias. The power-supply was assembled for next to nothing by some of 
the millions of young men and women who leave the land in China every year, as 
part of “economic restructuring.” 
The notion that knowledge, information and cybertech has fundamentally transformed 
capitalism, and is “free” from the constraints of class, conceals over the living labor which 
produces new technologies and the conditions under which this labor takes place: the conditions 
of private ownership and brutal exploitation in which the majority of the population does not 
own the means of production and is compelled under the threat of starvation, homelessness, and 
destitution to work part of the working-day to reproduce their own means of subsistence and part 
of the working-day to produce surplus-value for the ruling class.  
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Moreover, “new technologies” are not only produced under such conditions they are 
deployed in production for profit. “The computer,” Hughes continues,  
has been turned into a humourless device for extracting profit from people; 
systematically wasting their effort, ideas, hopes; turning any luxury it allows us 
into a costly, burdensome necessity; and, finally, erasing all evidence that human 
beings were ever involved. It has been recruited into capitalism’s historic mission 
to annihilate competition and generate needs, which so dominate our lives it is 
almost impossible even to notice that there is a real world out there.  
Like all technologies the ends and interests toward which they are put—whether they are 
used to provide clean drinking water and house people or to reduce an entire nation to rubble and 
destitution for profit—is determined by the material relations in which they are produced and 
used. With this in mind, the notion of “post-class” conceals feminism’s relationship to the 
material contradictions of capitalism and is a particularly devastating retreat for feminism in a 
time when workers in transnational capitalism are increasingly subordinated to the exploitative 
logic of capitalist relations of production—often while producing the goods and services that are 
the necessary preconditions for this new “cyber-reality.”   
 What many postmodern feminists presented as “effective” feminist practice in the name 
of feminism were the cultural intelligibilities of upper-middle class women such as knowledge 
workers in the academy because, by focusing on issues of deconstruction, coding, knowledge, 
discourse, etc. they were able to gain the cultural and labor skills they needed to “succeed” 
within the changing labor relations of capitalism. In fact, the intense focus on issues of “affinity” 
within “information networks” as articulated by Haraway and others was really more a model of 
networking among multicultural managers of the transnational labor force. But this success was 
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dependent on the fact that transnational capital was investing in producing technical managers 
and knowledge workers in the North—and it had capital to invest in this as a result of the 
exploitation of surplus-labor around the world. What the “object crisis” of feminism and its 
notion of “post-referential referentiality” concealed is that the majority of women in 
transnational capitalism who gained new skills in “informatics,” coding, discourse analysis, 
flexibility, etc. because these were the marketable skills at the time, were still subject to 
exploitation. The evidence of this is not only the continued exploitation in the service industry 
but the increases in wealth gaps between rich and poor, despite the updating of workers skills. 
The crisis of capitalism in the mid-1990s which entailed, among other things, the crisis of the 
“dot.com” industries in the North and the transferring of production for computing and 
technology both suggests that it is not “knowledge” but the extraction of surplus-labor and 
securing the material conditions for continued exploitation of surplus-labor that is the source of 
wealth—in this case now produced by workers in Latin America, India, China and Pakistan who 
are now the main suppliers of cheap labor for transnational capital.  
 Displacing the material referent to any signifier, as poststructuralism does, is at its basis a 
class question. Displacing the referent to the “category” and various discourses on “women” is 
an ideological means of preventing the possibility of explanatory critique of the historically 
produced (not inherently given) and, therefore, transformable material relations of capitalism. 
That is, it is a means of preventing the production of knowledges that can explain the material 
relations outside discourse that (re)produce gender and sexuality as social relations of capital and 
sites of exploitation and, in this way, historically speaking it has served as a force on behalf of 
transnational capital for the dismantling of knowledges needed to develop materially effective 
praxis in the struggle for social transformation. It does so by shifting the emphasis of the struggle 
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for social transformation from transforming the material relations of capitalism—its division of 
labor and property—to the transformation of signification, representations, and cultural 
productions of women which have become necessary for capital under the ever more complex 
strategies that capital uses to exploit workers. The “post-” conversion of feminism, in other 
words, has been part of the ruling class project of dismantling feminism as a force for social 
transformation and (again) converting it into a means for updating women as collective 
producers of capitalism. It is symptomatic not of the fact that feminism is “above” the mode of 
production and class antagonisms but of a class war over feminism and whether it will be 
articulated in the interests of social transformation to free women from the exploitation of their 
labor for profit or of capitalist reforms.  
 In many respects, capitalism has indeed changed on its cultural surface but the basic 
division between exploiters and exploited that is at the core of the wage-labor/capital relation is 
far from “over.”  The changes have been changes in the modes through which exploitation takes 
place, but not the basic social relations of exploitation. The “post-” conversion of feminism has 
been a cultural movement of ideas—a cultural updating of ruling class ideology—that conceals 
over the inequality of women and its material relationship to the social division of labor and 
social relations of production in capitalism. At the same time, it is developments in the economic 
relations of capital that have enabled this “cultural conversion.”  To put this another way the 
post- conversion of feminism is indicative of the way in which “culture” is a bearer of social 
relations and, more specifically, the way in which culture under capitalism is reduced to 
“ideology” and used in the service of the material interests of the capitalist class as a means to 
obscure the material relations of exploitation. 
 161 
4.0  THE “CONCRETE” BODY 
In the Foreword to her book Arts of the Possible, Adrienne Rich, a long time advocate of 
contemporary feminism’s rejection of Marxism, calls for contemporary feminism to re-examine 
its own “uncriticized and uninvestigated” anti-Marxism. When she first invoked Marx, she 
recalls, it was “to dismiss Marxism ‘for women’” and, in doing so, she, along with the dominant 
part of the U.S. feminist movement, was “echoing the standard anti-Marxism of the postwar 
American cultural and political mainstream” (4). In the meantime, the feminist method of “the 
personal is political” which was meant to show that the personal and daily lives of women were 
not of their own choosing and individual making but were the product of a totality of social 
relations that themselves needed to be transformed has, in the wake of the suppression of Marx’s 
explanatory critique of the social totality, turned into the understanding that personal choice is 
the root of women’s position in society. “Personal anecdote was replacing critical argument” as 
the means by which to investigate the conditions of women’s lives and the class desires of some 
women were displacing the needs of all women for economic equality and social justice. While 
“personal narrative was becoming valued as the true coin of feminist expression,” she observes, 
“at the same time, in every zone of public life, personal and private solutions were being 
marketed by a profit-driven corporate system, while collective action and even collective 
realities were mocked at best and at worst rendered historically sterile” (2). Articulating 
feminism on the terms of collective struggles for the social emancipation of all persons from the 
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exploitation of labor in capitalism, from imperialism and racism, in this context, has been 
overtaken by a “growing middle-class self absorption” (3) with one’s own life, pleasures, 
experiences.  
Indeed, contemporary feminism has by and large abandoned any notion of the 
relationship of gender, sexuality, and the daily lives of specific women to collective needs, 
capital, labor, and their relation in the mode of production (that is, exploitation). It has 
disconnected feminism from the struggle to transform the fundamental economic and social 
relations of production that shape women’s lives. Contemporary feminism has taken the 
“unrealizability of emancipation” that postmodern feminist Judith Butler declared in the early 
1990s as an uncontestable truth (“Poststructuralism and Postmarxism” 8). Instead it has (at most) 
resigned itself to offering codes of affect and caring and rules for “civil” and “ethical behavior” 
as the only means for addressing economic inequalities and social injustice around the globe.  
What is striking is that, in large part, this shift and the growing myopia of contemporary 
feminism have occurred in the very name of an engagement with the “material” conditions of 
women’s lives. “Materialism” to be clear, has itself been rearticulated in the wake of “post” 
theories—from postructuralism to post-marxism—to mean what Teresa Ebert has called 
“delectable materialism.” As Ebert explains, “delectable materialism” is “the theory of the 
material put forth in late capitalism to displace dialectical materialism” (280). “Delectable 
materialism” places a great deal of emphasis on what it calls the “concrete.” But by “concrete” it 
means not the materiality of the totality of social relations and the conditions of necessity that 
can explain why women’s conditions of life are being deteriorated around the globe, but the 
materiality of the sensuous, erotic, and tactile—particularly the sensuousness of the body and its 
pleasures and pains. For example, in her book Volatile Bodies, “delectable materialist” feminist 
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Elizabeth Grosz argues for the “primacy of corporeality” in explaining the material conditions of 
women’s lives and as a means to “transform women’s social subordination to men” (viii). 
According to Grosz, “Bodies have all the explanatory power of minds. Indeed, for feminist 
purposes the focus on bodies, bodies in their concrete specificities, has the added bonus of 
inevitably raising the question of sexual difference” (vii). The “concrete” of gender, sexuality, 
“questions about which kind of bodies, what their difference are, and what their products and 
consequences might be” are all to be explained by the sensuous singularities of the body that 
“resist” conceptualization and exceed explanation (vii). 
This notion of the concrete as a sensuous singularity, I argue, is a far cry from the 
dialectical materialism that is actually needed for feminism to explain the social relations of 
production that are confronting women in capitalism now—and to see through the local 
differences of its strategies for exploitation—so that it can effectively “transform the social 
subordination of women” to private property around the globe. The success of delectable 
materialism within feminism and cultural theory in general is in part owing to the fact that it 
claims to go beyond what it calls a “reductionist,” “abstract,” and “totalizing” logic of classical 
Marxism, which is now declared to be outdated in the face of triumphalist capitalism. These 
claims have, in fact, become trademarks of contemporary cultural theory after the “post” and are 
so much a part of the contemporary commonsense that they go unquestioned. But herein lies the 
problem. They have received a great deal of publication space, funding, and university support in 
the North precisely because they articulate the interests of transnational capitalism by covering 
over its trouble spots and representing the actual conditions of labor and need in capitalism as 
unsayable. Delectable materialism all but eliminates class, production, social totality, labor, 
collectivity, etc. from the explanatory vocabulary of contemporary feminism and reduces world 
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historical concerns for women in transnational capitalism—the exploitation of their labor—that 
have brought about the deterioration of their financial income, health, nutrition, economic 
security, and social well being to matters of individual choice, taste, and preference. 
A case in point is Elpeth Probyn’s Carnal Appetites: FoodSexIdentities, in which she 
applies Grosz “corporeal feminism” to questions of “food” and the “gendered, eating body.” For 
Probyn, the concrete “materiality” of gender, sexuality, food and eating is located in “alimentary 
assemblages”: the alimentary and erotic “sensations” of the body and its multiple surfaces. 
Eating, Probyn argues, is at root a “radically solitary” and “physical act.” In this view, the 
concrete of food and eating is constituted by its physicality and singularity: the feelings and 
sensations of the body in taking in and expelling food, from touch, texture, and taste to “hunger, 
greed, shame, disgust, and pleasure” (11). Using this delectable materialism, Probyn’s sensuous 
reading of food marginalizes burning social questions about the material relationship of women 
to the social relations in which food is produced and distributed in transnational capitalism. 
Probyn argues for what she calls “gut ethics”—or thinking “with our stomachs”—as the method 
of social change for women. “Gut ethics” requires acting on the body’s physio-psycho-social 
reaction—that is, feelings of appetite, desire, greed as well as dread, repulsion, shame, and 
disgust—that underlie and belie our reasoned decisions. Thinking with our stomachs and with 
our bodies requires abandoning so called “reductive” scientific and theoretical inquiry as a 
means to explain the material conditions of life for our “gut feelings” and “drives.” Probyn 
argues that “gut ethics” is a “non-reductive” understanding of the concrete of gender and food 
because it does not prescribe a set of moral rules and regulations that restrict others; rather, it is a 
matter of what Foucault calls the “care of the self.” 
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Instead of being more “concrete” and “innovative” Probyn’s theory is a re-articulation of 
Ernst Mach’s 19th century “subjective idealism” that Lenin critiqued in Materialism and 
Empirio-Criticism. As Lenin shows in his critique of Mach, when the body is theorized as a 
“complex of sensations” whose materiality does not exist independent of these sensations then 
all that is left is a “naked abstract I, an I infallibly written with a capital letter and italicised” 
(35). What is offered as “concrete,” in other words, is the height of bourgeois myopia: the 
abstract and ahistorical monadic individual of “civil society” who is autonomous from the 
external world and its social relations.  
The consequence of Probyn’s “care of the self” and “monadic subject” of civil society is 
that collective needs, and the position of the majority of women as collective producers—
exploited labor-power—who are denied access to basic needs (such as food) is unsayable. 
Instead, Probyn translates important social questions for feminism over food, hunger, starvation, 
and economic inequality—that is, who eats well and who eats not at all—into a frivolous matter 
of individual preferences, tastes, and choices. As a basic necessity, without which human beings 
cannot live and no social formation can exist, “food” and the social relations that shape the 
production of food and citizens’ access to it is an urgent social question for feminism. Food is an 
important index of whether a society is organized so that the material resources and social 
products belong to all members of society or whether they are privately appropriated by a few 
who own the means of producing these resources for profit. Under capitalism in which articles of 
necessity are produced as a means for profit not need, control over the world food supply means 
control over world development, the supply of labor-power and the rate at which workers can be 
exploited. This question of the organization of ownership and control of means for producing 
material resources and necessities such as food is crucial for feminism at a time when the 
 166 
expansion of global capitalism has widened the gap between classes and, moreover, these 
increased class contradictions have significantly deteriorated the material conditions of women’s 
lives in the international division of labor. According to a 2002 United Nations Food and 
Agricultural Organization report, at the same time the global economy produces enough food to 
feed 6 billion people, 2 billion suffer from malnutrition and of these people 840 million—
disproportionately women and girl children—suffer long term malnutrition (“Progress in 
Reducing Hunger”). A Global Health Council report indicates that “nearly a half billion women 
are stunted from malnutrition” (qtd. in Mathis “Global Statistics”).  
The turn away from the relation of women to basic necessities such as food under the 
wage-labor/capital relation is an extremely disenabling view for feminism because it steps 
backward from decades of the struggle to re-understand the material conditions of women’s lives 
as social and historical, and therefore changeable, and instead reduces unequal social and 
economic arrangements to personal differences—a matter of taste, preference, and consumption. 
The erasure of collectivity has led many feminists, including Rich, to question “whatever 
happened to feminism” and where is it going without Marx? As Maya Jhansi has put it, 
“Feminists need to rethink the relationship of women’s liberation to Marx, so that we do not fall 
into the same blithe reiterations of post-Marx Marxism.” Moreover, “until the women’s 
movement confronts Marx” she continues “it will not be able to move ‘beyond’ anything—let 
alone capitalism.” What the reflections of Rich, Jhansi and other feminists who are now 
“questioning” the rejection of Marxism and the turn away from class, labor, and production in 
feminism points to is that the history of contemporary feminism is proving that a feminism not 
founded on material conditions—on the relationship of gender and sexuality to the social 
relations of production, wage-labor/capital, imperialism, and the international division of labor—
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has been completely ineffective for transforming the material conditions of women’s lives in 
transnational capitalism.  
However, Rich and other contemporary feminists who are now formally objecting to the 
“post-” logic of much of contemporary feminism still have a very divided understanding of the 
use of Marx for feminism. On the one hand, Rich and others argue for the need to “return to 
Marx” and understand “women” on the basis of a totality of relations in capitalism, on the other 
hand, they want to restore Marx without using his dialectical materialist theory of political 
economy to explain the “concrete” conditions of women’s lives. One exemplary articulation of 
this is Nancy Holstrom’s essay “The Socialist Feminist Project” in which she argues that: 
Marxism’s basic theory does not need significant revision in order to take better 
account of women’s oppression. However, I do believe that the theory needs to be 
supplemented [...] [by] a social theory that gives a fuller picture of production and 
reproduction than Marx’s political economic theory does, one that extends 
questions of democracy not only to the economy but to personal relations. (46) 
On these terms, Marx’s theory of the totality of social relations of production cannot serve to 
explain the concrete of women’s lives. Instead, Marx is mainly returned to as a philosopher of 
ethics, morality, and caring. Like the postmodern feminism that they critique for its abandonment 
of collectivity, Rich, Holstrom and others see the personal relations of women as separate from 
the economic relations of class society. Despite their deployment of concepts of “class” and 
“capitalism” and their gesturing to the growing social inequalities, these concepts are emptied of 
any meaning. Rich, Holstrom and other socialist feminists are not “returning to Marx” as much 
as they are attempting to re-write the history of Red Feminism—of the revolutionary theorization 
of gender as determined by class and the social division of labor enabled by the wage-labor 
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capital relation. They are, in short, trying to make Red Feminism more palatable and reconcile it 
with the imperatives of the “upper middle class” feminism that they claim to critique. They do so 
by advancing a theory of feminism in which the daily aspects of women’s lives cannot be 
explained except by the sensuous and experiential, and thus by a theory of class as lifestyle and 
not as one’s relation to the means of production. 
This humanist reading of Marx leads Rich to read the crisis of contemporary feminism 
and its complete incapacity to help emancipate women, its absorption with upper-middle class 
lifestyle and self-improvement over collectivity and the material needs of all, as the product of a 
“moral,” “ethical,” and “psychic” crisis in American culture: “a cognitive and emotional 
dissonance, a kind of public breakdown, with symptoms along a spectrum from acute self-
involvement to extreme anxiety to individual and group violence” (147). However, it is not, as 
Rich contends, a “moral,” “ethical” or “cultural” crisis that lies behind the transformation of 
feminism into a “self-absorbed” discourse in which collectivity is at best ridiculed and 
“mocked.” Rather, it is the economic crisis endemic to capitalism. The monadic subject of 
private property advanced in contemporary feminism is needed by capitalism in crisis. In order 
to stave off a decline in the rate of profit transnational capital has embarked on a war on any 
notion of collective needs, social welfare, and economic well being—to re-privatize social 
resources, cheapen the cost of labor-power, and raise the rate of exploitation. Far from being a 
matter of cognitive or emotional confusion, contemporary feminism has been a most effective 
ally of transnational capitalism.  
The development and heightening of the economic crisis in capitalism is, moreover, at 
the root of the renewed interest in Marxism on the part of feminists and cultural critics who have 
spent the last several decades denying the relevance of Marxism and class to the study of culture. 
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The economic buffer of higher salaries, retirement investments, health insurance for some, that 
once helped to support the illusion that “we are all middle class now” in imperialist nations is 
quickly becoming eroded as economic crisis heightens class contradictions around the globe and 
the conditions of workers lives both in the North and the South are being severely deteriorated. 
As unemployment grows in the North it has become increasingly clear that the middle class only 
exists on paper: usually in the form of credit card bills, mortgages, bankrupt retirement 
investments, HMO statements denying coverage of prescription drugs and necessary medical 
procedures, rising grocery receipts... As more wealth is being transferred from workers to the 
ruling class, those who were once part of the so called “upper middle-class” and thought class 
was irrelevant to their lives are now having to take a second look.  
But the question for feminism remains: is feminism going to focus on the local conditions 
of some women’s lives (the formerly “upper middle class” of the North) in isolation from the 
global (all workers in the international division of labor) and, therefore, consider class, 
exploitation, production only so long as “our way of life” (as right-wingers put it) in the North is 
threatened by the current wave of economic crisis? Or is it going to be a practice that is capable 
of weathering the local strategies of capitalism in crisis, seeing through them by grasping their 
historical relation to the laws of motion of capitalism, and advancing emancipation of all persons 
from exploitation? Only a grasp of gender and sexuality in relation to the social totality of the 
capitalist relations of production is going to enable feminism to be a transformative practice 
capable of bringing about economic equality and social justice for all. It is, therefore, all the 
more imperative for feminism to (re)examine the explanatory materialist critique of social 
totality offered by Marxism and to distinguish this from the hybrid renditions of Marxism in the 
contemporary which represent it as a moral and ethical code of conduct. While “post-” theories 
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have made these kind of sharp distinctions unsayable in the contemporary by representing them 
as an articulation of reductivism, totalization, and exclusivity, they are exactly what is necessary 
to move feminism out of its impasse.  
 
TWO 
Rather than the sensuous and individual, what is needed in feminism is a method that can 
explain the relationship of specific women’s lives to the social relations of production in 
capitalism and the international division of labor—not treat individual women as “autonomous” 
singularities and isolated monads. Dialectical materialism is necessary for this because it 
understands the “concrete” as a complex set of historical and social relations—not the empirical 
or individual. The “concrete,” as Marx argues in the Introduction to the Grundrisse, “is concrete 
because it is the concentration of many determinations—hence, unity of the diverse” (101). 
It is important to note here, before proceeding, that this argument is widely 
(mis)construed in contemporary cultural theory and turned into a point that is quite the opposite 
of what Marx argues: that the “concrete” is indeterminate and, therefore, in excess of social 
totality. One extremely influential reading that ultimately leads to this conclusion can be found in 
Antonio Negri’s reading of the Grundrisse in Marx Beyond Marx. Among other things, Negri 
argues that the concrete in Marx is the product of what Negri calls “determinate abstraction.” In 
contrast to “naïve methodology that begins with the concrete as a presupposition,” Negri 
proceeds, “Marx’s methodology takes the concrete as a result,” which Negri regards to mean 
that the concrete is the product of “the development of a ‘process of synthesis’ of the givens of 
intuition and representation” (47). According to Negri, Marx argues that the concrete is the result 
of “the cognitive process” and that the determination of the concrete “is the product of a 
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theoretical approximation which utilizes general abstractions, polarities and dimensions for this 
end” (47). “Therefore,” Negri proceeds, the necessary method goes from “the abstraction to the 
concrete, to the determination” (47). 
To put this another way, Negri uses Marx as an endorsement of idealizing the concrete, 
arguing that epistemological abstractions are what enable us to arrive at the “concrete” and 
constitute it. Negri attributes to Marx a metaphysical explanation of the “concrete.” In effect, 
Negri argues that the “concrete” only has an ideal existence, not a material existence, and, in 
doing so, he puts forward a binary between “concrete” determinations and “abstract” universals 
that Marx actually subjects to a historical materialist critique. Marx never argued that the 
“concrete” is determined by “epistemological abstraction.” On the contrary, he argued that the 
“concrete” is determined by historical material relations. In contrast to this metaphysical reading, 
in outlining the dialectical materialist understanding of the “concrete” in the Grundrisse, Marx 
argued that: 
It seems to be correct to begin with the real and the concrete, with the real 
precondition, thus to begin, in economics, with e.g., the population, which is the 
foundation and the subject of the entire social act of production. However, on 
closer examination this proves false. The population is an abstraction if I leave 
out, for example, the classes of which it is composed. These classes in turn are an 
empty phrase if I am not familiar with the elements on which they rest. E.g. wage 
labour, capital, etc. These latter in turn presuppose exchange, division of labour, 
prices, etc. For example, capital is nothing without wage labour, without value, 
money, price, etc. Thus, if I were to begin with the population, this would be a 
chaotic conception [Vorstellung] of the whole, and I would then, by means of 
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further determination, move analytically towards ever more simple concepts 
[Begriff], from the imagined concrete towards ever thinner abstractions until I had 
arrived at the simplest determinations. From there the journey would have to be 
retraced until I had finally arrived at the population again, but this time not as the 
chaotic conception of a whole, but as a rich totality of many determinations and 
relations. (100) 
In Marxism, the “concrete” is not a metaphysical abstraction—the empirical, individual, or 
epistemologically indeterminate—as it is represented in contemporary cultural theory. Rather, it 
is a materialist abstraction of social relations, which must be explained through 
conceptualization of these relations. The “concrete” is a concentration of the totality of historical 
and praxical relations in which human beings enter into conditions of production independent of 
their will and produce their conditions of life. A materialist explanation of the “concrete” 
requires explaining how and why it is situated in these historical labor processes and praxical 
relations of production. 
On the one hand it is surprising to see a theorist, such as Negri, who is regarded as having 
in-depth and nuanced knowledge of Marxism, put forward such a superficial (mis)reading of 
Marxism. On the other hand, Negri’s reading is particularly revealing of the “post” condition in 
contemporary cultural theory, which represents the actual contradictions of private property—in 
which some people own the means of production and therefore command over the surplus-labor 
and lives of the majority who are exploited—as epistemological contradictions and language 
games.  
The reason that such readings of Marx have been so dominant is because they help to 
provide explanations of transnational capitalism that present the fundamental conflict between 
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capital and labor as solvable outside of any question of transforming private ownership, and 
simply by the expansion of the market and of global capitalist production. The basing of the 
“concrete” on “determinate abstraction” is at the core of Negri’s theory that the “knowledge 
economy” has displaced labor as the basis of production. It is telling that Negri, along with his 
collaborator Michael Hardt, argues not for the emancipation of people “through” labor—through 
the transformation of the relations of production in which labor processes take place—but for 
“liberation from waged and manual labor” (Hardt and Negri, Labor 281). To be clear, for Hardt 
and Negri, this means a liberation from labor; a “post-labor” economy. What Hardt and Negri put 
forward is a reading of capitalism quite useful for the labor needs required for transnational 
capitalism to stave off a decline in the rate of profit. On the one hand, it serves the need of 
transnational capitalism for the skilled labor necessary to expand the market by representing the 
service and technical labor in the North as free from wage-labor/capital relations; on the other 
hand, it conceals the private property relations that continue to determine both skilled advanced 
technological labor as well as unskilled labor, making them both occasions for the private 
appropriation of surplus-labor. Negri’s notion of “determinant abstraction” actually returns to the 
same notion of the “empirical concrete” that he claims to avert, by fetishizing the local 
conditions of production in the North as an explanation of the global relations of production in 
capitalism. By moving from “abstraction to the concrete, to the determination,” Negri’s “post-” 
theory does not de-idealize the “concrete” rather, it is an articulation of the pursuit of the 
concrete over the global totality of relations.  
But what does this understanding do for feminism? How does it explain the concrete of 
women’s lives and their needs? One can see how the “determinate abstraction” is really a version 
of the “empirically concrete”—and that both are idealist abstractions—by examining the 
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concrete of social needs such as food in contemporary feminism. In her reading of food, for 
instance, Probyn deploys Negri’s notion of the concrete as “determinate abstraction.” Probyn 
maintains that a “non-reductive” understanding of the concrete of food sees it as indeterminate. 
Probyn claims that by “reducing”—that is, explaining—bodies and the food they consume on the 
basis of their determination by one’s conditions in the social relations of production, class 
analysis re-enforces the existing “alignment of tastes, food, and class, that threaten to colonise 
the body in fixed identities” (31). Moreover, according to Probyn, the “problem” with class 
analysis is that it leads to the understanding that “food can only confirm identity” (31). Instead, 
she wants to articulate a theory in which food “can open up new avenues” of subjectivity, to 
“answer back” (31). In short, for Probyn, food is indeterminate and, therefore, can work to 
realign the relationship between gender, class, sexuality, and the body. 
This is itself a very abstract and highly commodified notion of food which makes food its 
own independent agency endowed with special powers. Probyn’s notion of food as indeterminate 
is basically a form of commodity fetishism that abstracts the “power of food” from the social 
relations that determine its production: from the labor relations based on private ownership of the 
means of production and exploitation of labor. Instead, Probyn presents food as its own agency: 
as an independent source of wealth and value, outside of labor, that can resist and change the 
class relations in which it is produced. In fact, it is precisely private property relations that 
enables the “commodity fetishism” of food. As Marx explains, “this fetishism of the world of 
commodities arises from the peculiar social character of the labour which produces them” 
(Capital 165). It is under private property relations in which workers do not own the means of 
production and therefore, do not have access to and control over the products of their own labor, 
that things appear to inherently produce wealth without the intervention of labor. 
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Even a brief look at world historical conditions reveals that food does not have an 
independent agency and in itself it does not radically transform conditions of life for the majority 
in capitalism. In Indonesia, for instance, economic inequality and class contradictions have not 
decreased or been reversed by a greater abundance of food. A 1999 report on the South East 
Asian Food Security and Fair Trade Council’s (SEAFTC) fact-finding mission on Indonesia’s 
food crisis shows that citizens’ unequal access to food is not the result of food shortages brought 
on by natural disaster, warfare, or even to lack of food production but “an economy unable to 
provide food for the hungry” (“Mission Uncovers Food Crisis in Indonesia”). In fact, not only 
Indonesia’s participation in transnational agribusiness, but also its small-scale farming has 
increased significantly over the last decade. What has not improved are its levels of malnutrition 
and poverty. In like manner food production around the world has been on the rise and the 
concurrence of hunger and starvation alongside huge food surpluses has intensified. The 
abundance of food and the agricultural and technological capacity to produce food does not, in 
itself, produce wealth and transform the class position of the majority. This is precisely because 
food is not an autonomous agency invested with special value-producing powers outside of the 
dialectical praxis of labor and the totality of social relations of production in which it takes place.  
According to the SEAFTC, the main problem in Indonesia is widespread poverty and the 
inability of people to purchase basic needs such as nutritious food (“Mission Uncovers”). That is, 
on the one hand, while workers have increased their productivity in agriculture and related food 
industries, on the other hand, their access to the resources that they produce has declined. What 
remains un-assessed here, however, is why poverty, payment for basic necessities, and the 
inability of those who produce basic needs to pay for them continues to persist—especially when 
there is no lack of their abundance? What lies underneath the concrete of food and the alienation 
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of direct producers from the products of their own labor is private ownership of the means of 
production and social production for profit. Under such conditions food, like any commodity, is 
merely a means for surplus-value extraction and the realization of profit, not need. What 
determines wealth—what changes class position—is not access to food (and other articles of 
consumption) but access to the means of production.  
To isolate the concrete of needs such as food (its consumption, exchange, distribution...) 
from the totality of material relations in capitalist production and to represent it as an 
autonomous agency is to produce a one-sided abstraction—an imagined concrete—that has very 
little to do with the real conditions of labor and need confronting the majority, including the 
majority of women, in capitalism. At best what such a method enables is the negotiation of 
specific women’s individual relationship to food, poverty, and class relations, but it leaves all 
questions of why poverty, class relations, and the production for profit not needs must persist, 
and thus treats them as inevitable. 
It has now become commonplace in feminism to represent Marxism’s emphasis on labor 
and the social relations of production as a method that dehistoricizes women. One such argument 
is articulated in the ecofemist arguments of Maria Mies and Veronika Bennholdt-Thomsen in 
their book The Subsistence Perspective: Beyond the Globalised Economy. Here Mies and 
Bennholdt-Thomsen offer a similar reading of Marx as does Negri: that is, they understand his 
emphasis on labor to be an instance of “determinate abstraction”—an idealist understanding of 
the concrete—that erases the actual conditions of women’s lives. The “difference” from Negri is 
that they use their formal rejection of abstraction in order to reject Marx for feminism. Labor, 
they argue, is a destructive and monolithic force that exploits nature, by treating it as a “free 
good” for human consumption and, in doing so, exploits women’s labor as part of nature. The 
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reliance of Marxism on the category of labor, they argue, makes it participate in the same 
exploitation of nature by capitalism. Like Negri, Mies and Bennholdt-Thomsen argue that the 
key to emancipating women is not the emancipation of women through labor—through the 
transformation of the social relations of production based on private ownership of the means of 
production. But, in contrast to Negri, they argue that women are freed from economic inequality 
through their liberation from the service industry and advanced technological labor.  
At the core of their book is the understanding that the “root problem” with capitalism is 
an “evidently ineradicable male fixation on technology” (180). Science, growth, and technology 
inevitably lead to hunger, exploitation, and violence against women, they assert, because they 
ultimately rest on the colonization and expropriation of nature as a “free good.” For Mies and 
Bennholdt-Thomsen, exploitation is founded on “the development of the productivity of human 
labour [power]” through its transformation of nature, not the private ownership of the means of 
production, which enables owners to command over the workers surplus labor (34). Moreover, 
they claim, it is the expropriation of nature as a “free good” that is the basis of the exploitation of 
women’s reproductive and “life giving” labor. This is, for Mies and Bennholdt-Thomsen, a 
failure of both bourgeois ideology and Marxism in accounting for women and nature. They 
suggest that the Marxist argument for freeing the forces of production from the existing relations 
of production shares the enlightenment conception of nature (and women’s reproductive labor) 
as “free” and “unlimited,” which leads to the boundless appropriation of nature and, 
consequently, the exploitation of women’s unpaid reproductive labor for private gain and profit. 
As an alternative, they advocate for a “subsistence perspective,” which involves rejecting 
industrial and technological development and a conservation of local agricultural production 
controlled by the subsistence labor of women—what they call “the real female-maternal, 
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agrarian subsistence practice” (181). The subsistence perspective, they argue, demonstrates 
respect for nature by above all, respecting women’s bodies and recognizing that “women [are] 
the beginning, the arkhé, of human life” (33). Moreover, they argue, that by turning away from 
the development of human labor-power, the subsistence perspective promotes meeting needs 
over profit. 
However, when Mies and Bennholdt-Thomsen collapse “women” and “nature,” they 
repeat the same patriarchal logic that was used to naturalize the social division of labor under 
capitalism and keep women out of the workforce. Moreover, they put forward an ahistorical and 
idealist understanding of oppression that abstracts out the transformation of nature and the 
development of the forces of production from the social relations of production toward which 
this development is put: whether labor is used for profit or need. By suppressing the importance 
of the relations under which social resources are produced, Mies and Bennholdt-Thomsen 
actually treat nature and “human need” in a very ahistorical and idealist way. For one, they 
presuppose that the resources necessary to meet human needs (and not profit) ultimately exist in 
“nature” alone, without the intervention of labor. But even a “basic” form of satisfying hunger—
the gathering of vegetation grown without human intervention—requires the appropriation of 
nature by labor. Moreover, Mies and Bennholdt-Thomsen do not escape the appropriation of 
nature with the subsistence perspective. Subsistence production requires agriculture which itself 
requires a whole series of historical developments of the productive forces (the disruption of the 
existing ecosystem to clear land for crops, the extraction of metal for tools with which to plow, 
the domestication of animals… ). As Marx explains: “The earth itself is an instrument of labor, 
but its use in this way, in agriculture, presupposes a whole series of other instruments and a 
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comparatively high stage of development of labour-power. As soon as the labour process has 
undergone the slightest development, it requires specially prepared instruments” (Capital 285). 
Far from offering a materialist understanding of meeting needs, the subsistence 
perspective does not even account for the necessary conditions for its own existence: that is, the 
dialectical praxis of labor in which, as Marx explains: “by acting on external nature and 
transforming it” to meet needs, “humankind also transforms its own nature” including its needs 
(Capital 283). In other words, Mies and Bennholdt-Thomsen base their argument for the 
subsistence perspective on an imaginary independence from conditions of necessity. 
It is hardly surprising, owing to their idealist theory, that Mies and Bennholdt-Thomsen 
read the dialectical materialism of Marxism as itself a version of idealism which posits “nature” 
without limits, and technology as the basis of emancipation. But what they attribute to Marxism 
is actually a reversal of its dialectical materialist understanding of nature and technology. As 
Marx argued, nature is indeed just as much the source of use-values as labor (which is itself only 
the manifestation of a force of nature, human labor power) (Gotha Program 13). What Mies and 
Bennholdt-Thomsen do not account for is that, “precisely from the fact that labour depends on 
nature it follows that the [one] who possesses no other property than [her] labour power must, in 
all conditions of society and culture, be the slave of others who have made themselves the 
owners of the material conditions of labour. [She] can work only with their permission hence live 
only with their permission” (13).  
The articulation of freedom from the exploitation of labor-power as “too abstract” to be 
of root importance to women is actually a highly privileged notion for women who no longer see 
exploitation as a problem because they seem to have the freedom to “live without permission” of 
others who exploit them: to eat nutritious, well balanced meals, have access to high quality 
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health care, to good housing, education, etc. But in Marxism, labor is not the empty abstraction 
that is presented in contemporary cultural theory and feminism in order to maintain the class 
position of those who own the means of production. Even the “simplest economic categories,” 
Marx argued, “can never exist other than as an abstract, one-sided relation within an already 
given, concrete, living whole” (Grundrisse 101; emphasis added). This is to say that even the 
simplest concepts are made possible on the basis of the material conditions of production. 
Concepts and economic categories do not have their own independent existence. They too are 
dependent upon the material conditions determining their production. As Marx makes absolutely 
clear, this is even the case with such founding concepts in historical materialism as “labor”: 
Indifference towards any specific kind of labour presupposes a very developed 
totality of real kinds of labour, of which no single one is any longer predominant. 
As a rule, the most general abstractions arise only in the midst of the richest 
possible concrete development, where one thing appears as common to many, to 
all. Then it ceases to be thinkable in a particular form alone. On the other side, 
this abstraction of labour as such is not merely the mental product of a concrete 
totality of labours. Indifference towards specific labours corresponds to a form of 
society in which individuals can with ease transfer from one labour to another, 
and where the specific kind is a matter of chance for them, hence indifference. 
Not only the category, labour, but labour in reality has here become the means of 
creating wealth in general, and has ceased to be organically linked with particular 
individuals in any specific form. (Grundrisse 104) 
Even as an abstract concept, “labor” is enabled by the historical level of development of the 
forces of production and the social relations of production within which this development takes 
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place. The “abstract” in Marxism is not an idealist abstraction disconnected from the actual 
conditions and relations under capitalism, but a materialist one:  “in the theoretical method, too, 
the subject, society, must always be kept in mind as the presupposition” (102). In short, for 
Marx, totality is always explained on the basis of actually existing relations of production. It is 
not, as it is in Hegel and post-Marxism, a self-producing ideal that erases the complex 
concreteness of daily life under capitalism, rather, it is founded on explaining the praxical 
relations in which people carry out the production of social life—that is, the mode of production. 
Totality is the historical grasping of the complex social series, what Marx calls “the ensemble of 
social relations.” Far from being the “evil monolith” that contemporary feminism attributes to it, 
the historical grasping of social totality, and the relation of the seemingly “singular” and 
“particular” to social totality is necessary for feminism if it is going to work to transform existing 
social relations. It is the only way to explain on what basis the conditions of life for women are 
not simply personal or “women’s problems.” It is, moreover, the only way for feminism to move 
beyond the class privileges of an ever smaller clique of women. 
Contrary to the idealist naturalism of Mies and Bennholdt-Thomsen’s ecofeminism, 
Minnie Bruce Pratt begins to illustrate the necessity of social totality for feminism in a recent 
critique of the imperialist wars in Central Asia and the Middle East. “Fighting to Stop Pentagon 
War is a Women’s Issue,” she argues: 
not because women are instinctively and ‘naturally’ more peaceful. Not because 
women give birth or because women have been the “guardians of life” while men 
have been making war. Fighting Pentagon war is a women’s issue because it 
flows out of the inherent need of capital to expand its markets and its rate of 
exploitation in order to survive—and women’s labor, paid and unpaid, is a 
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foundation upon which this profit system rests. Capitalism wages brutal 
imperialist wars and imposes brutal imperialist peace in order to secure those 
profits, extorted from working class, oppressed and impoverished people of all 
sexes. 
It is impossible to understand the relevance of the war to women—and to resist the cynical 
appropriation of the “liberation of women” in the service of imperialist warfare—without a 
historical grasp of social totality. Nor can feminism, without social totality, grasp how “women’s 
labor, paid and unpaid” is not simply a “women’s issue” but is determined by the exploitation of 
human labor-power—of “people of all sexes”—and is therefore a class issue that affects all.  
 
THREE 
It is important to clearly re-state here that the problem with excluding the dialectical 
materialist critique of social totality from feminism is not that feminism does not go “far 
enough” without it but that, by erasing the relation of women to the mode of production, it 
actually helps transnational capitalism cover over its trouble spots, its fundamental contradictions 
and the economic crises that result from them. The gestures in feminism toward “materialism” 
and “Marx” without a historical grasping of the social relations of production are ways to help 
update ruling class ideology and dismantle the revolutionary knowledges necessary to 
emancipate women from exploitation. 
Such updatings are driven by the needs of transnational capitalism in crisis. Transnational 
capitalism, to be clear, is increasingly a highly unstable system of production, which requires 
desperate and violent “solutions” to help try and create “stability” and “equilibrium.” Not only 
does this show up in the daily struggles of workers who are forced to go without basic needs in 
 183 
health care, social security, education… so that the ruling class can fund massive military 
expenditures in order to protect or gain access to conditions necessary to stave off a decline in 
profit, it also shows up within the ruling class itself in the form of increased bankruptcies and 
failed business ventures as wealth gets concentrated into fewer hand. The root issue is that the 
objective structures of private property in capitalism are based on exploitation and the 
accumulation of socially produced wealth (capital) in the hands of the few and the increased 
immiseration and impoverishment of the majority.  
Crisis brought on by the concentration of wealth is endemic to capitalism. As capital 
accumulates, it becomes increasingly difficult for the ruling class to maintain its rate of profit. 
This is because surplus-value is only produced by labor-power however, in order to undercut and 
compete with other capitalists, capitalists invest in labor-saving machinery (produced by 
previous labor) to reduce labor costs and increase the number of commodities produced in the 
same time other capitalists produce fewer commodities.  In other words, capitalists must seek 
new technologies and labor saving devices as a means to raise the productivity of fewer workers 
and thus increase the rate at which workers can be exploited. Yet, because technology does not 
produce surplus-value (and only transfers value from the machine to the commodity) with the 
employment of less labor, the rate of profit tends to fall (because there are historical and material 
limits—such as death!—to how much workers can be exploited).  So capital on the one hand in 
order to compete on the market, capital tends to “overproduce” capital by displacing productive 
labor with machinery, on the other hand this overall tends to lead to a decline in profit because 
less labor-power (which is the only source of surplus-value) is employed. In order to stave off 
falling rates of profit, capital must not only produce labor-saving technologies, expand 
production to create new needs (and thus, new sites for profit), at the same time it also ultimately 
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export capitalist production to new regions where access to reserves of cheap labor can be found. 
All of this requires a continuous supply of labor-power from which surplus-labor can be 
extracted. The transnational ruling class, therefore, has every interest in battling over the life 
conditions of workers of the world in order to control the development and growth of the 
surplus-value producing population and thus, the rate at which it can be exploited. 
Contemporary feminism has served as a most effective ally of transnational capitalism by 
helping to incorporate women into the labor needs of capitalism now. The differences between 
the feminists that I have discussed thus far—that is, those such as Probyn who see the “post-” as 
an enabling condition for women and those such as Mies and Bennholdt-Thomsen who see it as 
disenabling for women—is not all that vast. This is because both positions articulate the labor 
needs of transnational capitalism. Their differences are not fundamental differences over the 
social relations of production. Rather, they are differences that are the effect of these relations of 
production: the fact that capitalism brings about “uneven development,” that its constant quest 
for profit which requires it to expand production, export capital, etc. also requires that it have 
both “skilled” and “unskilled” labor. Their “differences,” in short, are local differences—specific 
needs of capital for particular kinds of labor—that are determined by the general need of 
capitalism for a continuous supply of labor-power that it can exploit for profit. The problem for 
feminism is not the status of the “post-” (whether feminists are “for” or “against” it; whether 
women are living under “modernity” or “postmodernity,” etc). Rather, it is the private ownership 
of the means of production that cuts across the local differences in production for women in the 
international division of labor. 
For instance, “delectable feminism,” with its emphasis on an “ethics” for “care of the 
self,” is especially useful for articulating the labor needs of transnational capitalism in the 
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imperialist nations of the North. In order to turn over a profit, capital needs to maintain a skilled 
labor force to work increasingly complex means of production but at the same time, as a means 
of securing high rates of profit, it must maintain such a workforce while still keeping the social 
cost of its reproduction low. Delectable feminism helps with this task by focusing on strategies 
for women that are aimed, on the one hand, at expanding the market by creating new “needs” so 
that workers can absorb some of the cost of overproduction and, on the other, at reducing the 
social cost of the laboring population so that wages can be lowered and the rate of exploitation 
can be raised. It articulates a new ethics for transnational capitalism that will enable women of 
the North to adjust to the specific historical labor needs that capitalism requires of them now in 
order to maintain profit.  
It is in the context of the growing crisis of production that Probyn’s theory of “gut ethics” 
works in theory to legitimate a new regime for controlling labor costs in the North. Responding 
to a crisis of obesity among working people that is threatening corporate profits, what is notable 
in Probyn’s gut ethics is the emphasis she places on the “productive” powers of “shame,” 
“disgust,” and “restraint.” “Shame” and “disgust,” Probyn argues, are “productive forces” of the 
body that help to “remake” gender relations. “In denying their affective force,” she continues, 
“we stand to lose the acuteness of the body’s own capacities for reflection” (141-142). In a 
criticism of the limits of “fat pride” for addressing the empowerment of women who are 
overweight, Probyn argues that the “fat pride” movement covers over the “productive use” of 
shame and disgust—what they tell us about the limits of existing social arrangements and what 
they reveal about our desires. To this Probyn emphasizes not only the “productive powers” of 
shame and disgust but also the “powers of restraint.” 
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“Body weight,” according to Probyn’s delectable feminism, is a matter of “self-
regulation.” She proceeds with sensuous specificity in describing the “affective and relational 
possiblilties” of an “ethics of restraint [...] embodied in the slow caress given to each detail, each 
ingredient, the sense of timing and movement so essential to eating, cooking, loving, and being” 
(77, 97-100). But what are the conditions that enable a woman to “eat well” in the first place, 
with access to the resources with which to purchase “each ingredient” and the “freedom” to 
allow a relaxed and comfortable sense of “timing” and “movement” in the preparation of food? 
Is her time spent on “each ingredient” and “cooking” owing to the fact that she has her basic 
needs met and can view cooking and eating as “fun” and “exotic” or because her position in the 
social relations of production also relegates her to the daily grind of a strict division of labor that 
is inflexible regarding gender? Is her sense of “self-regulation” and “restraint” an effect of access 
to an abundance of ingredients and familiarity of cosmopolitan cuisines gained from travel and 
access to diverse restaurants? Or is it the effect of crushing poverty and lack of access to food? 
The conditions in question are fundamentally connected to a woman’s class position and her 
position in the social division of labor. Yet, delectable feminism proceeds by erasing the class 
privilege of the pleasures and pains of the eating body that it celebrates. In short, while such a 
theory might explain the conditions of life for ruling class women who are able to meet their 
every desire and can thus selectively determine their eating habits, how does this theory stand to 
explain the “concrete” of women’s body weight, nutrition, and health for the majority for whom 
necessity is the determining factor? How does this theory, for instance, stand to explain and 
address the “concrete” reality of obesity which is increasing among women and children of the 
North and, worldwide, now equals the 1.1 billion people who are facing hunger and starvation 
(“Chronic Hunger and Obesity Epidemic”)? 
 187 
One explanation of this rise in obesity is that the labor needs in the North have changed 
as manufacturing and manual labor have been moved to the South and, as a result, the dietary 
needs of workers laboring under more sedentary conditions (e.g., telemarketing, data entry, 
computer programming, etc.) have also changed. On the terms of Probyn’s “delectable 
feminism” what is needed is a more “caring” and “selective” understanding of food in order to 
allow women to adjust to these new conditions. But obesity, as many studies are now showing, 
cannot be explained by a mere lack of “sophisticated,” urbane, “self-restraint.” It is a form of 
malnutrition that is the effect of economic exploitation and the production of food for profit.  As 
one study from the University of California, Davis indicates: “women struggling to put food on 
the table are more likely to be overweight than those with a reliably full refrigerator” (qtd. in Lok 
“Lean Times”). As household income “nears the poverty line,” the study states, “the prevalence 
of obesity increases among women.” In the United States, “Poor neighborhoods often lack large 
grocery stores, forcing people, especially those without cars, to shop at small, local convenience 
stores which stock little fresh fruit or vegetables but plenty of high-fat, high-starch processed 
food” (qtd. in Lok). Contrary to what Probyn implies—that a lack of “self-restraint” in 
consumption is at the root of the problem—it is actually a “lack of control over their food 
supply” that is leading to obesity in women. It is not a “diet of excess” but a “diet of poverty” 
that has made obesity rates increase in the United States, especially among African-American, 
Mexican-American, and Native American women. Obesity rates are not simply higher among 
women of color, they increase for women of color as poverty rates increase (Leigh and Huff 74).  
Moreover, this is, in part, because poverty often reduces these women to diets high in 
carbohydrates and fats and low in fruits, vegetables, and often protein (Lok). 
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To put this another way, women’s body weight and (mal)nutrition cannot be explained 
entirely by their consumption practices. In fact, it also cannot be explained entirely by the 
relationship between their food consumption and the specific, concrete labors that they perform 
for capitalism (i.e., whether they are required to engage in manual and physical labor or 
intellectual, information, etc. type labor). Rather, it is their relationship to the means of 
production that determines women’s relationship to food consumption, position in the technical 
division of labor, and body weight. When women live in conditions of private ownership of the 
means of production and are not owners of the means of production (as is the case with the 
majority of women) their surplus-labor and lives are economically commanded over by those 
who own the means of production. In capitalist production, women’s position within the division 
of labor, their consumption and food intake, their health and nutrition are all determined by the 
ruling-class imperatives of profit. This is because production for profit (not need) determines 
what jobs are “necessary” and what resources are available to workers to consume. Without 
freeing women from the conditions of necessity in capitalism that determine women’s lives, the 
focus on “body weight” is simply the necessary strategy for capitalism to increase worker’s 
productivity and therefore profit for some. It is not about putting the root conditions in place for 
economic security (including health and nutrition) for all women. 
Probyn’s “gut ethics” of “disgust” and “self-restraint” represents obesity as a matter of 
“pedestrian excess” and, in effect, mocks the class relations in capitalism that reduce millions of 
women to the diets of poverty and malnutrition that lead to obesity. Her only imagined 
alternative to the limits of “fat pride” is the “agency of anorexia.” Probyn reads “anorexia” as an 
agency of resistance to the excesses of commodity culture and social control: “instead of 
conceiving of the anorexic as a victim of social forces, it may be that she is also registering 
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profound disgust at those around her. Rather than placing her as a hapless cipher, this reveals the 
strength of the anorexic’s response to the world: ‘it/you are disgusting, I will not take you in’” 
(141).  
It should not go without saying that in this reading Probyn glamorizes an extremely 
disenabling and life-threatening effect of the commodification of women’s bodies in capitalism 
by representing anorexia as “radical resistance” to commodity culture. But what is most telling 
about her reading is the way that it articulates the labor needs of the ruling class in capitalism 
now. In many advanced capitalist nations, such as the United States, where obesity and related 
health problems (diabetes, heart disease, osteoarthritis...) especially among women and children 
have been rapidly increasing as the physical and technical requirements of new divisions of labor 
are changing what workers must do, obesity is costing the economy an average of $118 billion 
dollars a year in lost work days, lowered productivity, and medical bills (Knight, “Health: 
World’s Overfed”). 
Probyn’s “ethics of restraint” is a “new” strategy for new conditions that continues a very 
old task in capitalism: to lower the cost incurred by the ruling class for the social reproduction of 
the laboring population and increase the rate of exploitation. In response to the rising social cost 
of obesity, the ruling class, the corporate media, and celebrity spokespersons such as Sarah 
Ferguson have declared a moral and ethical crisis in food consumption and the need to transform 
consumption behaviors. Such strategies are essentially about protecting the economic security of 
ruling class and upper-middle class women who want to reserve greater amounts of the social 
surplus for their own use and reduce the social resources that go to the life conditions of working 
class women. Moreover, the notion in delectable feminism that the regulation of one’s “own” 
regimen is the basis of change follows the same corporate logic as Republicans who support the 
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cutting of food stamps on the one hand and authorize tax breaks to individuals and insurance 
companies for weight loss programs on the other. The overt ideological spin for these measures 
is that they reduce the social cost of obesity and obesity related disease to the economy and, at 
the same time, allow for more “freedom” and “choice” for individuals to pursue weight loss 
options in consultation with a physician. 
In actuality, they are aimed at transferring wealth in medical benefits and nutrition away 
from workers and into the hands of weight loss companies and pharmaceutical cartels who are 
already pulling in an average of $33 billion per year (and counting) out of the pockets of 
workers, especially women, on weight loss related programs and products while obesity rates 
continue to grow. On the one hand, these measures enable the continuation of obesity and 
unequal access to nutritious food brought on by food production for profit and, on the other, they 
put forward “solutions” to economic inequality and malnutrition that help bolster the profits for 
the ruling class. The crisis of obesity is not a moral, ethical, or cultural crisis: it is an economic 
crisis in production for profit. As one study has put it: “the century with the greatest potential to 
eliminate malnutrition instead saw it boosted to record levels” where “the number of hungry 
people remains high in a world of food surpluses” (“Chronic Hunger and Obesity Epidemic”). In 
short, production for profit subordinates the production and consumption of basic necessities 
such as food to what it profitable to transnational corporations.  
“Subsistence feminism,” using a different mode, also articulates the labor needs of 
transnational capitalism, but not for women of the North. Its emphasis on a “moral economy” in 
which people consume less and economic development is halted, articulates the labor needs of 
transnational capitalism for women of the South—where transnational capitalism relies on a 
continuous supply of unskilled cheap labor. It is quite telling in this regard when Mies and 
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Bennholdt-Thomsen read the relationship between the capitalist and wage-laborer as an 
exchange of equivalents by taking the legal labor contract at face value. In order to posit the 
expropriation of nature, and not the appropriation of surplus-labor, as the basis of class society, 
they erase the exploitation in the wage-labor capital relation altogether and present it as a 
relationship of equality. Thus, instead of working to transform the relations for the extraction of 
surplus-labor by capital, the “subsistence perspective” proclaims that what needs to be changed 
are consumption behaviors. It is “excessive consumption” of the North that drives 
“development” and causes the dire need in the South and the use of women’s labor as an 
“unlimited resource.”  
The subsistence perspective asserts that by opening up pockets of “resistance” such as 
community gardens in the city, growing one’s own vegetables alongside farming for 
corporations in the country, reclaiming land for common use in subsistence farming, workers, 
and women in particular, can gain autonomy from the production of food for profit and can 
gradually “edge it out” and reclaim production for need. The understanding here is that by 
decreasing demand for food produced by transnational agribusiness and other industries and 
increasing the demand for locally grown and produced food, small scale farming and handicrafts 
can be revived against transnational capitalism. But what this conceals is the way in which 
“subsistence farming” is itself inculcated into the wage-labor/capital relation. As one study of 
rural life in Kenya and Lesotho puts it: 
In Kenya, the tendency of increasing numbers of rural households to become 
[integrated into the market economy] […] has been disguised by the fact that 
many smallholders cling to small, infertile, degraded plots of land. They are not 
‘landless’ in the strict sense, but have been forced into reliance on casual wage-
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work, non-farm artisanal activities, and high-value export crops […] [The] 
resulting paradox: the dissolution of the peasantry ‘takes place precisely at the 
same time as a highly weakened peasantry continues to retain relations to patches 
of land and hence maintains the illusion of a property owning class.’ (Wisner 26) 
The proletarianization of the peasantry does not require that it ceases to own land when all means 
of production necessary in order to work the land, and all that is necessary to sustain the life of 
the workers, are privately owned and controlled. What Mies and Bennholdt-Thomsen erase is 
that all needs under capitalism are produced under conditions of private property. While they 
might “control” an immediate plot of land, subsistence farmers are nonetheless compelled to rely 
for basic needs on a host of privatized services including healthcare and veterinary medicine; 
farm equipment, livestock and seed reserves; clothing and education… This is the material 
reality under capitalism that drives many subsistence farmers out of farming and into the factory 
and other modes of wage labor: because “land” without the means to support labor, and even 
food produced on the farm, does not pay for medicine, farm equipment and repairs, plant disease 
control, irrigation systems... It also makes subsistence farmers sites for outsourcing of some of 
the labor of agribusiness and thus involves subsistence farmers directly in the wage-labor/capital-
relation as exploited labor. In effect this turns many subsistence farmers into “disguised wage-
laborers” whose farms are corporate annexes where even the minimum of labor laws do not 
apply. Without confronting the wage-labor/capital relation—without working to transform the 
world’s agricultural and industrial production in its totality—“subsistence feminism” merely puts 
forward a “just say no” policy to capitalism: assuming that the pressures of production for profit 
on farmers is a matter of consumer “choice.”  
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But more than “just saying no,” subsistence feminism actually is useful to transnational 
capitalism and helps capital to ideologically conceal its needs for a continuous cheap labor 
supply from the South. For one, since the “subsistence perspective” does not actually work to 
transform the objective pressures on farmers and workers of social relations of production for 
profit, what its “anti-development” policy does instead is help to keep the cost of reproducing 
labor low, and thus make it less expensive for transnational capitalism to use. 
Moreover, the subsistence perspective is not only a means to normalize the strategies of 
transnational capital to make sure that existing labor-power remains cheap, it also helps to 
normalize the strategies by which transnational capitalism works to maintain control over the 
continuous supply of labor-power: the rate of growth and development of the laboring 
population. This is especially apparent in the way in which the subsistence perspective attempts 
to revive the “innate power” of femaleness and childbirth to produce wealth. According to Mies 
and Bennholdt-Thomsen, “femaleness is more than only a symbolic metaphor for natural, life 
giving growth... after all,” they contend, “women’s capacity to give birth to children cannot be 
separated from women, in spite of all the intellectual acrobatics” (188). But in fact, reproduction 
and women’s capacity to give birth is not a “given” or “autonomous” capacity, nor is it an 
innately female power requiring, as it were, the involvement of men. On the contrary, a woman’s 
capacity to reproduce is in dialectical relation to the social relations of production, her material 
conditions of necessity, and her position within the division of labor. For women of the South, 
who contribute to producing the majority of the world’s food resources, private ownership of the 
means of production has led to a situation in which there are increasing numbers of women 
reduced to a diet of less than 1,500 calories/day (1,000 less than the recommended minimum). 
 194 
Moreover, even when calorie intake is higher, the production of food for profit has led to a diet 
severely lacking in micronutrients and protein.  
Poverty brought on by the concentration of socially produced resources in the hands of a 
few has made it impossible for workers to afford to buy the more expensive protein and 
micronutrient rich food. The priority to produce food for profit and keep social reproduction 
costs to capital at a minimum has lead to the least nutritious foods being the most widely 
available for the proletariat. Such a situation has led to a rise in the level of anemia, protein 
deficiency among women and the increase in rates of infant and maternal mortality, childhood 
disease and deformity. Moreover, long term malnutrition brought on by production for profit has 
lead to the loss of menstruation and the capacity of many women to reproduce. Far from being an 
“innate power” that women can use to transcend conditions of dire need, women’s capacity to 
reproduce is historical and depends upon their position in the social relations of production.  
The control of women’s diets that is advocated in “subsistence feminism” is also a 
strategy by transnational capitalism to control women’s reproductive cycles and control the 
future labor force and the “surplus population”: how much reserve labor-power is available for 
capital to exploit, the cost of its social reproduction, and whether or not it is “cost-effective” for 
capital to invest in the social reproduction of labor-power (i.e., whether it will receive a “return” 
of greater profit for its investment or not). As long as the reproduction of daily life, health, 
nutrition, and children takes places within relations of production based on private ownership of 
the means of production in which the few can command over the surplus-labor of others, this 
reproduction will continue to be subordinated to production for profit. 
Although in different rhetorics, both “delectable feminism” and “subsistence feminism” 
ultimately advance a transnational “ethics” that argues for freedom on the terms of consumption 
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under capitalism, and thus leave unexamined and intact for women the material conditions of 
private ownership in capitalist production that necessitate the exploitation of their surplus-labor. 
In other words, both put forward the understanding of freedom as autonomous from conditions 
of necessity and, therefore, assume that women are autonomous agents who can be freed from 
economic inequality and social injustice without transforming the fundamental property relation 
under capitalism. The maintenance of private property relations and production for profit leads to 
continuing economic crisis, insecurity, and instability for both workers and capitalists (who must 
compete more aggressively to maintain profit levels) as the productive forces develop.  
Unemployment, starvation, destitution, economic stagnation and decline, bankruptcy, are 
all inevitable results of maintaining capitalism. What this goes to show is that the position of 
women in society and their relationship to their bodies, desires, and needs is not a cultural matter 
of ethical and moral consumption choices, rather it is the product of economic conditions of 
necessity brought about by private property relations. Capitalism needs to keep workers 
economically insecure in order to drive down the cost of wages and make it easier to adjust 
workers to new strategies for ruling class profit. But doing so does not actually resolve the 
contradictions and crises in capitalism: both the disparity between workers and owners and the 
instability of transnational capitalism is growing not diminishing. Changing the position of 
women in society is not, at root, founded on the local strategies of capitalism in crisis, but on the 
transformation of private property relations. It therefore requires not “ethical consumption” or a 
“moral economy,” but heightening the fundamental contradictions in capitalism between wage-
labor and capital, bringing them to crisis, and fundamentally transforming them.  
By contrast what is needed is a Red Feminism, which grasps the local strategies of 
capitalism in the global North and the global South in relation to the underlying labor relations in 
 196 
the international division of labor and thus which advances material freedom for women through 
fundamental transformation of the material conditions of necessity not through imagined 
autonomy from them. This is because, as I have argued, what determines gender, sexuality, and 
women’s relationship to their bodies and need (such as food) is not consumption but class—
whether they are owners of the means of production or exploited surplus-labor. Without 
transforming the social relations of production based on private ownership of the means of 
production, projects that inculcate women into changing consumption patterns merely inculcate 
women into “structural adjustment” to transnational capitalism in crisis but do not change their 
fundamental conditions of economic exploitation. Only with the historical grasping of the totality 
of relations of production can feminism work not simply to avoid the conditions of labor and 
necessity for the majority, but work to transform them. 
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5.0  THE EMPIRE’S NEW MORALITY 
Under the pressure of increasing class contradiction for women in both the North and the South, 
the discourses of “postmodern feminism” which have served to help adjust women as 
instruments of labor to the needs of a fledgling transnational capitalism, have increasingly been 
brought to a crisis as transnational capitalism has matured.  After the crash of the dot.com 
economy in the late 1990s, what was already clear to many workers around the world was made 
unsubtly clearer to thousands of dot.com workers in the North thrown out of their jobs: that 
“knowledge” has not displaced “labor” and that, contrary to popular belief, class is far from over.  
Just as capital that exploits so called “hard labor” (the manufacturing of automobiles, computers, 
etc.) was exported in the 1970s and 1980s to Mexico, Taiwan, the Philippines, China… to raise 
profits by exploiting cheaper labor, so in the late 1990s capital that exploits so called “soft labor” 
(data processing, telecommunications, etc.) was exported to exploit the highly educated and 
skilled but much cheaper labor of workers in India, Pakistan, Latin America…  
Many feminists since the late 1990s, therefore, have sought to update cultural feminism 
with a “transnational feminism” which is thought to be more “resistant” to capital.  For example, 
contemporary transnational feminists such as Caren Kaplan, Inderpal Grewal, Norma Alarcón 
and Minoo Moallem claim to “resist” both the Enlightenment principles of abstract equality in 
the modern nation state (Alarcón et al, Between Woman 14-15), which divorces freedom and 
equality from the material conditions of women’s lives, as well as an apolitical post-structuralism 
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that is “unable to account for contemporary global conditions” of women in capitalism (Grewal 
and Kaplan, Scattered 1). Yet, far from confronting capitalism and its consequences for women 
and working to transform the material conditions of women’s lives in the international division 
of labor, these same feminists have retreated into a hybrid logic of “border crossing” and 
“muddying”—in short of “inbetween-ness”—in which the only way to address the objective 
reality of women’s lives is to ethically negotiate within capitalism and its cultural arrangements. 
Transnational feminism, in other words, posits a “hybrid” break within capitalism in which 
capitalism is always already divided “within.”  It therefore proposes ethical resistance within the 
dominant cultural practices of transnational capitalism—from civil society, to consumption, to 
lifestyle, to interpersonal relations, without transformation of their material basis.  
To be clear, before moving on, I use the term “transnational capitalism” to refer to a stage 
in capitalism in which consumption has been globalized—turning the world into a global market 
in which local “nation-states” act as local law enforcement of different sectors of workers of the 
world on behalf of capital.  However, in “transnational” (or transnationalist) cultural theory, 
including transnational feminism, the globalization of consumption is taken to be a material 
transformation or supersession of class contradictions in production. In this view, the 
“transnational” is a globalization free from imperialism, intra-class competition and the binary 
contradictions of wage-labor/capital.  This view, which was developed in Karl Kautsky’s notion 
of “ultra-imperialism” which proposed that capitalism had reached a phase of peaceful co-
operation of competing capitals, was critiqued by Lenin (in his pamphlet Imperialism—the 
Highest Stage of Capitalism) for the way in which it produced a “lifeless abstraction” (120) that 
obliterated “the realities of the capitalist system” (119).  Imperialism and “the rule of finance 
capital,” Lenin argued, does not actually “[lessen] the unevenness and contradictions inherent in 
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world economy” rather, “in reality it increases them” (94-95).  In addition to Kautsky’s notion of 
“ultra-imperialism,” the view that the globalization of consumption transforms production was 
also obliquely elaborated by Lyotard in The Postmodern Condition when he describes that now: 
“one listens to reggae, watches a western, eats McDonald’s for lunch, and local cuisine for 
dinner, wears Paris perfume in Tokyo and ‘retro’ clothes in Hong Kong” (76). More recently, 
this theory of an empire beyond imperialism, is most famously laid out in Hardt and Negri’s 
book Empire (and their related concept of the “multitude”) in which they argue that “imperialism 
is over” (xiv).   
Just a few short years after the publication of Empire, however, the class interests of this 
theory are now being thrown into sharper relief by the current crisis of profit in capitalism and 
the resulting imperialist wars in the Middle East and Central Asia.  Timothy Brennan, for 
example, has argued that the basic premises upon which the theory of Empire rests is “now little 
more than a cliché of the management genre” (“The Italian Ideology” 101). Ellen Meiksins 
Wood has argued that the theory of Empire is “a manifesto for global capital” that “is compatible 
with class rule by the rich” (63). Bashir Abu-Manneh in his essay “The Illusions of Empire,” 
unpacks the basic structure of assumptions in Empire when he demonstrates that Hardt and 
Negri’s theory of empire is based not on a development of Lenin’s theory of imperialism as 
Hardt and Negri claim (Empire 232-234), but on Kautsky’s notion of ultra-imperialism by 
positing a “post-imperialist moment” (Abu-Manneh 161-164).  
In actuality, the globalization of consumption and the turning of the world into a global 
market has most certainly not transformed production; it has not dissolved class antagonisms, 
inter-capitalist competition, or the material labor of workers, including the majority of women 
and persons of color (which is what Hardt and Negri assumed with their concept of a classless, 
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genderless, colorless multitude). In other words, the “transnational” is a class-based 
globalization.  Not only in general, in the sense that production is still based at its root on the 
exploitation of surplus-labor but also, more specifically: turning the world into a global market is 
itself class based. It is made materially possible on the basis of the integration of capitalist 
production.  This integration of production is not without crisis, contradiction, and the outbreak 
of imperialist war to re-divide ownership of the surplus labor of the globe; that is, war in which 
the capitalist class or, as Lenin put it “two or three powerful world maurauders armed to the teeth 
[...]”conscript workers of the world “in their war over the division of their booty” (Lenin, 
Imperialism 11).  This integration of production, however, also leads to the emergence of a world 
working class which, for the first time, allows people of the world to be aligned along class lines 
(i.e., class for itself) rather than nation (which is a species of “class in itself”).11 
It is to marginalize the material emergence and development of these class struggles (i.e., 
the development of workers as a class for itself not simply a class in itself) from feminism that 
transnational feminism rewrites women’s class struggles with transnational capitalism as “ethics” 
and, therefore, institutes in place of revolutionary praxis an “ethical resistance”—a transnational 
civil society. Ethical resistance, to be clear, converts the laws of motion of capital into 
sentimental codes of affect, caring, and civility and advocates primarily for changes in codes of 
affect, caring, behavior, and, at most, legal and cultural arrangements under capitalism. In this 
context, in this chapter I am re-examining the way contemporary feminism has placed primary 
emphasis on interpersonal, emotional relations, and specifically caring labor and emotional labor 
as the root site of resistance and agency for women. In doing so, transnational feminism puts 
forward the understanding that the social relations of reproduction are not only autonomous from 
                                                 
11 See my discussion in Chapter 2 of the distinction that Marx makes in The Poverty of Philosophy between class “in 
itself” and class “for itself” (a distinction which also serves as the basis of Gramsci’s critique of economism). 
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the relations of production but also the root social relations that need to be transformed in order 
to emancipate women. In doing so, transnational feminism restricts change for women to within 
the social relations of production based on exploitation.  
For instance, cultural theorists such as J.K. Gibson-Graham, Stephen Resnick and 
Richard Wolff argue that what is important in determining the material conditions of people’s 
lives under capitalism is not whether or not they are exploited but the “affective [and emotional] 
intensity associated with exploitation”—that is, how they experience exploitation (Class and Its 
Others 14-15). Following this logic, feminists such as Harriet Fraad and Jenny Cameron argue 
that what is necessary for changing the conditions of women’s lives is transforming the 
“emotional division of labor” and how women affectively and emotionally perceive their 
position in the mode of production and the social division of labor. As a consequence, 
contemporary feminists, are advocating as solutions to material inequalities and conditions of 
economic necessity for women under capitalism, “new” models of civil, interpersonal, and 
emotional behavior such as Chela Sandoval’s “postmodern love,” Marjorie Mayo’s “emotional 
democracy,” and Rosemary Hennessy’s “revolutionary love.” Ethics, as I have marked 
throughout the dissertation, is the spiritualization of material class conflicts; it is the ideological 
conversion of economic contradictions into cultural values. The cultural values do not resolve the 
material contradictions.  In Their Morals And Ours, Leon Trotsky says of “democratic morality” 
that “in order to guarantee the triumph of their interests in big questions, the ruling classes are 
constrained to make concessions on secondary questions, naturally only so long as these 
concessions are reconciled in the book-keeping” (23). But, as my analysis will show, once the 
concessions are not “reconciled in the book-keeping” (once it is not profitable for capital) capital 
no longer affords the social niceties of “ethics” or “reform.”  
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What makes a critique of this turn to ethics and civility all the more urgent is that many 
contemporary feminists (such as Mayo and Hennessy) who advance ethical resistance do so 
under the pretext of presenting a “revolutionary,” “socialist” or “anti-capitalist” solution to the 
material contradictions of women’s lives in capitalism and, as a consequence, misdirect women’s 
struggles with capitalism to reformist solutions. In re-examining these claims, I will show that 
transnational feminism purports to address the needs of women globally—but the actual 
practices proposed by transnational feminists do little to change the material conditions of the 
vast majority of women’s lives, and in fact reveal that the (affective/emotional) “needs” to which 
transnationalists attend are actually the very privileged concerns of those whose needs have 
already been met. 
This is because by reducing the transformation of material conditions of exploitation to 
codes of civil conduct, feminism goes no further than offering a “caring capitalism” as 
“resistance” to material inequality and dire necessity for the majority of women around the 
globe. As I argue in this chapter, far from working to address the material conditions of need for 
women in transnational capitalism, the new models of “transnational civil society,” “civility” and 
“ethical citizenship” that transnational feminism offers are actually an updating of the traditional 
and illusory notion of “freedom” as “autonomy” from material conditions of necessity that has 
long served to help maintain capitalist production and the exploitation of the majority’s labor for 
the profit of the minority. In fact, transnational feminism has become a most effective ally of 
transnational capitalism, which is violently working to undermine and erode the material 
conditions available for collective social well being, economic security, and freedom from 
exploitation and economic necessity for all persons, in order to maintain profit. By putting 
forward the notion that social transformation for women is to be found primarily in localities, 
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transnational feminism abandons any notion of material freedom for women, which requires not 
merely local and ultimately “self-empowered” changes in personal conduct and how we 
emotionally and affectively perceive the material conditions in which we live, but change in the 
material conditions of production that subordinate the needs of the majority to profit for the few. 
 
TWO: 
 Before further examining the consequences for women of contemporary feminism’s turn 
to civility, it is first necessary to further examine the underlying “post-” theory of “difference” 
that transnational feminism uses to support its argument for “ethical resistance” and “negotiation 
within” capitalism as the only way to change the material conditions of women’s lives. As I have 
marked already, the canonical feminisms have long embraced “post-” theories which understand 
social “differences” as “irreducible differences” that are “post-production,” “post-class,” and 
“post-labor.”  In other words, contemporary feminism sees differences as autonomous and 
unexplainable on any terms outside themselves such as the mode of production. With increases 
in material inequality in the international division of labor, there has been a renewed interest in 
materialism and pressure on feminists to address the material conditions of gender and sexuality 
and their relation to inequality in transnational capitalism. However, while many contemporary 
feminists now formally distance themselves from post-structuralist theories and articulate a 
transnational feminism, transnational feminism embrace (and merely updates) poststructuralist 
politics by approaching material reality through a logic of “muddying” and “inbetween-ness” in 
which there is no way to totally transform social relations, only the possibility of “negotiation” 
within capitalism. 
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It is by now a routine assumption within contemporary feminism (and the left in general) 
that a dialectical and historical materialist theory of “totality”—which explains social differences 
in terms of their root historical relations in the mode of production and opens up the possibility 
of fundamental transformation—reduces the material reality of women’s lives to an “abstract” 
and “binary,” metaphysical narrative. For instance, in their Introduction to Between Woman and 
Nation: Nationalism, Transnational Feminisms, and the State, Caren Kaplan, Norma Alarcón 
and Minoo Moallem argue that “the marxist call to ‘totalize’ in opposition to ‘globalization’ 
ignores the implications for many subjects vis-à-vis the (dis)array of localities and differences 
that have been produced through the material effects of discursive practices and the discursive 
effects of material practices” (3). The claim here is that dialectically relating gender and 
sexuality to the mode of production represents the material reality of differences as fixed and 
self-evident and, therefore, erases the actual conditions and lived reality of historical women. 
What is instead necessary, transnational feminists argue, is a logic of “in-betweeness” that does 
not purport to resolve social contradictions but “negotiates” within them. According to this 
argument, an eclectic position that negotiates social differences (without deciding on any set 
position) produces a more historically aware and post-binary understanding of concrete material 
reality of historical women that links discourse to lived reality.  Transnational feminist cultural 
studies has, therefore, embraced a logic of “negotiation,” “muddying” and “inbetween-ness” to 
explain the material conditions of women’s lives and the relation between various differences.  
In fact, transnational feminists Kaplan and Grewal argue, it is precisely a logic of “inbetween-
ness” and “negotiation”—what they call a “muddying” logic which “refuses to choose”—that 
“bypasses conventional binary divisions” and brings Transnational Feminist Cultural Studies 
beyond the divides between gender and class, as well as between Marxism and feminism . . . 
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They, therefore, go on to argue for an eclectic fusion of feminism, Marxism, and 
poststructuralism as a way to “negotiate” the historical divides between gender and class and 
resolve the rift between Marxism and Feminism. 
What is at stake in this in-between theory of materialism and how does a muddying logic 
explain the historical conditions of women? More importantly, what consequence does this 
explanation have for struggles to transform the material conditions of women’s lives and free 
them from conditions of exploitation and dire need in the international division of labor? 
At the core of transnational feminism’s “in-between” theory is the argument that social 
differences such as “gender,” “sexuality” and “race” are “non-dialectizable,” or what Judith 
Butler calls “irreducible” differences. More specifically, this means that they cannot be posited 
as having material conditions outside themselves such as the mode of production, class, and 
labor. Instead, transnational feminists such as Caren Kaplan, Norma Alarcón, and Minoo 
Moallem argue that “differences” are constituted by an internal “double bind.”  A “double bind” 
to be clear, is an epistemological contradiction within “differences”—what is considered in 
“post” theories to be a basic condition of all language, meaning, and explanation—that denies 
difference and simultaneously universalizes difference. Kaplan, Alarcón and Moallem argue, for 
instance, that “difference” is constituted by: 
An aporia, a spatial-temporal indeterminacy where différance as ‘interminable 
experience’ comes into being, [which] is not a ‘dialectizable contradiction in the 
Hegelian or Marxist sense’ and is constitutive of a double bind that cannot be 
overcome except through an epistemological metanarrative, which in turn denies 
the marginalization of difference qua difference and the suffering that 
construction entails. (2) 
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For these feminists, there is no definite outside to the “double bind” that constitutes differences 
and social inequalities. To put this another way, there is no position from which one can 
decisively oppose social exploitation without, at the same time, universalizing and erasing 
difference and, therefore, reproducing another set of inequalities. The only way to try and 
explain differences outside of this “double bind”—that is, the only way out of the simultaneous 
erasure and universalization of difference—is through a contesting epistemological 
metanarrative. Moreover, according to this same logic, a “metanarrative” cannot actually resolve 
the contradiction at the core of the “double bind” without at the same time reinstalling a 
universalized identity that erases difference. This is because any new “narrative” or mode of 
explaining difference is, according to this theory, always based on this irresolvable “double 
bind.”  This internal “double bind” in other words, is the fundamental and basic condition of all 
differences. For this theory, the only way one can ultimately explain social differences is to see 
them as “epistemological contradictions” and yet, this theory ultimately leads to the conclusion 
that there is no way outside of such epistemological contradictions and the inequalities they 
create. The “double bind” is a pan-historical and eternal contradiction. As a consequence, social 
inequalities that are thought to be “enabled” by this double bind are also presumed to be eternal. 
Here transnational feminist cultural studies re-turns to exactly what it claims to move away from: 
an ahistorical post-structuralism that reduces social contradictions to the textual play of 
differences in meaning and, meanwhile, leaves the historical and material conditions of 
exploitation for women in capitalism intact. 
“Inbetween-ness” and “negotiation” in other words, do not offer a position that explains 
the relations of exploitation that have produced social differences rather, they advance a 
metaphysical account of social differences that reduce difference to an ahistorical aporia or 
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“interminable [that is, endless] experience.”  This is not so much a position “beyond binaries” as 
it is a return to a new order of experientialism that displaces the social and historical relations 
that produce material inequality with “textual” interpretations and descriptions of “experience.”  
But what lies behind this ahistorical notion of difference is the understanding that social 
differences are autonomous and self-producing differences. For instance, in Danielle Juteau’s 
contribution to Between Woman and Nation she argues that social differences such as “gender,” 
“ethnicity,” “nation” and “sex” are constituted by analytically distinct social formations, each 
with their own “conditions of production, reproduction, and transformation” (142). There is no 
outside to social differences, only an internal self-producing dynamic—like the metaphysical 
dynamic of the “double-bind”—that lies outside of any historical relations that enable their 
production. 
It is not surprising, therefore, to see transnational feminists such as Norma Alarcón, 
return to “flesh and blood experience” as the basis for understanding the “materiality” of gender, 
and sexuality. In the midst of the claims for uncovering the social conditions of “historical 
women” is a return to the “naturalness” of differences and “bodily experience” of them. Such a 
position naturalizes social differences and, as a consequence, conceals over the social and 
historical conditions that produce differences and that enable difference to be used as a tool for 
increasing exploitation. What this reveals is that transnational feminism does not, in fact, 
produce a “post-binary” postion (“beyond” male/female, inside/outside, idealism/materialism, 
nature/culture, etc.) rather, it produces an eclectic position that merely oscillates between 
“discursive invention” (the understanding that social differences are “invented” by discourse) 
and “biologism” (the understanding that social differences are “self-producing,” “self-evident,” 
and natural processes outside of any historical and social relation of production). In short, what 
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lies behind transnational feminisms’ call for “negotiation” is a thin culturalism that is actually as 
a very traditional defense of the autonomy of social differences. “In-between-ness” and 
“negotiation” are, in other words, rhetorical moves for advancing “singularity,” particularity, and 
autonomy: the notion that social differences are natural, unchangeable and independent of any 
external historical and material conditions that enable their production. In short, the notion that 
they are “self-inventing,” “self-producing” differences.  
But what are the consequences if feminism presents the root condition of social 
inequality and differences for women in the international division of labor as “outside” of the 
social relations of production and instead founded on a metaphysical, ahistorical and autonomous 
“flesh and blood” or “interminable experience”?  
It is quite telling when transnational feminists such as Norma Alarcón read the collective 
struggles of women workers in the maquiladoras as an instance of Lyotard’s “differend.”  
Following Lyotard, Alarcón argues that the maquila woman is “a case of conflict, between (at 
least) two parties, that cannot be equitably resolved for lack of rule of judgement applicable to 
both arguments” (qtd. in Alarcón 70). According to Alarcón, the root problem for women 
workers of the maquiladoras (and other Chicana, female workers on the U.S./Mexican boarder) 
are the state-regulated cultural constructions they are caught between: on the one hand, for 
instance, an “Anglo-American literacy” enabled by the U.S. nation-state “that interpellates them 
as individuals” and, on the other, a “communal mode of power” enabled by the Mexican nation-
state that “interpellates them as ‘Mothers’ (the bedrock of the ‘ideal family’ at the center of the 
nation-making process…)” (69). The female maquiladora worker, Alarcón argues, is an instance 
of an “actual Chicana differend” whose basic condition for freedom and equality is her 
“engage[ment] in a living struggle to seize her ‘I’ or even her feminist ‘We’” (70).  
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The basic condition of “freedom” for female maquiladora workers is, according to 
Alarcón’s argument, “freedom” of “self-representation” of one’s own “flesh and blood 
experience” unregulated by the state and other “nation-making processes” (70). Even being part 
of a “we,” in this case, is preconditioned on the maquiladora worker’s struggle to “seize her I.”  
To put this another way, the basic precondition for freedom and equality for women in the 
international division of labor is, according to transnational feminists, freedom to be “oneself” to 
maintain control over ones own “identity-in-difference.”  Far from being a “radical” 
understanding of freedom, however, this understanding of “freedom” (freedom to seize one’s 
own “I” in all of its “differences”) is basically a re-articulation of the right of the “private 
individual” to be protected from state regulation. That is, it is a re-articulation of classical rights 
of civil society—particularly the right to “liberty”—in bourgeois democracy under capitalism 
and a return to the same “abstract equality” that transnational feminism claims to oppose in the 
first place.  
The notion of “freedom” as ownership, control, and “liberty” over one’s own “identity” 
(one’s “I”) or person is itself founded on private property as a necessary precondition. The right 
to “liberty”—for control over one’s own person and identity—is “a question of the liberty of 
man regarded as an isolated monad, withdrawn into himself . . . not founded upon the relations 
between man and man, but rather on the separation of man from man” (Marx, “On the Jewish 
Question” 42). Moreover, “the practical application of the right to liberty . . . is the right to 
private property . . . the right to enjoy one’s fortune and to dispose of it as one will, without 
regard for other men and independently of society. It is the right of self-interest” (42). On these 
terms equality “is only the equal right to liberty . . . namely that every [human] is equally 
regarded as a self-sufficient monad” (42). 
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This understanding of “freedom” as “liberty” of the nomadic subject is, in fact, quite 
useful to transnational capital in the international division of labor (for example those 
corporations which have come to the maquiladoras to secure sources of cheap labor) because it 
allows the ruling class to extract greater amounts of surplus-value from workers without having 
to turn as much of its profits over to the cost of social reproduction and public welfare. One 
striking example of the way in which the ideology of the “self-sufficient monad” enables the 
cutting of reproduction costs for capital are the “self-help settlements” in Mexico made up of 
casas de cartón (shacks built of scraps and cardboard) the standard housing of the extremely 
poor in Mexico and a common place of residence for a vast number of maquiladora workers and 
their families. As Elvia Rosales Arriola demonstrates in her article “Looking out from a 
Cardboard Box,” in these “self-help settlements” of cardboard shacks, there is no publicly 
funded infrastructure: no paved streets, sidewalks, no electricity, no plumbing and sewer 
services, or clean drinking water. While some of these “self-help settlements” eventually achieve 
the status of “Colonias,” and therefore become entitled to some public funding for paved roads 
and sidewalks, this process can take 20 years and, even then, “Colonias” still contain substandard 
living conditions brought on by unmet needs such as “lack of sufficient water or sewer services 
to meet the residential needs.” By regarding the maquiladora workers who live in these 
settlements as “self-sufficient” and therefore, not in need of public funds, the Mexican 
government is able to offer its citizens at a cheap wage to attract transnational corporations. 
Moreover, these transnational corporations, who extract surplus-value from these workers for 
private profit, are prevented from having to turn money over to the state to support the cost of 
social reproduction for the workers who have produced the surplus value to begin with. 
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The maquiladoras and the living conditions of its workers are not a “special case” that is 
autonomous from the social relations of production but, in fact, part of the daily workings of 
class society and production for profit not needs. What is taken for granted in the notion of 
freedom as liberty of the self-sufficient monad in all of her “differences” (i.e., freedom to seize 
one’s own “I” free from regulation), are the unequal material conditions in a society based on 
private property and class relations. In such a society, those who own the means of production 
are able to command over the surplus-labor of others and, therefore, privately determine the uses 
toward which collectively produced resources are put. What this means for workers is a 
continual decrease in their standard of living from not only shouldering the burden of the cost of 
their own reproduction, but producing surplus-value for the profit of the ruling class. 
Moreover, as Marx argues, “the political suppression of private property”—that is, the 
fact that it is not legally or politically recognized as what qualifies one as a citizen, as a political 
subject endowed with “rights”—“not only does not abolish private property; it actually 
presupposes its existence” (“On The Jewish Question” 33). While in the notion of “freedom” as 
“liberty” there is a formal denial of “private property” as a qualification for being a political 
subject of the state, private property and the capacity to command over the labor of others that it 
enables—as well as other differences that stem from this basic inequality such as education, 
differences in access to health care, nutrition, clean drinking water, quality housing and 
protection from the elements, etc—are still allowed to “act after their own fashion” as 
“personal,” “singular,” “autonomous” differences in civil society. Totally excluded in this notion 
of “freedom,” which is based on freedom of “private property” is freedom from private property 
and exploitation and for social and economic well being for all persons. 
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Transnational feminism, by putting forward an autonomous notion of “difference” and 
limiting its struggles to freedom of “identity-in-difference” (one’s “I”) from state regulation, is 
only rearticulating as a “resistant citizenship” the normal workings of “civil society” (and its 
contradiction with the state) in capitalism: as an arena in which differences that are a 
consequence of exploitation and class society (and used as a site of exploitation) are allowed to 
“act in their own fashion” and appear as “independent” and “autonomous”—or “authentic”—
differences. In short, transnational feminism goes no further than opposing the “state” (“power”) 
without opposing wage-labor (exploitation). (What reveals the ruling class interests of 
transnational feminism is that, even on the limited terms of “interminable experience” it 
completely excludes from its analysis of “experience” the daily conditions of the working day for 
the majority of persons under capitalism who work part of the day to reproduce their own 
conditions of life and part of the day producing surplus-value for the benefit of the ruling class). 
Moreover, by opposing the state without opposing wage-labor and exploitation (i.e., the class 
relations on which the state is founded) transnational feminism is actually serving in the interest 
of transnational capitalism insofar as it works to “deregulate” the nation-state to help produce 
international conditions more conducive for the extraction of surplus-value. As Teresa Ebert has 
shown, the dominant feminism merely succeeds in joining efforts of transnational capital in it 
attack on “social citizenship”—the guarantee of economic and social well-being, and freedom 
from exploitation and necessity for all persons—and its attempt to privatize all aspects of 
workers’ lives turning them into sites of production for profit (Ebert, “Spectral” 278-279). 
This is a particularly destructive understanding of “rights” and “citizenship” for feminism 
because it erases the material conditions of exploitation and dire necessity that the majority of 
women face in the international division of labor that fundamentally prevent them from 
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economic and social well-being. It puts forward the understanding that “freedom” is a matter of 
personal will and does not require material conditions to be in place. In doing so, it limits the 
struggles of feminism to a defeatist position of teaching women to adjust to conditions of 
economic inequality and necessity within class society. It also has the effect, once again, of 
“universalizing” and rendering transhistorical the existing class relations and the inequalities in 
economic access that they produce. 
The logic of transnational feminism’s defense of “liberty” becomes quite clear if we 
widen the scope of analysis of women in the maquiladoras beyond transnational feminism’s 
notion of “flesh and blood experience” to account for the dialectical relations of gender and 
sexuality to the mode of production, specifically wage-labor and capital and their relation 
(exploitation). In the maquiladoras, it has become a longstanding practice on the part of 
transnational corporations such as Zenith, Tyco International, Johnson Controls, Samsung 
Group, and Sunbeam-Oster, to submit women to pregnancy testing as a condition of hiring or 
continued employment. In order to gain or maintain employment, women workers in the 
maquiladoras have been routinely required to produce urine specimens for pregnancy testing, to 
undergo abdominal pregnancy exams by company doctors, and fill out detailed questionnaires 
about their menstruation cycles, birth control use, and sexual activity to determine pregnancy. 
Some female maquiladora workers, such as those who work for Siemens, Lear Corporation, and 
National Processing Company, have also been required by their employers to show used sanitary 
napkins to factory infirmaries as a means of proving that they are not pregnant. Moreover, those 
who become pregnant after being hired are often fired or pressured to quit, sometimes by being 
shifted to tasks with heavy lifting and toxic fumes to compel them to quit (“No Guarantees”). At 
the same time, health and safety standards in the maquiladoras are so low that many workers 
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have received toxic exposure leading to nausea, vomiting, urinary tract cancer and, among 
women, loss of menstruation and the capacity to reproduce children. 
If we restrict our analysis to the ahistorical “flesh and blood experience” of the body that 
transnational feminism advances, the issue of “menstruation” and “pregnancy” for maquiladora 
women can only, ultimately, be considered a woman-specific issue. Indeed, many “human 
rights” organizations, such as “Human Rights Watch” see the regulation of women’s menstrual 
cycles, pregnancy, and sexual activity as primarily a “sex-based” form of discrimination. As a 
consequence of limiting their analysis to the “flesh and blood experience” of women, such 
human rights groups advocate for “reproductive freedoms” for women to choose the “number 
and spacing” of their children free from regulation by the state and corporate interests. But this 
position restricts freedom for women to “reproductive choice” and says nothing of the conditions 
of production in which they reproduce. While access to the material conditions for women to 
freely determine the spacing and number of children is necessary for the emancipation of women 
and their economic well being, freedom to determine the spacing and number of children is a 
limited freedom when one cannot determine the life conditions within which children are 
reproduced and the ends and interests toward which their lives are put.  
The control of pregnancy by transnational capitalism is not merely control of women but 
control over the future labor force and the “surplus population”: how much reserve labor-power 
is available for capital to exploit, the cost of its social reproduction, and whether or not it is 
“cost-effective” for capital to invest in the social reproduction of labor-power (i.e., whether it 
will receive a “return” of greater profit for its investment or not). As long as the reproduction of 
children takes places within relations of production based on private ownership of the means of 
production in which the few can command over the surplus-labor of others, this reproduction 
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will continue to be subordinated to production for profit—regardless of the number and spacing 
of children involved. This is just as much the case when women are discouraged or prevented 
from childbearing as when women are encouraged to bear children through romanticizing 
“motherhood,” “childbearing,” and “family values”—as is increasingly the case for women of 
the North.   
Freedom of sexuality, reproduction, and freedom for women, as the case of women in the 
maquiladoras shows, is in dialectical relation to the social relations of production and one’s 
position within the division of labor. Under conditions of private property, specific sexual and 
reproductive relations are enabled (or disenabled) depending on whether or not they help to 
reproduce conditions necessary for production for profit. Understood in this context, gender, 
sexuality, and reproduction become tools for the extraction of surplus-labor and regulation of the 
workforce to make it more conducive to surplus-value extraction. By abstracting gender and 
sexuality from the social relations of production, transnational feminism accepts the logic of 
ruling class strategies used by transnational capital in the maquiladoras to isolate women 
workers from their collective class interests with all workers and command over women’s labor 
as collective producers. Moreover, by denying the dialectical relation of gender and sexuality to 
the mode of production and class relations, and presenting social differences as “autonomous,” 
transnational feminists go no further than “freedom” of gender and sexuality (which amounts to a 
limited “reproductive freedom”) without freedom from exploitation (the private appropriation of 
surplus-labor). In doing so, it advocates for (a limited reproductive) “freedom” for some women 
and continued exploitation for the majority. That is, it advocates for the limited “freedoms” 
available in capitalism to those women who already have access to material conditions to meet 
their needs.  
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As the conditions of dire need for women in the maquiladoras clearly demonstrates, what 
is needed is a historical materialist understanding of freedom that can account for the conditions 
of exploitation that must be transformed in order to free workers from economic necessity and 
compulsion. Engels clarifies this materialist understanding of “freedom” in Anti-Dühring, when 
he argues that “Freedom . . . consists in command over ourselves and over external nature, a 
command founded on knowledge of natural necessity; it is therefore necessarily a product of 
historical development” (144). Understood as a “product of historical development” freedom is 
not “imaginary independence” from conditions of necessity, but command over these conditions 
which, at root, requires collective ownership and control of the means of production and the 
abolition of class society. Engels, of course, has been read as simply reproducing capitalism’s 
drive to dominate and exploit nature by emphasizing “collective control.”  However, what these 
criticisms conveniently erase are the fundamental differences between a society based on private 
appropriation of social and natural resources (which privileges profit, regardless of the unmet 
needs of society and the costs to the environment among other things) and a society based on 
collective ownership (which prioritizes social need). The effect of such a (mis)reading however 
is to simply oppose the effects of capitalism without ever addressing the conditions under which 
private ownership is produced, in effect occluding the conditions under which human’s relation 
to nature can be radically transformed. It is, in short, not “control” over nature that is the 
“problem” with capitalism (a purely formal analysis of capital), but that all natural and social 
resources are privately controlled for the production of profit—at the expense of the vast 
majority of people as well as the environment. If feminism is going to take seriously the 
conditions of women in the international division of labor and not simply use the example of 
women in the South, as Norma Alarcón does, to advance a ruling-class notion of freedom as 
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“self-help,” it must put forward a feminism for freedom from economic necessity founded not 
upon imaginary independence from conditions of necessity but upon changing the social 
relations of production (of private ownership) that determine the production and meeting of 
needs. 
What is needed for such a transformative feminism is a dialectical understanding of 
social difference that explains them in terms of a totality of relations: in terms of their root 
relations in the social relations of production. What enables feminism to account in materialist 
terms for the “lived reality” of “historical women” is not the seeming “tangibility” of “flesh and 
blood” experience, but the historical relations of production behind the “lived reality” of 
women’s lives. As I discussed in Chapter 4 through Marx’s argument in the Grundrisse that the 
“concrete is concrete because it is the concentration of many determinations” (101), far from 
being “concrete,” the very notion of material reality as a “tangible experience” (that transnational 
feminism puts forward as the “concrete” reality) is actually an “abstraction” that must be 
explained through conceptualization. To begin with the immediate perception of the concrete—
its “flesh and blood” experience—in other words, is to begin with an abstraction which itself 
must be unpacked to explain the root relations behind it that enable its production. Moreover this 
unpacking and explain requires “moving analytically toward ever more simple concepts [. . .] 
arriv[ing] at the simplest determinations [. . . which] would have to be retraced […] but this time 
not as the chaotic conception of a whole, but as a rich totality of many determinations and 
relations” (Marx, Grundrisse 101). It is only by unpacking the historical conditions of production 
behind the “concrete” of women’s lives and retracing the dialectical relation between these 
conditions of production and their effect on the material conditions of women’s lives—that is, 
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understanding gender and sexuality as part of a totality of relations—that feminism can begin to 
explain and work to transform the conditions of necessity for women under capitalism. 
 
THREE 
What are the consequences of transnational feminism’s notion of “difference” and 
“ethical resistance” and what kind of changes does it actually advance in the material conditions 
of women’s lives?  
Proceeding from the logic of transnational feminism’s theory of differences as irreducible 
and unexplainable on the terms of the mode of production, many feminists argue that what is 
most needed to change the material conditions of women’s lives in the international division of 
labor is a “resistant ethics” or “new morality” that embraces differences and takes “loving care” 
to understand the point of view of others. For instance, transnational feminists such as Chela 
Sandoval are now articulating a “new morality” of “postmodern love” as the way to address 
social inequalities around the globe. “Postmodern love” is what Sandoval describes as “radical 
mestizaje . . . a complex kind of love in the postmodern world, where love is understood as 
affinity—alliance and affection across lines of difference that intersect both in and out of the 
body” (170). This “postmodern love,” Sandoval argues, is forged through what she calls the 
“methodology of the oppressed,” which are essentially “semiotic skills” that “recode” and 
“redefine” reality, and have been developed by oppressed persons in order to psychologically 
survive under conditions of oppression in capitalism. According to Sandoval, “postmodern love” 
serves as a “punctum” that “breaks through” established understandings of social difference, 
“traditional, older narratives of love, [and] that ruptures everyday being” in the interests of the 
oppressed (142). Sandoval claims that it is “postmodern love” (and the “semiotic skills” she calls 
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the “methodology of the oppressed”) that serve as “technical skills” required for “survival” 
within capitalism and “produce. . . human being[s] that are capable of generating egalitarian 
social relations” (168). 
The claim here is that the “radical mestizaje” of “postmodern love” undoes traditional 
notions of love in which love is understood as a singularity of the isolated “couple in love.”  
Through postmodern love, Sandoval claims, “subjectivity becomes freed from ideology as it ties 
and binds reality” (170). This modality of love, according to Sandoval, “undoes the ‘one’ that 
gathers the narrative, the couple, the race, into a singularity. Instead, . . . [it] gathers up the 
mezcla, the mixture that lives through differential movement between possibilities of being” 
(170). Yet, at the same time that Sandoval claims that postmodern love undoes “singularity,” 
what she claims is radical about it is that it sees differences as “instances of ‘elaborate 
specificity’ and the ‘loving care’ people might take to learn how to see faithfully from another 
point of view” (170). Sandoval presents this “elaborate specificity” and particularity as in 
opposition to singularity because it emphasizes “plurality.”  But “singularity” is not simply 
determined by its “lack of plurality” but by its autonomy from conditions that produce it. 
“Affinity through difference” is concerned with restoring our understanding of the “specificity” 
and “particularity” of social differences not the capacity to explain them on the terms of the 
larger historical and material conditions that produce them.  
What is especially revealing in Sandoval’s theory of “love” and human relations for the 
“postmodern world” is that it is theorized as a “transclass” love in which “‘love’ is a 
hermeneutic, . . . a set of practices and procedures that transit all citizen-subjects, regardless of 
social class, toward a differential mode of consciousness and its accompanying technologies of 
method and social movement” (140; emphasis added). Postmodern love, in other words, is a 
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trans-social modality of love—what Sandoval describes as a “drifting” or “movement of 
meanings that will not be governed”—that claims not to be determined by social conditions such 
as private property and class relations (143). But such a view of a “transclass” notion of love is 
not one that works to transform the conditions that produce class in the first place rather, it 
merely accepts the co-existence of classes and encourages better relations between them. Seen on 
these terms, it becomes clear that while “postmodern love” is concerned with “making a place 
for the different social subject” (172), it says nothing of the conditions of exploitation within 
which these differences are produced and used as tools for the extraction of surplus-labor. 
Differences are, in fact, quite acceptable in social relations of production as “instruments” of 
labor,” making it “more or less expensive to use” (Marx and Engels, Manifesto 115). 
In fact, the “methodology of the oppressed,” “survival skills,” and “postmodern love” 
that Sandoval argues are a mode of “radical resistance” to unequal conditions for women in 
transnational capitalism, are actually identitical to new managerial and behavioral control 
strategies of “emotional tolerance” that are advocated for in corporations to increase worker 
productivity and maintain the economic “bottom line”—that is, conditions that are favorable to 
increasing surplus-value extraction and profit for owners. In the advanced capitalist societies of 
the North where a great deal of productive labor now takes place in the “service” industry, in 
jobs often held by women, strategies of “netiquette,” civility, and behavioral control have 
become increasingly important to the ruling class in order to help reproduce conditions that 
enable production for profit. They are, in other words, ruling class strategies to enable workers to 
adjust to economic exploitation and keep them from changing the social and economic 
conditions that alienate them in the first place. But many corporations are finding that 
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maintaining these conditions requires seemingly “open” and “flexible” arrangements with 
workers. 
In a study of “emotional management” in the workplace over a decade ago, Nicky James 
argued that the “repression of emotional expression” may appear to have greater efficiency in 
production, but that there are “hidden costs” for capitalism and the production of wealth in this 
style of “emotional management.”  For example she argues: 
It has been suggested that a society which requires equilibrium for the production 
of wealth must minimize the impact of death [. . .] With fewer people taking a day 
off work to attend a funeral than formerly there is less disruption in the 
workplace, but an increase in the amount of pathological grieving [. . .] with 
hidden costs in health care. (20) 
A more recent study of job stress in the service industry, in fact, suggests that the “emotional 
labor” (combined with low wages) required of clerical and service workers, in which “service 
with a smile” is mandated by the company, not only can cause “absenteeism, decreased 
productivity, fatigue, and burnout” but, according to industrial and organizational psychologist 
Alicia Grandey, it also “taxes the body over time by overworking the cardiovascular and nervous 
systems and weakening the immune system” which research has linked to “high blood pressure, 
heart disease and cancer” (qtd. in Blaum and Fong). This same study reports that the American 
Heart Association estimated cardiovascular diseases cost the U.S. economy more than $130 
billion dollars (in health care, lost productivity, and employee replacement costs) in 1995. As a 
consequence, Grandey argues that “Overall, companies need to be concerned about providing 
friendly customer service but also recognize how this may tax their employees’ health. Both 
have an impact on the bottom line.” 
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But what these analyses actually reveal (contrary to the claims of both James and 
Grandey who support “emotional expression” and “behavioral change” as a root material change 
in labor relations), is that it is neither the “emotional repression” nor “emotional expression” that 
is the core of root changes in material relations in order to meet the needs of the majority: both 
can be used as managerial behavioral strategies for capitalism depending on what reproduces 
conditions that are most cost-effective (the “bottom line”) to make a profit. The “post-repressive” 
understanding of emotion (that James and Grandey each ultimately endorse) can just as easily be 
used as a managerial strategy under capitalism in order to make conditions more favorable for 
surplus-value extraction as “emotional repression.”  In fact, since the time in which James wrote 
her article, many corporations have come to recognize the “hidden costs” of “emotional 
repression management” and, as a response to the negative effect this has had on production 
levels, corporations are now putting in place new “post-repressive” managerial strategies in order 
to get workers to adjust to their conditions of exploitation more easily.  
According to Temple University’s Department of Human Resource Administration, one 
“effective” managerial approach in increasing worker productivity has been to: 
train employees to try to generate real, rather than fake, emotions when working 
with customers. Akin to famous theater director Stanislavsky’s notion of actually 
‘becoming the role’ one is asked to play, employees can be encouraged to try to 
empathize with and feel toward the customer in a way that is appropriate for their 
task. (“Faking It” 2)  
By instituting policies that allow for the “emotional differences” of employees and, moreover, 
get employees to identify and empathize with the “emotional differences” of customers, 
corporations have, evidently, been able to increase job performance within the workplace. This 
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is, in fact, identical to the strategies in transnational feminism for changing “ethical” and “civil” 
behavior,” such as Sandoval’s notion of “postmodern love,” at the root of which is “behavioral 
management” and a “new morality” in order to “empathize” with the “other” and “survive” 
within capitalism. As Sandoval puts it: “the semiotic perception of signs in culture as structured 
meanings that carry power” as well as the capacity to “deconstruct” and “recode” these signs and 
perceive differently are “basic survival skills necessary to the subordinated and oppressed 
citizenry” (131).  
On the contrary, instead of being “trans-social” and “above” class relations, ethics (and 
the codes of civility and emotional conduct advocated by a particular “ethics”) are in dialectical 
relations to class. Human beings “consciously or unconsciously, derive their ethical ideas in the 
last resort from the practical relations on which their class position is based—from the economic 
relations in which they carry on production and exchange” (Engles, Anti-Dühring 118). It is, for 
instance, under conditions in which private ownership of “personal property” develops that the 
moral injunction “Thou shalt not steal” develops and becomes commonplace. The “ethical 
ideas,” in other words, are not eternal truths: “In a society in which the motives for stealing are 
done away with ….how the preacher of morals would be jeered at who tried solemnly to 
proclaim the eternal truth: Thou shalt not steal!” (118). Ethics as well as emotional relations with 
others, are historical products of the social relations of production. 
The ethical ideas of Sandoval’s “trans-class” postmodern love are no exception. They are 
ruling class ideas aimed at producing subjects—what Sandoval calls “risky subject-citizens”—
who can more easily adjust to capitalist relations of production. Her call for “postmodern love,” 
“affinity” and “alliance and affection across lines of difference” is really no more than a 
traditional call for liberal pluralist “inclusion” and “awareness” of the other—a call for 
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“respecting differences.”  Such a position presupposes that the conditions of exploitation and 
economic necessity for the majority in capitalism are simply a product of insensitive and 
disrespectful attitudes toward differences. This is, moreover, quite useful in protecting the 
economic interests of some women at the expense of the majority by allowing them to 
opportunistically “oppose” the oppression of women only insofar as it serves as a limit to their 
own “success” within capitalism (articulated as their own “particular differences”). When 
“affinity,” “affirmation,” and “affection” are understood as the foundation of social 
transformation then one need only participate in social change so long as one feels “affirmed” in 
doing so. What “postmodern love” occludes are the material conditions of exploitation that 
economically compel the majority of women of the world to affirm and respect the difference 
between “exploiter” and “exploited.”  Capitalism, in other words, does not depend on the 
“exclusion” of difference rather, its social relations of production based on exploitation produce 
social and economic differences.  
Postmodern love, is not at all trans-social or trans-class but enabled by historical 
developments in the capitalist mode of production. “Love,” as Alexandra Kollontai argued, is a 
“social emotion”: both the kinds of love produced and the “needs” that they work to fulfill are 
enabled by the mode of production. As the forces of production have developed, and capitalist 
production has expanded, this has changed the social division of labor and, in doing so, it 
requires new subjectivities and new modalities of “interpersonal relations” to help maintain 
conditions for production for profit. While earlier stages of capitalism sharpened antagonisms 
between men and women by isolating women within the “family” and robbing women of their 
role as productive laborers, the advance of capitalism puts into place conditions that throw 
“gender” into sharp relief. At the same time that capitalism continues to reproduce conditions for 
 225 
the privatized family, it needs the productive labor of women to maintain profit—it needs their 
surplus-labor as collective producers—and, therefore, pulls women out of the “home,” integrates 
women into productive wage-labor, makes women’s relation to wage-labor/capital more evident 
and confronts working women with the fact that a solution to conditions of women’s oppression 
in general cannot be found in abstraction from solution to the class question. 
Traditional notions of “couple-love,” while still useful for the ruling class because of the 
way in which they construct love as a “private matter” and, therefore, help “to channel the 
expression of love in its class interests” (279), are increasingly becoming historically outdated in 
the face of changes in the division of labor brought on by developments in the forces of 
production. As a consequence of these changes, the bourgeoisie in advanced capitalism is now 
also supporting practices that “negotiate” between “class” and “gender” because it cannot avoid 
the issue that capital requires the labor-power of women, but at the same time, in order to help 
maintain social relations of production based on profit it seeks to blunt the class consciousness of 
workers in general and women in particular by offering a position of “negotiation” of the 
fundamental class contradictions for women. “Postmodern love” is a useful mode of love for 
transnational capitalism because it emphasizes “flexibility,” “negotiation,” and survival within 
existing social relations of production. Such a position, which sees social differences such as 
“gender” as “affectively linked” to class but not dialectically related, “addresses” gender without 
addressing the material needs—the historical preconditions—that must be fulfilled in order to 
free women from exploitation. To put this another way, it attempts only to resolve interpersonal 
problems and, at that, only for ruling class women (and petit-bourgeois women who protect the 
interests of the ruling class), but does not actually materially resolve the conditions of economic 
inequality for proletarian women of the world who are excluded from “negotiation.”  In this way, 
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despite the fact that “postmodern love” is presented as a “resistance” to traditional modes of 
couple-love—and, therefore, a site of “emotional freedom” for women—it is likewise a 
“bourgeois ideal of love” that “does not correspond to the needs of the largest section of the 
population—the working class” (284). As Kollontai further argued, without working to free 
women for subordination to production for profit, women cannot be freed from emotional and 
personal relations based on financial considerations (274). 
The “postmodern love” of Sandoval’s “risky citizen-subject” is actually a liberal 
hegemonic coalitionism, which sutures the utopia of pluralism from multiculturalism to the 
deregulation of the transnational corporation. The “risky” and “drifting” subject represents the 
abandonment of economic and social well being for all for the ruthless and reckless practices of 
the transnational corporation, which must maintain flexibility in its quest for the accumulation of 
profit all around the globe. Instead of being “anti-imperialist” and “anti-capitalist,” transnational 
feminism is really quite useful for the accumulation of capital on a world scale as it works to 
produce the pragmatic, flexible subjects necessary for capitalism to ensure a cheap labor force 
from which to extract surplus-value. The “risky citizen-subject” is the new entrepreneur of 
transnational capitalism whose “drifting” and “deregulation” eliminates the limits to profiting off 
of the labor of others. 
Yet the root condition for capitalist “deregulation” is the increased exploitation of 
workers of the world, including the majority of women. If feminism is to prioritize the economic 
and social emancipation of all women over the liberation of an already privileged minority of 
women, then it must work to transform the social relations of production instead of limiting its 
interventions to lessons in “moral conduct” for the 21st century. If we understand “morality” in 
historical materialist terms then “morality which stands above class antagonisms and above any 
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remembrance of them becomes possible only at a stage of society which has not only overcome 
class antagonisms but has even forgotten them in practical life” (Engels, Anti-Dühring 119). The 
root issue in determining whether or not society is organized so that its “interpersonal” and 
“emotional relations” are based on freedom from class relations, exploitation and economic 
necessity, or whether they will be a front for the class interests of some at the expense of the 
majority, is whether social resources are privately or collectively owned and thus, whether 
society produces for profit or collective need. In itself, transforming emotional and ethical 
behavior toward others does not resolve the root material inequality brought on by production for 
profit, which is the basic condition that causes alienation among workers. Without confronting 
“class” and private ownership of the means of production, feminism cannot understand the 
conditions that produce dire need and economic compulsion of workers brought on by 
exploitation. Without confronting conditions of necessity and economic compulsion, there is no 
ground upon which to establish collectivity. Collectivity is not a structure of interpersonal 
relationships and behaviors rather, it is a structure of social and economic relations founded on 
collective ownership and control of the means of production. It is a social relation in which no 
one person can privately own means of production and, therefore, command over the surplus-
labor (and thus lives) of others.  
 
FOUR 
Under the pressure of growing class contradictions, transnational feminism has 
increasingly turned to the concept of “emotional labor” to explain the material basis of 
“emotion,” “behavior” and morality. The concept “emotional labor,” it is claimed, proposes to 
recognize that “emotions,” “behavior” and “morality” are structured by the social relations of 
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production and points to a dialectical relation between “emotion” and all other forms of labor 
relations in capitalism. However, the dominant analysis of “emotional labor” is not a dialectical 
one but a localist analysis that isolates it from other labor relations as a “special case.”  The main 
way in which this is advanced is that “emotional labor,” it is argued, is treatable through a 
change in emotional relations and not the social relations of production. Insofar as “labor” is 
theorized it is as a largely interpersonal “process” not as a structure of ownership of the means of 
production. 
What is notable here is that at the same time transnational feminism denies class 
antagonisms, it claims to advance class as a necessary category of analysis in its readings. But 
class, for transnational feminism and the transnational left generally is, as J.K. Gibson-Graham 
argue in their writings, a process in which what matters is the “distributive moment.” Class is not 
understood in terms of irreconcilable property relations but in terms of a process of distribution 
and consumption of the products of labor, irrespective of one’s relationship to ownership of the 
means of production. “Class” as a “property relation” is considered too abstract to explain what 
are multiple and varied processes of “surplus-value” appropriation.  
In their respective contributions to the volume Class and Its Others, Jenny Cameron and 
Harriet Fraad each articulate a theory of “emotional surplus labor” and “emotional exploitation” 
in which the concepts of “labor” and “exploitation” are seemingly “freed” from private 
ownership of the means of production. As Fraad argues, “emotional exploitation” is understood 
to be the process by which any labor that involves emotional expenditure is “appropriated by 
those who are not performers of that labor” (70). What is most central to the “exploitative 
relation” is not whether or not one privately owns the means of production and, therefore, has 
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command over the labor-power of others rather, it is whether or not one consumes the products 
of other peoples labor or produces for their consumption.  
In actuality, this theory does not produce a more historical and materialist understanding 
of “labor” and “exploitation.”  Instead, it produces an unspecified and ahistorical understanding 
of surplus-labor. When surplus-labor is taken to be any labor produced by one person whose 
product is consumed by another, then a disabled person who receives rides to work from his 
cousin, a homeless person who sleeps in a bed prepared at a homeless shelter, or, as Cameron 
claims, a child who eats breakfast prepared by her father, can all be considered exploiters of 
surplus-labor just as much as an owner of a transnational corporation who appropriates the 
surplus-labor of thousands of workers for the sole purpose of capital accumulation. But labor is 
not inherently and transhistorically productive of surplus-value. It is not the concrete usefulness 
of labor for others that determines surplus-labor rather, it is the social relations of production. 
Labor is productive of surplus-value only when material conditions of production have reached a 
level in which socially necessary labor time for producing the existing conditions of life does not 
monopolize all available labor-time. When the forces of production are considerably less 
developed and all hours of the day must be spent by all members of the community to simply 
sustain life, a surplus of collective resources is not historically and materially possible. 
Moreover, labor is only productive of surplus-value when it is “directly consumed in the course 
of production for the valorization of capital” not when it is consumed for the reproduction of 
labor-power (Marx, Capital 1038).  
The consequence of abstracting surplus-labor from property relations and turning it into 
an entirely local power relation in which “everyone” exploits and is exploited is to suppress 
transformative praxis for collective social relations of production. If all labor is exploited 
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surplus-labor by virtue of being used by others, then collective social relations—based on 
collective ownership of the means of production—are inherently relations of exploitation. 
Exploitation, in other words, is a transhistorical phenomenon that can only be modified in form 
but not abolished. This erases the social conditions of labor and represents a society in which 
“the free condition of each is the free condition of all” as impossible and unnecessary. On the 
one hand transnational feminism claims to acknowledge the “labor” of those not “recognized” by 
capitalism (a gesture toward the “other” and the “interdependence” of individuals). On the other, 
because it is still working within the framework of capitalist relations, it ends up asserting a 
deeply individualist argument—the unsaid (yet familiar) conclusion of which is that we should 
all aim to be as independent and “self-sufficient” as possible. That is, the problem of capitalism 
is that individual people cannot meet their own individual needs, by themselves. But it is not 
because people rely on others that individual’s needs go unmet rather, it is because of the 
production relations in which that interdependence is organized. 
This abstract and ahistorical reading of exploitation in “emotional relations” is itself 
historically specific to capitalism and works to produce subjectivities that are useful to the ruling 
class. At the core of this reading is the monadic subject of civil society in capitalism for whom 
freedom is “freedom of private property” relations. This monadic subject is ruled by what Marx 
called “the right of self-interest” which leads every person to see in other persons “not the 
realization but the limitation of his own liberty” (“On the Jewish Question” 42). On these terms, 
emotional relations and emotional needs—in fact, all needs—are understood as individual and 
“private matters” that are separate from and contrary to the social collective and the needs of 
others in society. In fact, the needs of others are understood as a hindrance to one’s own personal 
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liberation since meeting the needs of another is fundamentally and transhistorically considered to 
be an instance of exploitation.  
But this is a specific result of the subordination of collective needs to private property 
relations. To return to what I discussed in Chapter 2, as Marx and Engels explain in The German 
Ideology, the production and satisfaction of “needs” is fundamental to human life and at the same 
time develops in historical relation to the mode of production:  
life involves before everything else eating and drinking, housing, clothing, and 
various other things. The first historical act is thus the production of the means to 
satisfy these needs, the production of material life itself. And indeed this is an 
historical act, a fundamental condition of all history, which today, as thousands of 
years ago, must daily and hourly be fulfilled merely in order to sustain human life. 
(47)  
In other words, “needs” and the conditions for producing and satisfying needs are historical. As 
Marx explains, they involve the dialectical praxis of labor in which humans “act upon external 
nature and change it, and in this way . . . simultaneously change [their] own nature” (Marx, 
Capital 283). The production and satisfaction of needs, in turn, gives rise to new needs. As the 
forces of production develop so do needs and the methods and modes of producing and meeting 
needs: “Hunger is hunger, but the hunger gratified by cooked meat eaten with a knife and fork is 
a different hunger from that which bolts down raw meat with the aid of hand, nail and tooth. 
Production thus produces not only the object but also the manner of consumption, not only 
objectively but also subjectively” (Marx, Grundrisse 92). For instance, what counts as 
“nutrition” and the conditions necessary in order to gain access to this nutrition (whether this 
requires hunting and gathering, tools for agricultural cultivation, or large scale industry) is 
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historically enabled by the mode of production. In this way “production not only supplies a 
material for the need, but it also supplies a need for the material” (92). The conditions of 
production, both the forces of production and the relations in which they are organized, 
therefore, determine both the historical development of need themselves and the way in which 
they are fulfilled. 
Under capitalism, where the productive forces have enabled the historical development of 
new needs and ways of fulfilling them, the private property relations subordinate the majority to 
dire economic necessity by excluding them from access to the resources necessary to meet needs. 
By subordinating the needs of many—the collective needs of all persons for freedom from 
exploitation and economic necessity—to production of profit, capitalist relations of production 
impede the development of human capacity enabled by meeting existing need and increasingly 
deteriorate the standard of living of workers. When human beings are reduced to a means for 
profit-making for a few, workers are pitted against each other for mere survival and must 
shoulder the economic burden not only of meeting their own needs but producing surplus-value 
for the ruling class, the needs of others represent an obstacle to capital accumulation for the 
ruling class and impoverishment for workers.  
When inequality in emotional relations is divorced from class contradictions in the mode 
of production and the dire economic necessity that exploitation produces for the majority, at best, 
one can work for what Marjorie Mayo calls “emotional democracy” and Fraad calls “communal 
emotional relations” in which persons have the right to express their own feelings and the key to 
social change is ethical negotiation and behavioral reform: adopting caring behavior toward 
others and negotiating with them to get needs met. But it is telling that one of the signs that such 
“communal emotional relations” are “working well” is that, as Fraad explains, a school age child 
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can negotiate between “sustaining [communal practices] at home while learning to submit, at 
least to some extent, to what are often non-communal emotional requirements at school” (81). In 
short, the theory of class processes and negotiation merely advocates a more “humane” 
capitalism—a caring capitalism—with “functional” emotional, sexual, and family relations that 
help to reproduce subjects who can more easily adjust to capitalism and its cultural 
consequences.  
Far from freeing emotional relations from private property, the dominant feminism’s 
theory of “negotiation” and “ethical resistance” offers an idealist and illusory freedom that has 
no ground in the real material conditions of need and labor that shape gender difference, 
sexuality and emotional relations. Instead of working to address the needs of all persons for 
freedom from economic necessity and exploitation, it serves as a cover for the reproductive 
requirements of capital, which is now engaging in a massive assault on any notion of social 
collectivity in order to secure an exploitable labor force with which to make a profit. Behind the 
privatized and individualized “need” that grounds dominant theories of emotional labor in 
feminism are the class interests of the bourgeoisie to bolster property relations and the monadic 
individualism of civil society as the only ground of freedom. 
One of the objections from transnational feminists to the critique I have made thus far of 
the turn in feminism to “civility” and “ethical resistance” is that Marxism “ignores” the 
“emotional” and “affective needs” of people and that without putting a foundational emphasis on 
“ethics” and the “affective experiences” of others, it will be impossible to build the kind of 
collective organization necessary in order to transform existing social relations. This 
understanding of collective organization and Marxism is, in fact, so pervasive that even theorists 
who claim to advance “classical Marxism” are now rearticulating its revolutionary theory of 
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“needs” and “labor” to prioritize “affective needs” as a foundational component to revolutionary 
struggle. One striking example of this is Rosemary Hennessy’s book Profit and Pleasure in 
which she claims to advance a “Marxist” theory of sexuality and “affect” and their dialectical 
relation to needs, class, and labor. Hennessy’s book is especially important to examine here 
because of the way in which it rewrites the Marxist concepts of “class,” “collectivity,” “labor,” 
and “need” at the same time that it claims to restore their centrality in contemporary cultural 
critique. Her text, in fact, argues that one of the main limits to contemporary cultural critique is 
an erasure of “class,” “needs” and “production” as fundamental structures that must be 
transformed in order to enable material transformation of the conditions of people’s lives. More 
specifically, she claims to want to restore the centrality of the Marxist concept of “need” (and its 
dialectical relation to the mode of production) to debates about desire, sexuality, identity, affect, 
and emotion.  
But when we look closely at Hennessy’s theory of “need,” “labor” and “class” we find 
not a materialist understanding, but one which once again separates emotion from the relations of 
production. According to Hennessy, not only the dominant cultural theory but also revolutionary 
collectivity has by and large proceeded by abstracting “affect” and “human affective capacities” 
from basic needs and the social relations of production and, in doing so, revolutionary 
organizations have limited the possibility and scope of revolutionary praxis and class struggle by 
alienating potential participants and their “individual” experiences in their everyday lives. For 
Hennessy, “affect” represents a “basic human need” which is no less necessary to survival than 
other “basic needs” such as food, clothing, shelter, and healthcare. The primary concern of 
revolutionary organization, she argues, should therefore be “how to marshal our human affective 
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capacities in the struggle to redress the inequitable meeting of other human needs” (208). 
Hennessy continues: 
If we no longer ignore affect in the calculus of human needs, then in forging a 
collective standpoint for oppositional—even revolutionary—forms of 
consciousness we will need to acknowledge how political agency, practice, and 
commitment are motivated, complicated, and undermined by our human capacity 
for affect,” to which she adds “perhaps especially the emotion . . . “love.” (208) 
In fact, as a solution to the abstraction of “affect” from “needs” she argues that revolutionary 
organizations need to be organized on the basis of what she calls “revolutionary love.”  
Revolutionary love, according to Hennessy embraces “multiple” forms of love—both 
“individual” and “collective”—so that individuals in their everyday “love” and “affective” lives 
are not fundamentally alienated from revolutionary struggle. “To endorse . . . collective love 
[i.e., love for a collective people]” she is quick to point out “without acknowledging other kinds 
of love that are more individual . . . that also have an intense hold on us, would be not just 
dishonest but a costly political mistake” (205). “Revolutionary love” in short, is able to “bridge” 
the gap between “individual experience” and “collectivity” that Hennessy argues is “missing” 
from revolutionary praxis, by working to meet the “affective needs” of its participants.  
Rather than producing a dialectical understanding of “love” and “affect” that understands 
its relation to the mode of production and need, Hennessy rewrites “need” to produce the 
understanding that it is “love” and “affect” that form the basis of production relations. As part of 
her theorization of “affective needs” Hennessy argues that, “affective needs are inseparable from 
the social component of most need satisfaction . . . but they also constitute human needs in 
themselves in the sense that all people deserve to have the conditions available that will allow 
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them to exercise and develop their affective capacities” (210-211). But affective capacities are 
here treated very ahistorically: the right to develop these capacities is in itself quite banal—this 
amounts to the right for freedom of emotional expression, but abstracts the “expression” itself 
from the conditions in which it is produced and the ends and interests that it serves. Moreover, 
Hennessy argues that “alienation from sensation and affect underpins the organization of 
commodity production and consumption and the logic of exchange value. In capitalist divisions 
of labor, the extraction of surplus value requires that workers alienate themselves from their 
human potentials, including their sex-affective potentials” (217; emphasis added). This is another 
way of saying that alienation is not founded upon class and the separation of workers from 
ownership of the means of production but on our separation from “ourselves,” our “experience,” 
and from the “ideal human” (which Hennessy calls “human affective potential”).  
What belies the idealism of Hennessy’s project of “revolutionary love” is that it requires 
an idealized human being who already embodies the interpersonal relationships and affective 
capacities that are projected onto a communist future. This is a far cry from the understanding of 
“emotional relations” and “love” produced by historical materialists such as Alexandra Kollontai 
who argued that the basis of the “hypocritical morality” of capitalism is not in its failure to 
produce “ideal human beings,” but on “the structure of its exploitative economy, while at the 
same time mercilessly convering with contempt any girl or woman who was forced to” depart 
from this ideal (263). It is important to note here that the concepts of “red love” and “love-
comradship” produced by revolutionaries such as Kollontai are dramatically different from 
Hennessy’s sentimentalizing of revolutionary struggle because they understand “love-
comradeship” to be based on a structure of economic relations in which no person can 
appropriate the surplus-labor of others. “Red Love” in other words is not a set of interpersonal 
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relations nor even “solidarity” but a set of social and economic relations in which class 
antagonisms have not only already been abolished (because private property has been abolished) 
but have been “forgotten in practical life.”  Hennessy’s theorization of the concept of “affective 
needs” and their exclusion from revolutionary “solidarity” is not a historical materialist 
understanding of the relationship between “affect,” “love,” and needs but a version of Max 
Stirner’s theorization of the “ideal human” that Marx and Engels critiqued in The German 
Ideology. Like Stirner, Hennessy’s concept of “revolutionary love,” “imagines that people up to 
now have always formed a concept of man, and then won freedom for themselves to the extent 
that was necessary to realize this concept; that the measure of freedom that they achieved was 
determined each time by their idea of the ideal of man at the time” (Marx and Engels, German 
456). In actuality, however, people won freedom for themselves “to the extent that was dictated 
and permitted not by their ideal of man” (for example, the revolutionary lover who is able to 
harmonize her personal relationships with her relationship to revolutionary struggle), “but by the 
existing productive forces” (457). However, so long as the “productive forces” themselves 
continue to be restricted by the social relations of production based on private property, 
“development [is] possible only if some persons satisfy their needs at the expense of others” 
(457).  
An instructive example of the fact that Hennessy’s theorization of “need” empties it of its 
revolutionary content and restricts social change to within capitalism is her critique of the 
“minimum wage.”  In this discussion, Hennessy argues that the “minimum wage,” which 
represents the “needs” of the proletariat that are excluded by capitalism, “is of course invariably 
not the same as a living wage” (216). Unlike the “living wage,” Hennessy argues, “the minimum 
wage cannot cover even the most basic needs for living—food and clothing and housing and 
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healthcare, no less education and time for intellectual and creative development—many unmet 
needs for living a full human life are virtually “outlawed’” (216). But what is left unchallenged 
by her defense of the “living wage” is the system of “wage-labor.”  The “needs” of workers are 
not excluded by the minimum wage alone, but by the system of wage-labor founded on private 
property. Moreover, what is obscured here is that even with a “living wage,” workers are still 
exploited. Such a reading of living/minimum wage in other words shows how the theory of 
“ethical resistance” and “revolutionary love” has the effect of distracting attention away from 
causes of exploitation and oppression, substituting the amelioration of the effects of capitalism 
for their transformation. 
If feminism is going to be a transformative praxis and not simply a cover for ruling class 
interests, it must break with the idealism of “ethical resistance” and the “monadic subject” and 
build a theory and praxis of emancipation for women as part of a social collectivity based on 
meeting needs, social well being, and freedom from exploitation for all. Feminism needs to 
articulate a materialist theory—a red theory of gender and sexuality—which understands needs, 
including emotional needs, as not simply private matters or “free floating” choices, but historical 
practices that develop and change in response to the development of forces of production as they 
come into conflict with the relations of production. The conditions of possibility for freedom for 
women, including in their emotional and sexual relations, are in dialectical relation to class and 
economic necessity—that is, to the material conditions within which their society produces its 
needs and their position within the social relations of production and division of labor. The 
material conditions for freedom of sexuality, emotions, and love for women who occupy 
gendered positions in the social division of labor and are economically compelled to take up 
strictly heterosexual positions in marriage such as single women in the export processing zones 
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of Taiwan who are trading their eyesight for cash to save money for expensive dowries, are quite 
different from the conditions for women who are well paid professionals in occupations in 
advanced capitalism that are relatively flexible regarding gender. Understanding “emotional 
relations” as separate from class antagonisms and restricting change to within interpersonal 
relations is strategy of transnational capital to “maintain an elastic labor force” by “muting” class 
consciousness and turning women away from their “commitment to work and their solidarity . . . 
with men as well as women” (Gallin 190).  
The significance of private ownership of the means of production and command over the 
labor-power of others as well as its normalization in contemporary feminism, matters because it 
determines what material resources and conditions are at the disposal of all members of society 
(and what material interests they can advance) and therefore determines whether the social 
arrangements will be able to free all persons from necessity or whether they will need to be 
transformed to do so. Freedom of sexuality, love, desire cannot be produced unless emotional 
relations are, as Alexandra Kollontai argues, freed from financial considerations, which is to say, 
freed from class society and its privatized relations of production that produce dire economic 
necessity for the majority. Transnational feminism, with its focus on “ethical resistance” to the 
material conditions of inequality for women, actually works in the interest of subordinating the 
needs of women for material equality and freedom from necessity to the reproductive 
requirements of transnational capitalism. What is necessary in feminism is not the individualized 
“responsibility” of transnational feminism but the collective solidarity of revolutionary 
internationalism for a feminism that will participate in the class struggle to abolish capitalism’s 
regime of profit and wage-labor and therefore put the material conditions in place to emancipate 
all people from exploitation and economic necessity. 
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PART III. MAKING “CRISIS” (UNUSUALLY) CRITICAL 
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6.0  HISTORICAL MATERIALISM AND GENDER 
In all class societies, at historical junctures when class contradictions reach a crisis moment, 
there is a shift in the social logic. The world is explained in, broadly, spiritual terms in order to 
obscure the material social relations as cultural values and represent class antagonisms (that have 
now broken through the surface of the “old” social logic) as cultural differences. It is on these 
terms that, in the wake of the increasing collapse of the U.S. economy and the ongoing 
imperialist wars, the canonical feminism has (once again) become increasingly fascinated with 
its own “end.” As I implied in Chapter 1, contemporary feminism by and large enacts an “end” 
to feminism through the circuitous route of presenting a counter-narrative of feminism as an 
ongoing, “vibrant,” cacophonous project—with no origin and no end—rich with diverse, 
conflicting, and contesting cultural values. In what is presented as bringing a breath of fresh air 
to feminism—particularly in the wake of the collapse of postmodernism—feminist theorists 
located in the United States and Europe are calling for moving “beyond” the “endless” divides, 
impasses, and debates over questions of universality and difference, power, identity, etc. that 
have dominated feminist discussion through the 1980s and early 1990s leading to impasses, dead 
ends, and so on and turning to the exploration of cultural values as the means of renewing 
feminism and re-connecting it to the lives of women.  
Here I would like to examine in a bit more depth a few examples only mentioned in 
Chapter 1 regarding the turn in feminism now, and then move on to what is needed to make 
feminism matter again. For example, in her book Literature After Feminism, Rita Felski remarks 
that “Feminist criticism is a widespread and well-known field of study that [...] has had more 
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impact on the teaching of literature than any other recent school of criticism. It has generated 
innumerable books, conferences, and articles and has its own phalanx of superstars” (5). But 
feminism, Felski continues, is a “mixed bag” that, in the wake of postmodernism, has become 
obsessed with a “fruitless zigzagging between universality and difference” (16). Now that 
feminism is “an established institution, not a fragile and delicate seedling,” Felski argues, it is 
time to “sort through” feminism and determine “what is worth keeping and what is not” (5). She 
claims that the source of this “fruitless zigzagging” is that feminism has for too long concerned 
itself with understanding cultural and aesthetic “values” as “ideology” and, therefore, as “nothing 
more than an endorsement of current power relations” (164). Feminist critique, according to 
Felski, has alienated the “female reader” and her “values” and, by implication, it is this critique 
of culture and values and their relationship to unequal material relations that has turned women 
off of feminism. “The feminist scholar who earns her living by analyzing texts,” Felski states, “is 
not doing the same thing as the female reader who picks up a book in the hope of finding several 
hours of enjoyable distraction” (53). In Felski’s narrative, feminism benefits more women—and 
is, therefore, more “valuable”—when it provides “hours of enjoyable distraction” or “pleasure 
and consolation in aesthetic experience” from women’s “exhausting and stressful lives” (53).  
As it turns out, what Felski means by “sorting through” feminism is quite literally the 
sorting out of feminism any trace of a materialist analytics of inequality and exploitation under 
which the majority of women in capitalism live today. Felski’s discussion cuts out of 
consideration the material relations that have brought about increasingly “exhausting and 
stressful lives” for the majority of women, even after some class-fractions of women have 
become part of a “phalanx of superstars” and moved into positions of economic privilege and 
institutional power over other working women and men within capitalism. Instead, she celebrates 
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a symptom of the way in which the capacity of working class women in the North to critique 
their conditions of life—that is, their historical capacities to analyze the superficialities of culture 
under capitalism and uncover the material relations of exploitation and inequality behind them—
has been so dismantled and paralyzed that most workers and most women in the U.S. today are 
immobilized in the face of the rising poverty rates for single mothers, declining social security, 
inaccessible health care, the rise of a national security state and the onslaught of imperialist 
warfare under the pretext of “freedom for women.”  
In place of analytical critique and conceptual analysis of material relations behind these 
contradictions, Felski puts forward moral clarity and certitude over “our values” and “way of 
life.” She puts forward the “values” of disengagement from the political and retreat into the 
aesthetic as self-evidently valuable and in doing her argument converts the cultural 
intelligibilities that are now being used to justify imperialism into “new” values for feminism. 
Moral certitude over “values” and “our way of life” has become the conservative benchmark for 
ideologically translating U.S. capital’s class war to appropriate the cheap labor and material 
resources of the Middle East and Central Asia into a “culture war” over civilization, democracy, 
and freedom for women’s values. “Democracy” of “values” has become a political cover for the 
material transfer of wealth (exploitation) from the “rest” to the “West.” Perhaps Felski’s 
comments regarding a postcolonial literary canon are especially telling in this regard:  
This literature no longer stands for sober reportage and single-mindedness of 
purpose; it is no longer viewed as an instrument, a weapon, or a tool. Instead, it is 
hailed as a polyglot, hybrid, Creole form teeming with multiple and conflicting 
voices. […] Once seen as formally unadventurous, even dull, the postcolonial text 
is now on the cutting edge of aesthetic excitement. […] Rather than a clarion call 
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to justice, the writing of the non-Western world is now a thoroughly ambiguous 
mélange of voices that is not easily deciphered. (159) 
Felski suppresses analytical critique through articulating a new exotica which basically reassures 
a Western public that the non-Western (literary) world is now “safe” for travel, pleasure, and 
consumption. For both working class women in the North and workers in the South, Felski puts 
forward as the other of feminism now any “clarion call to justice.” Felski does not, of course, 
come out and say that “calls for justice” should be criminalized. Instead, she takes the more 
moderate position that we should “value” the end of such calls. But clarion calls for justice and 
oppositional critique are an objective outcome of class contradictions; they are an effect of 
capitalist social relations of production and the inequalities they produce. The “end” of such calls 
is also the effect of material developments in class contradictions. To value the “end” of “clarion 
calls for justice”—without the transformation of the class relations that produce exploitation and 
inequality—is to lead feminism to value the material practices that have led to the violent 
suppression of workers’ struggles against capitalism through national security juntas, global 
militarism, and pre-emptive strikes. 
In a recent interview for Stacy Gillis et al’s Third Wave Feminism, Elaine Showalter’s 
comments make the class interests of the contemporary “renewing” of feminist values even more 
stark. She argues that feminism “cannot pretend anymore that no women have power” (61-62). 
“Feminism,” Showalter remarks, “has operated for several decades on an ethics of 
powerlessness” when, instead, for a feminism of the 21st century, “we need to investigate an 
ethics of power” (Gilles et al 61). Feminism as a critique of social inequality and economic 
injustice and the material relations that produce them, and as a mode of organizing to transform 
these relations, according to Showalter and a growing number of feminists, is over. It has 
 245 
become “out of date” in the face of women’s achievements in leadership, government, and 
business. By focusing its critique on the way in which the existing social relations continue to 
oppress and exploit women, so this argument goes, feminism has gotten in the way of “making 
alliances” for real change. It is therefore time to “let go of feminism” (61-62). For Showalter, 
although “academics, social workers, and welfare mothers” may have “good ideas” they have no 
“real leverage” for making change and thus, she concludes, “I would invite some rich women to 
these discussions” (62). The (post-) feminism of today, she claims, needs to concern itself with 
“women who are powerful economically and politically as well as women who make things 
happen” (63).  
Showalter’s comments are notable because they mark the degree to which many 
contemporary feminists have abandoned the principles of social transformation and materialist 
analysis of the oppression and exploitation of women that situates it as an effect of social 
relations and have increasingly moved toward the notion that women’s material conditions of 
life are of their own making. Showalter’s implication is that women—for example so called 
“welfare mothers”—are not oppressed and exploited by structurally unequal economic and social 
relations but by cultural values of “powerlessness”—what has been chastised in right-wing blogs 
such as Free Republic and American RealPolitik as a “culture of victimhood.” In fact, 
Showalter’s very use of the term “welfare mother” is an index of the degree to which many 
contemporary feminists—in the name of a “re-newed” feminism—have moved to the political 
and economic project of the right. For instance, Showalter’s argument that it is “rich and 
powerful women” who will make all the difference for a 21st century feminism is identical to the 
strategies of the Bush administration and its tax laws, which give tax breaks to the wealthiest 
segments of the population. Like Showalter’s view that it is wealthy and powerful women that 
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will benefit the most exploited and oppressed segments of the female population, the defense of 
corporate welfare is, of course, that such tax breaks, by giving the most wealthy and powerful 
economic rewards, will “trickle down” in jobs, resources, health care provisions, etc. for working 
men and women who do not otherwise have access to wealth. What historical evidence has 
shown however, is that such “trickle down” measures have actually resulted in a massive transfer 
of wealth to the wealthiest segments of society—a transfer that has contributed to a situation in 
which, compared to 30 years ago, the income of the top 1% of the U.S. has grown from 133 
times the bottom 20% to 189 times the bottom fifth (“Ever Higher,” The Economist).  
But the argument for the removal of materialist analytics of feminism now is not only 
emerging in the more obvious instances of Felski and Showalter, it is also emerging in a very 
different and more subtle language by feminist cultural theorists who would, likely, find Felski 
and Showalter to be unlikely allies. Robyn Wiegman, in the introduction to her anthology 
Women’s Studies on Its Own, remarks that “those of us trained by the founding generation [of 
second-wave feminists] have the opportunity to carry something forward, and to do so from 
within the positions of power that feminism in the academy has made possible for us” (2). 
Women who are working in positions of power in the institutions of capitalism (in particular in 
academia), in Wiegman’s narrative, should now give just due to earlier feminist critiques of 
inequality between women and consider their own positions of power as a “positive political 
inheritance” for feminism (2). But, she stresses, it is now time to move beyond debates over 
inequality and power between women and “think about the field otherwise” (3). These debates, 
according to Wiegman and other contributors to Women’s Studies on Its Own, only lead to an 
“impasse,” “general malaise,” and “faulty and damaging divides”—in short, the “crisis” of 
feminism. According to Wiegman there is a “difference that resides in the present” which now 
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requires feminists to rethink feminism. In this regard, Wiegman remarks: “how non-identical are 
our motivating factors and how newly legible are the contexts and problems that generate this 
important rethinking of the interventionary project of the field” (44). This is another way of 
saying that we are in a “new era” in which the social inequalities and material contradictions for 
women have fundamentally changed. According to Wiegman, in this so called “new era” the 
“central problematic and most important animating feature of feminism as a knowledge 
formation” is the “impossibility of coherence” of feminism or of our conception of women 
(170).  
In each of these stories of “feminism now” there is assumed to be, as Wiegman remarks, 
a “difference that resides in the present” requiring a “rethinking” of feminism. Feminism has 
become an established institution in the culture of capitalism—from academia, to politics, 
business, international relations, non-governmental organizations, Hollywood, haute couture, 
and so on—and many women now occupy positions of power when they would not have a few 
generations ago. Feminism in the West, this story also presupposes, has become a progressively 
multicultural, transnational, polysexual, multilingual and “inclusive” movement with the 
criticisms of women of color, lesbian, bisexual and transgendered persons, and the “innovations” 
of poststructuralist and postmodern theories of differences. Feminism has, according to this 
narrative, gone from a movement that was once absorbed with a monolithic, white, straight, and 
logocentric conception of “Woman” to a “post-movement” that is a collection of diverse and 
contesting values, an incoherency of positions—what Felski calls a “hybrid polyglot” of 
inclusivity and what Wiegman calls the “impossibility of coherence.” Now that the “lessons” of 
the past few decades of feminism have been “absorbed,” there is something still standing in the 
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way of feminism causing it to come to an impasse or “crisis”—threatening its end or 
exhaustion—from which feminism now needs to be “freed.”  
What we find out is that, according to these narratives, what is standing in the way of so 
called “feminism” is, simply put, the residue of any serious project of social transformation of 
the material relations of capitalism to bring about economic and social equality for women. The 
critique of unequal material relations and the struggle to transform them are the “old” values of 
feminism that only stand in the way of feminism and women and, so the story goes, it is time to 
move on to a “new” and “renewed” feminism. While most contemporary feminists formally 
distance themselves from narratives of “origin” “progress” and “end,” they in fact assume an end 
to feminism by virtue of the success (progress) of some women within capitalism—that some 
women have become more wealthy, powerful, and successful by gaining a greater share of the 
distribution of social wealth. Although they don’t openly declare an end to feminism, and 
therefore keep talk about feminism alive, the dominant understanding of feminism’s “crisis”—
and the transition from the “old” to the “new”—is grounded on the assumption that feminism (or 
at least earlier generations of feminism) has achieved and accomplished what it set out to and 
that in the contemporary historical situation the “older” goals of social transformation for the 
emancipation of all women from exploitation and economic inequality cause conflict, division, 
crisis, and are no longer relevant today.  
This culturalist understanding of “crisis” takes as its starting point the notion that 
“crises,” “divides” and “impasses” in capitalism are the effects of a loss of “ethics,” “morality,” 
“unity,” etc., when they are actually the objective consequence of exploitation and capitalism’s 
inherent tendency towards a falling rate of profit. Feminism is divided and in “crisis” because of 
deepening inequality for the majority of women in transnational capitalism brought on by 
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exploitation in production while some class-fractions of women have moved into positions of 
class privilege independent of men. This means that it is not critique, debates and public 
contestation over “women” and “power” that cause feminism to come into “crisis” rather it is the 
material contradictions of class society that have made feminism a divided terrain. The unsaid of 
these arguments for ending “faulty and damaging divides” and “renewing values” is that the 
crises of capitalism (i.e., the crisis of profit-making)—and the way it is wreaking havoc in the 
lives of women today—are the result of women’s struggles against and in opposition to 
capitalism and not the result of exploitation and capitalism’s tendency towards a falling rate of 
profit. Again, this is a standard conservative analysis in a slightly updated language: capitalism is 
not the problem for women; capitalism and its “efficiencies” are the solution for women. 
Anything that gets in the way of this “efficiency,” this productivity is pathologized as the 
problem from which feminism needs to renew itself.  
In actuality, the crisis of feminism today—i.e., why feminists are now calling once again 
for “new values” to “renew feminism” against its impasses and “ends”—is not a “crisis of 
values” rather it is a class crisis; it is the effect of the economic crisis of wage-labor in 
capitalism. What bourgeois theorists call the “end” of feminism—or allude to as the “end” in 
their calls for “renewal” of feminism by removing from it materialist analytics—is simply a new 
dialectical turn: it is an ideological response to new changes in the organization of labor. 
Capitalism requires changes to its organization of labor not because of a crisis of values (culture) 
but a crisis of profit (economics). But it produces new values in order to conceal this.  For 
example, post-Fordism is seen as the “end” of Fordism not because exploitation has ended but 
because niche marketing is needed by capital in order to stave off declines in profit. 
“Postmodernity” was seen as the end of “modernity” because a fledgling transnational capital 
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needed to break up the “welfare state” no longer needed for securing exploitable labor power for 
profit. Today, “postmodernism” in general and postmodern feminism in particular are 
increasingly the subject of discussions of the “end” because capital no longer needs the “ethics of 
difference” institutionalized in “post” understandings of difference and now needs a “post-
difference” hegemony of “values” to ideologically unite isolated workers—whose lives have 
been fractured by the increasing concentration of wealth—together as consumers. In like manner, 
the spectre of the “end” has once again been raised in feminism because the class fraction that 
fought for the integration of (some) women into positions of wealth and power within capitalism 
has now achieved those goals and therefore sees the fulfillment of its own class ambitions as the 
“end” of the emancipation of all women from inequality and exploitation. What is called “end” 
in bourgeois feminism, in other words, is in material reality a new class development in 
feminism.  
The “end” of feminism is not an “end” (termination) to the project of freedom for women 
rather, it is an index of class struggle.  It has to do with the way in which private property 
relations and production for profit objectively—in their material relations—work to root out all 
forms of collectivity, reprivatize any gains made, and to convert all struggles for freedom from 
exploitation into social forces for maintaining profit. But these relations are not permanent; they 
are not the “end” of history and they are in tremendous instability and crisis.  The taking of more 
and more desperate measures by capital to stave off collapse and decline in profit is an effect and 
symptom of this instability and structural crisis.  These contradictions and their aftermath, 
moreover, are also gathering social forces for the transformation of class relations that can re-
direct feminism in new directions and enact a change in it.  The re-emergence of “class” in 
public discourses in general (see for example the New York Times series on “Class Matters”), 
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among cultural theorists (see, e.g., Žižek’s Revolution at the Gates) and in feminism in particular 
(even in bourgeois discourses such as Gibson-Graham)—are all symptoms of these gathering 
social forces.  To be clear, I am not pointing to these examples as models and directions for the 
way class should be analyzed in the contemporary.  Formally and theoretically the way class is 
understood in all of these examples is by and large still through the lens of ruling class ideology.  
Rather, what I am suggesting is that the re-emergence of “class” in public debate is an index of 
gathering material forces in opposition to capitalism.  It is an indication that even in the struggle 
for basic subsistence, workers—which includes the majority of women—are and will 
increasingly find themselves collectively in confrontation with the owners of capital and with 
class relations, which increasingly stand as obstacles in the way of their material conditions of 
life. The re-emergence of class and the decisive “cover up” of the class crisis in contemporary 
feminism is also an indication that working class women in particular are increasingly brought 
into conflict with capitalism just to get basic needs met and are being brought into conflict with 
class relations themselves.  It is on this material basis that question of “class” and its 
transformation continue to break through in public discourse in general and feminism in 
particular.   
This dissertation has been an examination of the way the canonical feminisms have 
continued to conceal class contradictions and the crisis of capital and have re-directed social 
forces for transformation toward ends that reform capitalism; and how this updates women for 
the contemporary workforces of capitalism in order to stave off declines in profit for the owners.  
In short, it has been an examination of the way that the dominant feminisms have acted on behalf 
of the self interests of a minority of women, and therefore the material interests of capital in 
theory and practice.  If feminism is to matter again and not become a force for maintaining profit 
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and ideologically covering over the crisis of capital and the condemnation of millions of people 
to living in the ruins of capitalism in crisis, it must break with liberal pieties about its “successes” 
and break from finding “agency” and “resistance” sites for women within the most reactionary 
and retrograde practices of “free trade” in capitalism.  It must instead situate the struggle for 
women’s freedom firmly on the material basis of transforming class relations and work to 
support the development of fledgling social forces in the struggle to transform class relations. 
One of the first steps for doing so is the development in feminism of an historical 
materialist analytics in the study of gender, social differences, culture and ideology under 
capitalism—what I have called a labor theory of gender—to contribute to developing the 
capacity of workers in general and women in particular to critique the ideology and culture of 
capitalism and to grasp the material contradictions confronting women in capitalism now. The 
task of feminist cultural theory is to produce materialist cultural critique that offers serious 
conceptual analysis of the ways in which the economic interests of the ruling class are converted 
into cultural values and used to obscure the material conditions under which working people, 
including the majority of women, are exploited. Feminist cultural critique today should 
demonstrate how culture under capitalism is reduced to ideology and deployed to obscure the 
violence and brutalities of transnational capital, and how it can be made to matter again in 
struggles for social transformation. While cultural theory—which is a knowledge practice and 
therefore part of the cultural relations in which human beings fight out material conflicts at the 
level of ideas–does not itself constitute material transformation for women, it is necessary in 
struggles for social transformation. 
Feminism should help produce a materialist analytics of gender that helps people grasp 
that what unites the “old” cultural arrangements for women with the “new” cultural 
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arrangements for women is the exploitation of labor under capitalism. One of the resources for 
building historical materialist critique is returning to the writings of classical Marxists and 
Marxist feminists such as Marx, Engels, Lenin, Alexandra Kollontai, and Clara Zetkin and 
reconsidering their critiques of women and the working day in relation to women and the crisis 
of capitalism now.  In these writings, what is foregrounded are not simply how gender has been 
“constructed” in culture and how to “resist” one mode of construction with another, but, more 
importantly, why: the fact that gender is an instrument of labor and a social relation of capital. 
Gender is used, for example, as a means to cheapen labor-power and make relative adjustments 
between the ratio of surplus labor to necessary labor within the working day.  It is also used as a 
means of produce a “surplus population” pulling different sectors of the waged workforce in and 
out of the workforce depending on what is profitable for capital.  The fact that gender is at root 
an instrument of labor is marked by the fact that as women have been pulled further into waged 
labor, they have also on a world scale fallen further into poverty.  Marx explained the class basis 
of this economic development for women in the following way: 
The value of labor-power was determined, not only by the labor-time necessary to 
maintain the individual adult laborer, but also by that necessary to maintain his 
family. By throwing every member of that family on to the labor market, spreads 
the value of the man’s labor-power [was spread] over his whole family.  It thus 
depreciates his labor-power.  To purchase the labor-power of a family of four 
workers may, perhaps, cost more than it formerly did to purchase the labor-power 
of one, but, in return, four days’ labor takes the place of one.  In order that the 
family may live, four people must now not only labor but expend surplus labor for 
the capitalist. (Marx et al, The Woman Question 28) 
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The further integration of many women from exclusively unpaid labor in the home to 
part-time or full time wage-labor has overall not led to the increase in women’s economic 
conditions of life in capitalism, but to the deterioration of women’s conditions of life and to 
catastrophic increases in the wealth gap between rich and poor. What Marx shows here is that 
this is owing to the hidden relation in the work day in which the worker works part of the day to 
reproduce the value equivalent to her own subsistence, and part of the day to produce surplus-
value for the capitalist.  What seems like a “free exchange” that would then lead to the increase 
of the conditions of life of workers around the world as women have been pulled further into the 
waged workforce, actually ends us as an instrument to increase exploitation and increase poverty 
for all workers.  
On the social surfaces of capitalism, women’s working day has dramatically transformed 
in terms of the kind of tasks and occupations that have monopolized their labor-time: not only 
have women been more thoroughly inculcated into paid wage-labor so that now they are 
spending a significant time in paid wage-labor outside of the home, in addition to the unpaid 
reproductive labor in the family, women have also been drawn into new occupations—
themselves the outgrowth of new divisions of labor—that require new skills and new technical 
knowledge of the contemporary workforce. The material conditions of women’s lives in 
capitalism have not, however, fundamentally transformed so that the project of feminism has 
been “finished.” On the contrary, the daily conditions of women’s lives in capitalism have been 
determined by production for profit. For all of the changes on the surface of the working day of 
capitalism, and women’s place in the technical division of labor, the structure of the working day 
in capitalism is still founded on the theft of surplus-labor.  It is still founded on the fact that the 
minority privately own and control the means of production and therefore command over the 
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surplus-labor of the majority who only own their labor to sell in order to survive; it is still 
structured by the fact that workers work part of the day to reproduce the value equivalent to their 
own means of subsistence and part of the day producing surplus-value for those who own the 
means of production.  
Even a brief comparison of the conditions of life in a socialist nation such as Cuba and an 
“advanced capitalist” nation such as the U.S. indicates the decisive difference that the relations 
of production (i.e.,  whether they are based on private ownership or public ownership of the 
means of production) have on all aspects of social life, including for women.  The degree to 
which production is privatized or socialized determines whether or not (and to what extent) 
needs for all are prioritized over the profit of some.  Cuba, a socialist nation under decades of 
stringent U.S. economic embargo in an attempt to force it to privatize its economy 
(euphemistically called “liberalizing”), nonetheless has put into place substantive socialized 
institutions which provide to all citizens healthcare, education, food, housing, childcare, paid 
medical and parental leave, economic security in retirement, social and medical support in old 
age, workers’ safety… Cuba has universal school enrollment and attendance.  Public education 
(paid for out of the workers fund at no additional cost to citizens) goes from preschool to a Ph.D.  
In the span of 10 years Cuba reduced illiteracy rates from 40% to zero. In education, UNESCO 
has ranked it first out of all Latin American countries in math and science, equally among men 
and women. Even a World Bank study (which, as an instrument of capital, works to dismantle all 
semblance of socialized economies including Cuba) has remarked that Cuba’s education system: 
“pedagogically consistent in all areas” of the island not favoring some more than others (qtd. in 
“What do Cubans Stand to Lose?”).  
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Cuba has universal health care in which all citizens are entitled to publicly paid 
healthcare at all levels. All citizens are entitled to paid medical leave when ill.  Parents are 
guaranteed paid parental leave and infant child care is publicly funded. Cuba’s public healthcare 
includes guaranteed medical care at all levels from routine and preventative checkups and 
emergency care, to full neo-natal and pregnancy care, publicly funded abortion, multiple forms 
of birth control and STD protection, to hospitalization and long term care.  All citizens suffering 
from any illness in Cuba, including people with severe illness such as AIDS get full medical care 
and guaranteed paid medical leave for missing work. As of February 2007, moreover, the 
National Assembly of Popular Power has voted to begin discussing legislation to make gender 
reassignment surgery part of its socialized health program, paid for out of the workers’ collective 
fund at no additional cost to individual workers who request it.  Sex education starts in 
elementary school and for over 20 years has included mandatory education of all young in 
understanding multiple sexualities (gay, lesbian, bisexual, heterosexual, transgendered 
sexualities) as a viable parts of human expression and social life. All citizens have the right to 
legally change their name and their gender identity (Wickham “When it Comes to Gay Rights”; 
“What do Cubans Stand to Lose?”).   
By contrast, in the United States: more than 45 million of its citizens go without health 
insurance.  People are “rewarded” for surviving cancer and living with HIV by being denied 
medical coverage for the rest of their lives putting them at risk for severe poverty. Public 
education is being dismantled and eroded leading to spiking illiteracy rates. According to a 1998 
U.S. government survey, The State of Literacy In America, 90 million adults are either 
functionally illiterate or nearly illiterate, having an 8th grade reading level or less (Roberts, 
“Illiteracy on the Rise”).  Social security only exists on paper. Thousands of people who “own” 
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their homes have done so on the basis of government inflated loans (designed to transfer wealth 
from workers in the U.S. to owners of banks). In other words, what is “owned” in no way 
represents actual wealth for the majority as many found out when they lost their Enron 
retirements to corporate CEOs and many more are finding out as the real value of their homes is 
sinking leaving them as indentured servants to banks for the remainder of their lives.  According 
to 2005 U.S. Census data “extreme poverty”—defined as a family of four who live off of less 
than $9,903—is at a three-decade high and grew 26% from 2000 to 16 million people (“In US, 
Record Numbers”).  In the U.S., under the dictatorship of private property, the frontier of “public 
health” and “sex education” in many regions consists of public policy makers still fumbling 
about over such “quandaries” as to whether or not one of the most archaic forms of birth control 
and one of the most primitive forms of protection from the transmission of STDs—the 
condom—should be publicly distributed to sexually active young people.  AIDS patients are 
routinely left to die in poverty and isolation because they either don’t have insurance or are 
denied coverage for treatment from the health insurance cartels (whose only purpose is to profit 
off of human suffering). Gay-marriage has been constitutionally banned. Publicly funded 
childcare is non-existent and single female heads of household are one of the fastest growing 
poverty groups. 
Many in the North Atlantic still attribute the gains made in matters of freedom for women 
and freedom of sexuality to the economic pressure on Cuba by the U.S. embargo to privatize its 
economy and to dismantle socialized production and collective welfare. For instance, 
transnational feminist Sujatha Fernandez in her article “With or Without Fidel” uses the 
“cultures of revolution” to eclipse the economics of revolution and, therefore, erases the material 
base of Cuba’s advances in matters of gender and sexuality, as well as the material basis of its 
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setbacks in these areas.  In her cultural analysis of contemporary Cuba, she attributes “the 
emergence of a critical layer of artists, intellectuals and activists in Cuban society” and “greater 
tolerance toward opposition groups” (by which she means, for example, feminists and gay rights 
activists) to the “political and economic liberalization of the early 1990s” (emphasis added).   
This, however, is a seriously misleading analysis that is also quite consistent with the 
analysis of Jo Ritzen, the former Vice President of Development for the World Bank, who argues 
that “liberalization” leads to “more freedom for people to pursue their desires for a higher 
standard of living.” “Liberalization” is merely a euphemism for the dismantling of public 
industry and the reprivatizing of social wealth concentrating it into fewer hands.  What is most 
telling here are related comments Ritzen makes along with the Former President of the World 
Bank, James Wolfensohn. To be clear from the outset, the World Bank, of course, has had no 
hand in Cuba’s advances because the World Bank is an instrument for capital to transfer wealth 
into fewer hands and, it observes the U.S. embargo.  Nonetheless, both Ritzen and Wolfensohn 
laud the advances made in Cuba in education, healthcare and other basic human institutions as 
“remarkable” and, Ritzen adds, “if Cuba shows that it [i.e., socialism] is possible, it shifts the 
burden of proof to those who say it’s not possible.” Yet, Ritzen also remarks that this “may not 
be easy to sustain in the long run”—but “not so much because the economy may collapse and be 
unable to support such a system.”  Rather, according to Ritzen, it is that “any transition after 
Castro passes from the scene would permit more freedom for people to pursue their desires for a 
higher standard of living” but the trade off would be the dismantling of the social institutions it 
has now (qtd. in “What do Cubans Stand to Lose…”).  As one writer put it in response to these 
comments, emphasizing the ruling class “irony” of the Ritzen’s remarks:  
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One way or another, socialism will pass from the scene and “freedom” will 
reign—a form of “freedom,” however, which is somehow incompatible with the 
very best health and education system in Latin America! You may wonder who 
will benefit from these “opportunities for more prosperity?” Apparently not those 
who would be using public health care and education—average working Cubans! 
Apparently with all of their newfound “prosperity,” they would no longer be able 
to afford these levels of services! Regrettable perhaps, but that would be the price 
of “progress” World-Bank-IMF-style in Cuba’s newly globalized economy. (qtd. 
in “What do Cubans Stand to Lose…”) 
“Liberalization”—i.e., privatization of social wealth and its concentration into the hands of 
owners—as we see in the case of the United States above contains a hidden cost to workers in 
general and historically especially to women in particular.  The deterioration of socialized 
resource hits women and other relatively marginalized workers first.  When social reproduction 
such as health care for aging or disabled persons is not provided publicly out of the social wealth 
produced by workers (because this wealth is being privately appropriated by the owners), it 
becomes the private responsibility of the family to pay for social reproduction out of their wages 
(or to labor more hours in the home).  In this sense workers are not only exploited in the 
workplace but wealth gets concentrated into fewer hands as they have to take on privately more 
and more of the economic responsibility for basic reproduction just to make it to work the next 
day (to be exploited again). To put this another way, the family and kinship are not simply 
affective units or relations of affinity and desire as, for example, Judith Butler argues in her 
discussions of “kinship.”  The family (whether or not it is legally bound or recognized) is an 
economic unit in capitalism. It is a private property relation and the main institution through 
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which capital forces workers to shoulder the cost of their own reproduction. Historically this has 
especially fallen to women who are used in capital as reserve labor, to pull in and out of the 
workforce in reproduction and production depending on what is most profitable. 
If one examines the material basis of the question in the relations of production one can 
begin to see that the pressure to so called “liberalize” (to privatize public industry and wealth) by 
the U.S. led to the deterioration of all Cuban’s conditions of life—for example, after the collapse 
of the Soviet Union, the embargo reduced the caloric intake of the Cubans by one third.  It is 
under these conditions, as well, that many women were economically compelled to take up sex 
work and other forms of sex tourism.  The deterioration of women’s conditions of life is a direct 
result of the onslaught of capital fronting as the U.S.’s “Democracy Pact” with Cuba (the main 
legislation that mandates economic embargo). In other words, the relative increase in the 
commodifation of gender and sexual relations is a direct consequence of a class war fronting as 
the United States. Any understanding from the material basis of the issues has to examine the 
way in which Cuba is the site of continued class contestation—between socialism and capitalism. 
It is in its class struggle against capitalism—and therefore against the cost of “liberalization” to 
its citizens and its deterioration of collective conditions of life—that Cuba has not only 
significantly let go of relics of class society (such as the ideology that homosexuality is simply a 
practice of decadence under capitalism) but struggled to put in place basic human institutions for 
women and queer workers that prioritize the need of all not the profit of some.  So much so that 
it excels over so called “advanced” societies in these areas (see Wickham, “When it Comes to 
Gay Rights, is Cuba Inching Ahead of the USA?”).  Far from disproving the relationship of 
gender and sexuality to class, labor, and production relations this provides indication of the way 
in which freedom of sexuality and freedom for women are dialectically related to freedom from 
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material exploitation and to the socialization (public ownership) in the relations of production. 
Moreover, it is historical evidence for the case for a feminism serious about social transformation 
and not simply engaged in what Lenin called “liberal pieties” about the inclusion of the 
difference of “women.”   
On a final note, for many feminists, my suggestion to return to Lenin in particular, will be 
difficult to consider because of the place that Lenin has had in particular in feminist debate. It is 
worth mentioning here that the return to Lenin in general and reconsidering his understanding of 
“theory” (in What is to Be Done?) and imperialism (in Imperialism—The Highest Stage of 
Capitalism) would actually shed a great deal of clarity on debates in contemporary theory today 
in a time of the dismantling of public critique and “wars without end.”  But in my comments 
here, I will focus on Lenin’s discussion of women and feminism. Lenin had a sharply critical 
relation to the bourgeois feminism of his time which he saw as placating and condescending 
toward the majority of women of the world by “appeasing them with reforms” and “liberal 
pieties” useful to some women and aimed at “lulling [working class women] into inaction and 
keeping them on leading strings” (Marx et al, The Woman Question 91). When he referred to 
“feminism” and critiqued and opposed it in his writing, it is this ruling class feminism that he 
was opposed to.  However, he did not take the ideological and practical limits of the bourgeois 
feminist movement to be a cause for the indifference of revolutionary movements to the “woman 
question” or to what he called “the burning needs, the shameful humiliation of women in 
bourgeois society” (91). 
For example, in an interview with German Marxist feminist, Clara Zetkin, Lenin started 
from the premise that the “woman question”—women’s unequal conditions; brutality and 
violence against women by employers, managers, men; political oppression, exploitation, 
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growing poverty; the whole nexus of contradictions and inequalities in the workplace, the family, 
sexual relations and all parts of social life confronting the majority of women—derives from “the 
inseparable connection between the social and human position of the woman, and private 
property in the means of production” (Marx et al, The Woman Question 89). Far from popular 
belief, which has charged that Marxism advocates for “waiting for the revolution” before the 
“woman question” needs to be addressed, Lenin argued quite the contrary: that the “woman 
question” should be considered not “women’s problem” but “part of the social question, of the 
workers’ problem” (90; emphasis added).  Women should, he argued, be regarded as full and 
equal members of the revolutionary party “with equal rights and duties” and should be 
understood not as “support” but as revolutionaries who are “equals in transforming the old 
economy and ideology” (90, 91).  Yet, he argued, at the same time, this does not mean dissolving 
the struggle against oppression and exploitation of women into the struggle for socialism and 
“closing our eyes” to the specific class contradictions confronting women in capitalism and 
deteriorating their conditions of life.  Nor did it mean turning a blind eye to the limits within the 
revolutionary party itself and softening critique of practices which maintained the exploitation of 
women. Lenin harshly critiqued tendencies within the revolutionary party itself that did not 
consider the development of a mass movement of working women to be “an important part of 
entire party activity” (92; emphasis added).  He, moreover, critiqued the “occasional recognition 
of the necessity and value of a powerful, clear-headed Communist women’s movement” in the 
party as a “platonic verbal recognition, not the constant care and obligation of [i.e., needed 
within] the party” (92).   
And most importantly, Lenin argued that doing away with the “right and dignity of a 
man” and developing a mass movement of working class women within the party, as without in 
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society at large, must be done on the basis of making clear material advances for women in 
matters of work, education, marriage, family, law, sexual relations, health, childcare, and so on a 
priority, recognizing that without doing so women would not be in the material position to act as 
full and equal participants in revolutionary struggle.  But, he added, this must be done without 
limiting the struggle for women to the limited reforms within bourgeois democracy in capitalism 
which redirect these struggles to solutions profitable for capital but exploitative for women (92-
93). 
Understood on this basis, feminism is not finished because freedom for women is not 
simply success in the conventional sense—that is, success in distribution for some women by 
becoming wealthy and powerful—but what Engels called “the reintroduction of the entire female 
sex into public industry” (74). This, however, is not merely a change of the “gender” division of 
labor—changing the distribution of exploited wealth to some women and relocating the majority 
of women from unpaid work in the family into new exploited wage-labor forces within 
capitalism—rather, it requires the abolition of private property relations through the 
transformation of the social relations of production. “Ending” feminism, in other words, requires 
transformation of the material relations of production in which women are exploited. Feminism 
does not “end,” namely, until class relations end. 
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